Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988

25. Memorandum From John Douglass of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, March 18, 1985

SUBJECT

• Update of NSDD-91, Strategic Forces Modernization

On February 25, 1985 I sent you the proposed NSDD at Tab III² and requested approval for a final price out of the proposed changes for yourself and the SECDEF.

As a result of your approval, OSD (PA&E) has prepared the paper at Tab II.³ The PA&E cost analysis revealed that most of the changes in the new NSDD are already funded in the five–year defense program (FY 87–91). The three elements that require additional funding are:

Item	FY 87–91 Estimated Cost
(1) Maintaining Bomber force at 350	$250M
(2) R&D on Defense against Bombers and Cruise missiles	$2–5B
(3) Capability to attack mobile target	TBD

This additional investment is modest in comparison to the overall modernization program cost or the cost of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The completion of the cost analysis at Tab II completes the informal coordination process. The OSD staff and the three Services have all verbally concurred with the NSDD as amended. (The final version is slightly different from the version at Tab II, but contains no substantive changes). The only major issues which remain controversial are the lower limits on the Bomber force (PA&E does not like the 350 lower limit) and some general complaining about why we have NSDDs at all.⁴ I do not expect significant changes during the formal coordination of the NSDD.

On our staff, Bill Wright does not concur with the need to reissue an expanded strategic force modernization NSDD at this time. He believes that the President’s five point Strategic Modernization Program (TRIAD plus strategic defense and survivable command/communications) has gained a long-term credibility and a degree of success in addressing a decade of inattention to the health of our strategic force posture. To add new priority emphases on warning, mobile targeting, ABM penetration and air defense capabilities will unduly burden the basic program with expanded priority elements, dilute its effectiveness and draw funds from non-strategic force modernization.

I do not agree with Bill on this. I believe there is strong rationale for bringing the President’s Strategic Modernization Program up to date with developments within the real world of strategic modernization. In fact, the modest additions proposed to NSDD–91⁵ correct serious deficiencies in our evolving strategic posture. I find it professionally very difficult, for example, to accept a position of not addressing methods to take out mobile targets when we know the Soviets are moving to the SS–X–24 and SS–X–25, or to not study ways to defend against manned bombers and cruise missiles when we are proposing to spend so much on SDI.

Bob Linhard, Sven Kraemer, Mike Donley, Don Mahley, John Grimes, Joe Wheeler⁶ and Bob Wood concur.

Bill Wright does not concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memos at Tab I⁷ forwarding the NSDD to DOD and State for formal coordination (I will handcarry them due to the Special Access portions).⁸

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–090, NSDD 178. Top Secret; Special Access. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “Signed.” Douglass submitted the memorandum to Poindexter under a covering memorandum dated March 21, which began: “The only personnel in the complex cleared for the Annex for this NSDD are yourself and McFarlane. For this reason the attached original is the only copy which contains the Annex.” (Ibid.) Poindexter sent the memorandum to McFarlane under cover of an undated routing memorandum, writing: “Bud, This all seems very reasonable except the floor of 350 bombers. If that is for arms control negotiating position then OK. Otherwise I’m not certain it makes sense. JP” (Ibid.)
2. Attached but not printed are a February 25 memorandum from Douglass to McFarlane and a draft NSDD.
3. Not attached.
4. McFarlane underlined “some general complaining about why we have NSDDs at all,” and drew two short vertical lines in the right-hand margin beside this portion of the sentence.
5. See footnote 3, Document 19.
6. An unknown handwrote “N/A” below Wheeler’s name.
7. Not found attached.
8. McFarlane neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.