J. C. S. Files
Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes3
Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 900/24)
The Meeting had before them C. C. S. 900/2, the draft of the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister on the results of the Terminal Conference.
The President and The Prime Minister proceeded to examine the report paragraph by paragraph.
With respect to paragraph 4, Admiral Leahy explained that there was a divergence of opinion on two or three points in connection with the basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war and that the respective views of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff were set out in Appendix “A.”5
Appendix “A” paragraph 4
Admiral
Leahy said that the United States Chiefs
of Staff proposed to include the following:—
The British Chiefs of Staff on the other hand wished to combine these two paragraphs into the following:—
“Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept.”
The view of the United States Chiefs of Staff was that the basic commitment in this respect should be confined to the maintenance of war-making capacity in so far as it was connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, whereas the British Chiefs of Staff felt that it should be extended to include the occupation of Germany and Austria, as provided in the strategic concept.
The Prime Minister said that he supported the British Chiefs of Staff and suggested that the holding down of Germany and Austria [Page 341] was certainly a very vital matter. He felt therefore that this commitment should be embraced in this particular section of the basic undertakings.
He called attention to the extent to which the British industrial effort had been interwoven with that of the United States by reason of agreements reached earlier in the war and his own discussions with President Roosevelt at Quebec.6 As a result of these agreements many British units were equipped with U. S. equipment and no provision had been made to replace this equipment from British sources. To make such provision would take time and he hoped very much that the President would be able to make it possible for him to pass smoothly from this position of dependence on the United States to one in which British forces could be independent. He feared that a rigid interpretation of an undertaking to maintain the British war-making capacity only in so far as it was connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, would place him in great difficulties. He hoped also that the rules applied to the supply of lend-lease equipment would not be held to limit British sovereign rights over British equipment. He must be free to give British equipment, for example, to the Belgians, if His Majesty’s Government felt that this was desirable, and he hoped that this would not result in the drying up of equivalent supplies from the United States.
The President explained that he was handicapped in his approach to this matter by the latest renewal7 of the Lend-Lease Act.8 As Vice President, he had worked out its clauses together with Senator George, who had explained to the Congress that the Act was intended to be a weapon of war only. The President was now striving to give to the Act the broadest interpretation possible and he had no intention of causing the British any embarrassment in the matter of furnishing supplies to the British troops or the maintenance thereof. However, he must ask the Prime Minister to be patient as he wished to avoid any embarrassment with Congress over the interpretation of the Act and it might be necessary for him to ask for additional legislation in order to clear the matter up.
With respect to the basic undertaking under discussion, The President said that he thought that the holding down of Germany and Austria was quite definitely a part of war. After all, we were technically still at war with Germany and Austria.9
General Marshall said in view of the foregoing that the United [Page 342] States Chiefs of Staff accepted the paragraph proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff.
The President agreed.
Appendix “A” paragraph 4 c.
The Prime Minister said that he could not see very much difference between the two subparagraphs proposed. He suggested that the proposal of the United States Chiefs of Staff should be accepted.
The President agreed.
Appendix “A” first sentence of paragraph 6 c.
Admiral Leahy explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were anxious to add a clause at the end of the first sentence of this paragraph which would extend the combined liability to provide assistance not only to such of the forces of the liberated areas as could fulfill an active and effective role in the present war but also to such of those forces as were “required to maintain world order in the interests of the war effort.” In his view, therefore, the issue before the meeting was whether or not the United States was prepared to undertake a commitment to equip and supply forces of occupation other than American.
The Prime Minister asked what the British Chiefs of Staff had in mind in proposing this clause.
Field Marshal Brooke instanced the Belgian and Dutch forces and Admiral Cunningham suggested that such French divisions as were not going to the Far East would also fall into this category.
In the light of this explanation, The Prime Minister felt that the point had already been covered under paragraphs 4 a. and b. above, where it had already been agreed that occupational forces should be included in that particular basic undertaking.
It was agreed that the point would be adequately covered if the words “in accordance with the over-all strategic concept,” were added to the first sentence of paragraph 6 c, in lieu of the clause proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff.
Appendix “A” paragraph 7.
