76. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Leonard Unger, United States Ambassador to the Republic of China
- Maj Gen Brent Scowcroft, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, NSC
- John A. Froebe, Jr., Staff Member, NSC
SUBJECT
- Reaction to Ambassador Unger’s Appointment, Future Moves in U.S.–PRC
- Relations, Present Problems with Taipei, ROC–Soviet Contacts, Use of Backchannel
Reaction to Ambassador Unger’s Appointment2
Ambassador Unger: I am going to a land neighboring that which I just came from—Thailand. I appreciate the opportunity to get from you whatever background and guidance that I haven’t gotten elsewhere.
General Scowcroft: You certainly must have most of it by now. I’m delighted to see you. Your name is famous.
Ambassador Unger: It has become famous in Taipei but I don’t take that as flattery. I know they are pleased. It gets them out of the jitters.
General Scowcroft: It has helped in that respect. But it has caused concern farther north.
Ambassador Unger: How seriously does Peking take that?
General Scowcroft: With slight disappointment at what they hoped would be a continuing decline in our relations with Taiwan.
Ambassador Unger: But they know that our relations with the ROC will continue. They might even see some benefit in having someone of prestige there, since he would be better able to work constructively with Taipei.
General Scowcroft: On the other hand, they probably face some domestic pressure on the Taiwan question. Although Chou and Mao can look at this question philosophically, they have problems with their own domestic constituencies.
[Page 473]Ambassador Unger: In the past month the PRC has seemed to be reconsidering their approach to the Taiwan issue.
General Scowcroft: The leadership in Peking can’t appear to be caving in to the imperialists. Dick Solomon, as our tea-leaf reader, might have something to add on this subject.
Mr. Solomon: Your appointment to Taipei probably has impacted on their current domestic leadership problem. The evidence is seen in the different way they handled this year the celebration of the February 28, 1947 uprising on Taiwan. Last year they talked of “peaceful” liberation. This year they pulled back somewhat from that formulation. We believe that there is a policy dispute in Peking over the Taiwan question. We also have other signals that they are concerned.
General Scowcroft: We have been walking this tightrope on our China policy. We are firm that we will maintain our commitment to the ROC. At the same time, we will continue to normalize relations with Peking.
Advance Notice to Ambassador Unger on New Moves with Peking
Ambassador Unger: In Taipei I would like to have maximum information for myself. I would also like to have maximum advance consultation on new moves toward Peking. I realize that this may not always be possible. But some advance consultation might help ameliorate any ROC tendencies to make trouble.
General Scowcroft: We will do whatever we can.
Ambassador Unger: I know how some Washington decisions are made, and that advance consultation is not always possible. But I believe that in this case whenever advance consultation is possible it would help keep the ROC from becoming embittered and would help keep them on the reservation.
General Scowcroft: We wll make every effort to keep you informed. We would also appreciate your evaluation of their reactions.
Ambassador Unger: Yes. I consider this a standard part of my task out there.
General Scowcroft: It would help us walk this narrow line.
Present Problems in U.S.–ROC Relations
Ambassador Unger: On the program side, there does not seem to be a great deal going on. Our big package was what Ambassador McConaughy put before the ROC just before he left.3 I feel that we will get through this all right.
[Page 474]General Scowcroft: I agree—but they will probably try to extract a price.
Ambassador Unger: But if the price is not too steep, I would hope that we could accommodate them wherever possible.
Similarly, on the economic side if the present well-being can be maintained, this will reduce the political complications. We have, for example, the recent Exim Bank delays in processing loans for the ROC.
General Scowcroft (to Mr. Froebe): Is the Exim Bank still holding up the loans?
Mr. Froebe: I will have to check on that, sir.
General Scowcroft: I believe Exim is beginning to move again on these loans.
Japan–PRC Civil Air Agreement
Mr. Solomon: Another current issue of interest to us is the Japan–PRC Air Agreement.
Ambassador Unger: I believe we should continue to stay out of that arrangement.
General Scowcroft (to Mr. Froebe): Where does this stand at the present time?
Mr. Froebe: The negotiations now seem to be in their last week or two. A Japanese team is now in Peking winding up the negotiations. Prime Minister Tanaka seems determined to push through to a quick conclusion, both because he wants to show continued progress in normalizing relations with Peking and because he wants to clear this away as a source of dispute within his own Liberal Democratic Party. His objectives also relate to the major political test he faces in next June’s Upper House elections.
