In light of recent changes in the factors favoring such action, the
President has approved your recommendation that the United States
Government not go ahead with a Baltic Sea operation. For the same
reason, the President has also decided that you should not modify
regularly scheduled and normally configured Black Sea operations.
Attachment
Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)2
Washington,
October 10,
1970.
- SUBJECT
- Black Sea and Baltic Sea Operations
In response to your request,3 plans for an expanded presence in
the Black Sea and a show of naval force in the Baltic follow:
Black Sea Operations
I propose that we expand our Black Sea operations moderately by
sending two destroyers into the area on 23 October for a period of
six days and attempt to arrange a port visit to Constanta, Rumania,
during this cruise. Our previous operations have been of three or
four days duration (in 1964 a 9–day cruise was made with port visit
to a Turkish Black Sea port), and since 1968 have been limited to
areas south of Latitude 43–30N at the request of the State
Department. State now has agreed to raising this to Latitude 44N for
the next scheduled operation. As Constanta is at Latitude 44–15N,
the port visit in conjunction with the increased cruise duration
would comprise a step-up in our naval operations in the Black Sea.
In the event that the Constanta visit cannot be arranged, I propose
that the destroyers operate up to Latitude 44N. I would further
propose that during subsequent operations in the Black Sea we
consider expanding the area of operations further to the north and
increasing the number of destroyers to three or four. I believe it
may be useful to reserve the increase in number of ships as an [Page 21] option for further expansion
of our activities should we find that desirable. This approach would
also place less strain on Sixth Fleet resources which, as you know,
are already stretched tight.
The only coordination specifically required for this operation would
be compliance with the provisions of the Montreux Convention4 requiring
notification of the Turkish Government at least eight days prior to
transit of the Turkish Straits. Although the Montreux Convention
states that a prior notification time for non-Black Sea powers of
fifteen days is desirable, and this has been our past practice, I
would propose that for this occasion we consider reducing the
notification time to the Turkish Government to eight days to
exercise and keep available our legal right to do so.
The remaining provisions of the Montreux Convention concerning
maximum number of ships, tonnages, and gun calibers would not be
exceeded by this operation. Notification to the Turkish Government
of the expanded nature of the operations would be desirable to
forestall possible adverse reaction.
Baltic Sea Operations
The JCS proposal provides that a
cruiser from the Atlantic Fleet be joined by a missile escort ship
from the Sixth Fleet to conduct a cruise in the Baltic Sea during
the period 26–31 October, remaining in international waters at all
times except during port visits. Port visits could be made to any
one or a combination of the following: Helsinki, Kiel, Copenhagen,
and Oslo, in the priority listed. No coordination would be required
other than arranging for port visits. Advance notification to our
European allies would be advisable.
Pros and Cons of these concepts are as follows:
Pro:
- —Will demonstrate U.S.
willingness and determination to counter expanding Soviet
naval presence in the ocean areas of the world.
- —Would be essentially consistent with the existing pattern
of recurring U.S. operations
in the Black Sea.
- —The Rumanian port visit would make a strong signal to the
Soviets and other European Governments, yet would not depart
markedly from the pattern of U.S. actions in the recent past.
- —Would, against the background of the Presidential trips,
indicate our will to maintain a strong posture on NATO’s Southern Flank.
- —Will demonstrate U.S.
capability to conduct expanded naval operations on short
notice in widely dispersed sea areas in spite of continuing
heavy commitments in the Western Pacific and expanded
commitments in the eastern Mediterranean.
- —Would satisfy a request by the U.S. Ambassador to Finland for further U.S. Navy ship visits to
Finland. Visits in 1969–70 were highly successful.
- —Would demonstrate to U.S.
European Allies and the Soviets alike U.S. capability to conduct operations on short
notice in the NATO northern
flank area.
Con:
- —As this concept represents some increase in the scope of
U.S. Black Sea naval
operations, it could trigger Soviet harassing actions
against U.S. ships conducting
the operation.
- —It may precipitate a Soviet diplomatic reaction accusing
the U.S. of further
provocative actions exacerbating Middle East
tensions.
- —Concern over Soviet reaction may engender an adverse
reaction on the part of the Turkish Government.
- —Request for a visit to Constanta could put the Rumanian
Government in a difficult position, particularly in light of
the Prime Minister’s forthcoming trip to the U.S.
- —Montreux Convention requirements for 8 days advance
notification (15 days desirable in the case of non-Black Sea
powers) as well as the need to arrange the Constanta visit
with the Rumanian Government create pressing time
constraints for meeting the proposed October
schedule.
- —Visits to Baltic ports could trigger adverse Soviet
reaction and pressure on countries visited.
- —The operation in the Baltic and proposed visit to
Helsinki, just before the scheduled resumption of the SALT talks, could influence
Soviet actions and impinge on the talks.
- —This action would constitute an additional drawdown of
major units available for Caribbean contingency
operations.
- —These U.S. operations
could trigger increased Soviet naval activities in the
Caribbean. This could lend substance to Congressional
criticism of our concern over Soviet activities at
Cienfuegos as being a response to U.S. provocations.
- —These actions could weaken our case for protesting Soviet
activities in the Caribbean.
In conclusion, I understand the fundamental purpose of this operation
to be to demonstrate to the Soviets, our allies, and neutrals that
[Page 23] the U.S. will not remain passive in the face
of Soviet attempts to change the strategic situation in various
areas of the world. In particular, such initiatives on our part will
alert the Soviets that lack of restraint on their part in the
Caribbean and elsewhere may have counterproductive consequences.
There are, of course, some risks involved, as delineated above. On
balance, however, I think that such operations as these are a
considered step which will accomplish desired objectives at an
acceptable risk.
I recommend proceeding with the plan for the Black Sea operation as
indicated in this memorandum.
I recommend not going ahead with the Baltic
Sea operation at this time. Sudden and unscheduled deployments of
this nature cause personnel difficulties and hardships to
dependents, and are expensive with respect to immediate costs and to
the downstream effect on overhauls and maintenance requirements. I
believe that the potential benefits to be gained do not justify the
major disadvantages entailed in this case.