At this point Lord Leathers entered the meeting.
The Prime Minister said that he attached great importance to the United Kingdom import program and would not wish to see it lose its status in a document of this nature.
The President said that he was not quite clear how far he could accept liability for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom under existing United States law. Therefore, if this paragraph were intended to indicate any such liability his acceptance of it would have to be on the understanding that the necessary authority did exist.
[Page 343]Admiral King and General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff felt that the matter contained in this paragraph was out of place among the basic undertakings. General Marshall drew attention to paragraphs 20, 21, and 22 at the end of the report10 and pointed out that there was no more reason for including cargo shipping among the basic undertakings than the similar matters dealt with in these paragraphs. He suggested that this paragraph should also be placed at the end of the report under the heading “Miscellaneous.”
Lord Leathers pointed out that the inclusion of the United Kingdom import program had been implicit in the basic undertakings at previous conferences.11 In consonance with the changed situation, a major change was now being made in the presentation of the basic undertakings. As shipping requirements for military and civilian needs were closely interlocked, his view was that the United Kingdom import program would be more properly associated with military requirements if it were linked to them in the basic undertakings.
General Marshall said that he did not consider that any great change had been made in the presentation of the basic undertakings. He still felt that the matter would be more appropriately placed at the end of the report under the heading “Miscellaneous.”
The Prime Minister inquired whether this would result in the sweeping aside of the United Kingdom import program.
The President said the Prime Minister could take his word for it that the United Kingdom import program would not suffer from this change. He suggested that General Marshall’s proposal be accepted and the paragraph incorporated at the end of the report.
The Prime Minister said that on this undertaking he would certainly agree that the paragraph should be included at the end of the report.
Appendix “A” last sentence of paragraph 6 c.
Lord Leathers suggested that as it had now been agreed that paragraph 7 should be removed from the basic undertakings and placed at the end of the report, the last sentence of paragraph 6 c. would more properly be deleted. However, if it were held that this sentence merely referred to supplies and not to shipping, he thought it might remain.
The President and The Prime Minister agreed that the last sentence of paragraph 6 c. should stand.
[C. C. S. 900/2, paragraph 8 d.12]
The Prime Minister referred to paragraph 8 d. of the report in which it had been agreed that “In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a [Page 344] decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as would permit them to make timely rearrangements.” The Prime Minister said that he hoped it would not be thought the British Chiefs of Staff would wish to take advantage of this arrangement. What was good enough for the United States would certainly be good enough for the British.
Admiral King said that the United States Chiefs of Staff did not expect the British Chiefs of Staff to invoke this paragraph and General Marshall explained that it had been put in at his suggestion. After Olympic for example, if the British Chiefs of Staff did not agree with the action proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, they would, under this paragraph, be free to take such action as they thought fit. The paragraph was a result of an attempt on his part to cover both sides.
The Prime Minister thanked the United States Chiefs of Staff for their explanation and the spirit in which this provision had been made.
The President and The Prime Minister accepted and approved the report as amended in the above discussion and directed the [that] copies of the revised version be submitted to them for signature. (The report in its approved form was subsequently circulated as CCS. 900/3.13)
- The papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that “These Minutes were transcribed from notes taken by the United States Secretaries, Combined Chiefs of Staff.”↩
- The draft report to the President and the Prime Minister circulated as the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2 is identical with the text of the report as approved (document No. 1381, post) except as noted in the footnotes to that document and except that minor variations of punctuation, capitalization, and abbreviation have not been annotated.↩
- For the text of appendix A, see document No. 1266, post.↩
- The records of the Quebec Conferences are scheduled for subsequent publication in volumes in this series.↩
- Approved April 16, 1945; 59 Stat. 52.↩
- Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.↩
- The United States had not declared war on Austria, and the Department of State announced in 1946 that Austria was not regarded “as an ex-enemy state or a state at war with the United States during the second World War”. See Department of State Bulletin, vol. xv, p. 865.↩
- See document No. 1381, post, paragraphs 20–22.↩
- Cf. Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 827–831.↩
- See document No. 1381, post, paragraph 8 d.↩
- Document No. 1381, post. It appears that the revised report was not actually signed by Truman and Churchill.↩