General Scowcroft: How far apart are the two at this point?
Mr. Froebe: The crunch issues are still the two involving Japan’s air links with Taiwan—China Airlines’ continued use of that name and retention of ground facilities at Japan’s civil airfields. the PRC has shown some flexibility on these issues, but at this point the Tanaka Government seems disposed to move to close the gap on these issues and to confront the ROC with a fait accompli. the ROC at the same time is attempting to face the Tanaka Government down. According to a ticker report today, the ROC Foreign Minister issued a five-point statement taking a fairly hard line and threatening unspecified consequences, although his language was sufficiently ambiguous to allow Taipei a face-saving way out.
Mr. Solomon: Interestingly, Finance Minister Fukuda within the past few weeks has come out publicly in support of Tanaka’s approach on the Civil Air Agreement.
[Page 475]Mr. Froebe: I may not have seen that report, but almost all other reporting has indicated that Fukuda has scrupulously maintained a neutral position on this question, presumably in order not to alienate the support of some right-wing groups in the LDP such as the Seirankai.
Mr. Solomon: The airline name issue involved in this question is quite important in traditional Confucian terms—the rectification of names.
Giving GNP Better Idea of Future Course of U.S.–PRC Relations
Ambassador Unger: the GNP probably would like me to speak to the question of the future pace of our normalization of relations with Peking. I am hoping to talk with the Secretary before leaving and to get his guidance on this score.
General Scowcroft: Yes—although I’m not sure how specific he would be willing to be on this subject.
Ambassador Unger: I don’t believe that I have to break new ground. We are still hewing to the basic decision that we took at the time of the Shanghai Communiqué. As long as there are no sharp departures, I believe that my existence in Taipei will be reasonably calm.
General Scowcroft: We here will try to keep calm and quiet—although we can’t commit ourselves in advance.
Ambassador Unger: Are there any particular questions that I should watch?
General Scowcroft: I don’t believe so. I think you understand very well what we are about. We have a basic strategy, the tactics of which must be adapted according to the circumstances of the particular moment.
ROC–Soviet Contacts
Mr. Solomon: I would suggest that Soviet interest in Taiwan might be worth keeping an eye on. We have learned through a special channel which might not have come to your notice that the ROC Embassy Minister Counselor for Political Affairs recently expressed interest in contacting Federenko (former Soviet Ambassador to the UN) through an academic intermediary here. I don’t think this business was developed to the point of a meeting, however. In addition, the Soviets last December invited a ROC national who resides in the U.S. to Moscow, where they indicated their interest in further contacts with Taiwan.4 You may also be aware that the Soviets seem to be playing games in South Korea as well.
Ambassador Unger: I know that Ambassador McConaughy’s judgment is that it would be exceedingly unlikely that Premier Chiang [Page 476] Ching-kuo would authorize any probes with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I agree that we must watch this aspect of the question.
Use of Backchannel
Just on procedures—I have not asked for a meeting with the President because I didn’t feel this was necessary at this point.
General Scowcroft: At this point, probably not. But it might be useful in the future. You are enough of a celebrity to make this inadvisable at present.
Ambassador Unger: But if I feel it might be necessary in the future, I will come in to you to that effect.
General Scowcroft: When are you leaving?
Ambassador Unger: April 28. I will be in the Department through next week. Following that, I plan to spend a couple of days in San Francisco to see people at the Asia Foundation and other institutions there. In Hawaii I intend to see Admiral Gayler. That will get me to Taipei no later than May 4 or 5.
General Scowcroft: Any time that you want to use a backchannel feel free to do so. If for example you want to sound us out on something informally, this will enable you to do so without getting the wide circulation that usual State channels would involve.
Ambassador Unger: Very good. As you know, I have some experience with this from Bangkok.
General Scowcroft: You could also use a backchannel if you want to get to the Secretary on something that you did not want to have such wide distribution.
(After closing amenities, Ambassador Unger took his leave of General Scowcroft.)
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 524, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XII, Oct 25, 1973–. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House. According to an attached April 19 memorandum by Froebe, Scowcroft approved this memorandum of conversation.↩
- Leonard Unger was appointed Ambassador to the Republic of China on March 14 and presented his credentials on May 25.↩
- Unger is referring to the changes to the U.S. force levels on Taiwan; see Document 74.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 67.↩