Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976

81. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 24, 1974, 8:10–9:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Huang Chen, Chief of the Liaison Office of the People’s Republic of China
• Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor
• Chi Ch’ao-chu, Interpreter
• Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
• Arthur W. Hummel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
• Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Department of State
• Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

• Tour d’Horizon Discussion on the Eve of the Secretary’s Departure for Europe and Moscow

Ambassador Huang: You are going tomorrow?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I depart tomorrow morning. Did my colleagues tell you what we have planned to cover in this session?

Mr. Lord: This is to preview the Soviet trip, our improving relations with the NATO allies—we haven’t discussed the specific topics.

Secretary Kissinger: Right. I just wanted to tell you that I can see no agreement of major significance coming from this trip [to the Soviet Union]. I don’t want to make you unhappy; we could make a special effort to speed up our negotiations.

Ambassador Huang: In saying that, I recall your discussions with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing in New York.²

Secretary Kissinger: No agreement is now foreseeable on strategic armaments—nothing major.

Ambassador Huang: Secretary Schlesinger also said that in general terms in a speech on the 18th.

Secretary Kissinger: There would be some negotiating progress, but I do not expect the conclusion of an agreement on this trip. If there will be some progress, it will be in limiting the number of missiles on which the Soviets can put MIRVs.

In addition, we will discuss limits on underground testing. That also is a totally unresolved issue. The issue concerns what level to put the threshold [of underground nuclear explosions]. As far as an underground quota is concerned—the number of tests—we will not accept a quota. We will not accept a threshold higher than 200 kilotons. The Soviets want a much higher threshold.

We will not write into an agreement any recommendation for universality [of limits on underground testing].

The third category concerns [ABMs]. You know that in the ABM agreement each side can build a second site in addition to the one they have already constructed. We will probably agree that both sides agree to forego the second site, although they can move [the ABM installation] from one site to the other.

We also may begin negotiations on environmental warfare through climatic changes.

As for the rest, all the other subjects we will discuss are technical in nature: energy, exchanges of information, research and development. There will be no agreement on U.S. financial investment in the Soviet Union. (To Winston Lord:) Send Ambassador Huang a list tomorrow. (To Ambassador Huang:) We will send you a list of each issue with a one paragraph explanation.³

So this is what we expect from the summit. The Soviets will press us on Middle Eastern problems. Our position is that the countries of the region should solve these problems themselves.

Ambassador Huang: I want to inform you of one thing. Mr. Ilichev, head of the Soviet delegation to the Sino-Soviet border negotiations, will return to Peking for discussions tomorrow. This gentleman has been away for almost a year. He is returning at his own initiative on the eve of President Nixon’s visit [to Moscow]. This is being done just for you to see. We do not expect anything to come of his return. We do not think he is bringing any new position.

Secretary Kissinger: Subtlety is not their strong point. When I was in Syria the Russians asked what time I would be leaving. The Syrians said I would depart at 12:00. The Soviets then announced their arrival for 1:00. My departure was then delayed, and they had to delay their departure several times.

Ambassador Huang: Another issue: As I mentioned to you at the Mayflower Hotel, we informed Senator Jackson that our invitation to him was at your suggestion…

Secretary Kissinger: Your invitation hasn’t changed his behavior toward me at all.

I understand that regarding the Middle East my colleagues have already briefed you. Our strategy is to continue on our present course. We may have to let the Geneva Conference reconvene, but not before September. We will continue to deal with each issue bilaterally, as we have done thus far.

I appreciate your kind invitation for my wife and I to join you for dinner. If you will permit it, I will set a date when I return, sometime in the second half of July. But I accept now with great pleasure. The only reason I don’t want to set a date now is that my schedule is not yet settled.

Ambassador Huang: I know you are very busy.

I was just joking with my colleagues, noting that at the time your press was attacking you, expressing their lack of confidence in you, I cast a vote for you [through my invitation].

Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate that. You know I have a rule that I never accept embassy invitations. This rule does not apply to Liaison Offices, however.

Ambassador Huang: Haven’t you accepted any embassy invitations?

Secretary Kissinger: Not invitations for receptions or dinners in my honor. However, I have gone several times to receptions if a Foreign Minister was in town. Once I accepted an invitation from the Indian Embassy, but that was in honor of Senator Mansfield.

Ambassador Huang: I also invited your wife, the dinner is in her honor as well. And you should bring your colleagues and friends.

Secretary Kissinger: She has many more friends than me—can you accommodate six hundred guests?

Ambassador Huang: At the reception at the Mayflower there were more than six hundred.

