Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, June 6, 1967, 2:53 a.m.

208420. Ref: Amman 4084.²

For Tel Aviv.

You should immediately impart information Amman’s 4080 to highest available level Israeli Government urging that Israel agree immediately take steps move toward cease fire with Jordan imparting information either through UNTSO or USG channel. You should urge strongly slackening of attacks against Jerusalem while efforts to bring about cease fire proceed. Information paras one and two Amman’s 4084 may be used. Immediate offer to accept Pope’s appeal that Jerusalem be considered open city by both sides might provide basis for mutual cease fire Jerusalem and environs. We urging this on Jordan.³

For Amman.

Inform King Hussein actions being taken and urge similar actions by Jordan. Our understanding has been Israel willing respond to restraint by Jordan. We have asked Israelis to slacken off and urge Jordan to take all possible steps make this possible. In strongest terms urge acceptance open city appeal. You should urge Hussein publicly rebut canard re aircraft carriers.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Exdis; Flash. Drafted by Davies; cleared in substance by Houghton, and approved for transmission by Robert D. Yoder of the Operations Center. Also sent Flash to Tel Aviv and repeated Flash to Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Kuwait, Jidda, and USUN.
2. Telegram 4080 from Amman, June 6, reported that King Hussein had advised the Embassy that unless the Israelis stopped their attack on Jordan immediately, Jordan and his regime would be finished. He said Jordan had no offensive capability and its army was in the process of destruction, and there was fighting in Jerusalem, endangering the Holy Places. He asked the U.S. Government to arrange an immediate cease-fire. (Ibid.) Telegram 4081 from Amman, June 6, reported that the King had not said “cease-fire” but rather “I must have immediate end to the violent attacks.” (Ibid.) