390. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1
Washington, November 11, 1966, 7:40
p.m.
83625. For Ambassador from Secretary Freeman. Ref: State 83624.2 Please pass following message from me to Subramaniam:
Begin Text.
- 1.
- We are much disheartened here by the reports of another poor crop in India. Coming after last year’s near disastrous crop, it poses exceedingly difficult problems. We also face difficult supply, domestic food price and political problems here.
- 2.
- This Administration is deeply concerned over the failure of major food producing countries other than Canada to contribute foodgrains to India on a meaningful scale.
- 3.
- The new food aid legislation requires that we carefully assess agricultural performance in countries requesting food aid. At the direction of the President I am therefore sending immediately two of my top economists to India to undertake a quick on-the-spot assessment of the agricultural production effort, particularly the functioning of the Foodgrains Corporation, private investment in the production of fertilizer, the extent to which the 6.5 million tons target of additional foodgrain production is being achieved under the High-yielding Varieties Program, and other jointly agreed targets which help to determine whether the self-help requirement of our new legislation is met.
- 4.
- This team of economists, consisting of Martin Abel and Art Thompson, have worked with you and your staff previously. They will be joined by Assistant Secretary Dorothy Jacobson the week of November 20.
- 5.
- Since our short supply situation has resulted in increased Congressional concern, we would like to have several members of Congress from both houses and both parties join us in order to confirm to their elected colleagues India’s need and the seriousness of the effort being made. We realize this may be a delicate matter particularly at this time in your political timetable. But you can be sure that the President would not propose it unless he felt it essential here. We would welcome your suggestions as to how this could be kept as low key as possible as they join the team the week of November 20.3 End Text.
Rusk
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, SOC 10 INDIA. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Lester Brown in Agriculture; cleared by Farr (AID), Wriggins, and Secretary Freeman; and approved by Handley.↩
- Telegram 83624 to New Delhi, November 11, also for Bowles from Freeman, provided more background detail on the mission Freeman proposed to send to India to assess the food crisis. Freeman noted that the utmost urgency was attached to the assessment. (Ibid.)↩
- In a personal cable to Rusk, Bowles described this message as “extraordinarily insensitive” and complained that sending economists from Washington to assess the situation in India constituted an indictment of the Embassy’s competence and judgment, which he felt to be “unjustified and unacceptable.” Bowles argued that Freeman’s message suggested a totally unfounded relationship between a second poor crop year and Indian efforts in agriculture. He stated that he did not intend to deliver Freeman’s message to Subramaniam unless directed to do so by Rusk or the President. (Telegram 6998 from New Delhi, November 12; ibid., AID (US) 15 INDIA) Rusk responded in telegram 83747 to New Delhi, November 12, that the dispatch of a special mission to India was not intended as a vote of no-confidence in the Embassy’s judgment. Rusk noted that the larger objective of the experts from Agriculture and the later Congressional delegation was to enlist the cooperation of Subramaniam and the Indian Government in redoubled efforts to meet the crisis and to persuade them not to take for granted action by the United States. (Ibid.) In telegram 83787 to New Delhi, November 13, Rusk instructed Bowles to make an oral presentation to Subramaniam along the lines of Freeman’s message, but softened somewhat to take account of Indian sensibilities. (Ibid., SOC 10 INDIA)↩