There is also one issue regarding Senator Mansfield. I should tell you about his visit to China, inasmuch as you expressed your concern about it at the Mayflower. At the Mayflower you said it would be best if he could go to China before the Congressional delegation. Subsequently Peking decided that Senator Mansfield’s visit should be postponed until after September—we have aleady informed him of this. We will welcome him a second time. This time he can stay longer, and travel to many more places. But during July and August we will be very busy. Senator Jackson will be going soon. We have given Senator Jackson priority as he has not been to China before. In addition, the Senator and Mrs. Mansfield dislike hot weather, and that is the hottest time of the year. So we suggest that he come after September.

In addition, I told him frankly that if he goes at the present time it is likely to give rise to speculation about Cambodian peace negotiations. He knows our position: we support the Cambodian people in continuing their struggle. We don’t want to involve ourselves in peace negotiations. The present time is not convenient, but he can come after September.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think the Cambodian situation will be solved by September?

Ambassador Huang: I cannot predict anything. You know our position.

Secretary Kissinger: At my press conference today I was asked when I would take another trip to China. I replied that I have been going about once a year. I would be glad to go for an exchange of views sometime in the second half of this year.

Ambassador Huang: We will welcome you.

Secretary Kissinger: For me it would be best if I could go after October 1.

Ambassador Huang: At your convenience. We will welcome you.

Secretary Kissinger: Should we propose a time? Or would you like to?

Ambassador Huang: At your convenience. Let us know a time that would be convenient to you.

Secretary Kissinger: When I am back from this current trip I will propose a time—perhaps in mid-October.

Ambassador Huang: There is time. When you come back just tell us your tentative dates and I will report them to Peking.

Secretary Kissinger: When you have considered our proposal regarding the UN Command in Korea, inform Mr. Hummel in my absence.⁴

Ambassador Huang: We haven’t received any word yet.

Secretary Kissinger: My theory is that if you have something to tell us, you will tell us. My colleagues are afraid you are too shy. They keep sending me notes to remind me to ask you about various issues.

Ambassador Huang: I’m sure I will tell you [when we have a reply].

Secretary Kissinger: When I’m back from Moscow, I will see you after the first few days. I will travel in Europe after leaving the Soviet Union, to reassure our allies and also to see the World Cup soccer matches. I will be back on July 9—I will be away almost as long as your absence. You are not going to leave Washington suddenly?

Ambassador Huang: I cannot tell. I just obey orders.

Secretary Kissinger: Our press speculates a good deal about a loss of interest on our part in our relations with China. This is not true. We maintain our interest in the policies which we have discussed with your leaders.

Ambassador Huang: You know our People’s Daily published your talk at the Mayflower Hotel.

Secretary Kissinger: I noticed that. I was very pleased.

Ambassador Huang: (to Tsien Ta-yung:) Is there anything else?

Mr. Tsien (in Chinese to Ambassador Huang:) He did very well in the Middle East.

Mr. Chi: The Ambassador just asked if we have any notes to hand to you, as your colleagues just did. Mr. Tsien said that in the Middle East you did very well in your shuttle diplomacy. You were warmly received. We approve of this.

The Ambassador mentioned to your colleagues before we came in a cartoon he had seen in the Washington Post around June 17th. It shows a pyramid with President Nixon and President Sadat running up one side, and Brezhnev going down the other side. There is an American flag at the top. There is only one problem with the cartoon. Dr. Kissinger should be just ahead of President Nixon.

Secretary Kissinger: We were encouraged by some good Chinese advice.

Ambassador Huang: You are very busy. You will be leaving about eight tomorrow morning?

Secretary Kissinger: I am sorry to have kept you waiting. I had to testify before a Congressional committee.

Ambassador Huang: Mrs. Kissinger is not well? Please give her my regards.

(The meeting then concluded.)

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State. All brackets are in the original. In a June 24 memorandum, Lord informed Kissinger, “I genuinely believe that a failure to touch base with the Chinese before you leave for Moscow could cause very serious damage to our relations with Peking.” Kissinger acceded to Lord’s request and agreed to this meeting with Huang. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 78.
3. Not found.
4. On June 13, Lord gave Han Xu a paper expressing U.S. willingness to consider abolition of the UN Command in Korea. In place of the UN structure, the United States suggested that the U.S. and ROK military commanders substitute for the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, that the two Koreas enter into a nonaggression pact, and that the People’s Republic of China and North Korea accept the continued presence of American forces in Korea as an interim measure. (Memorandum of conversation and attached proposal, June 13, 5:40–6:10 p.m.; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 1–August 8, 1974)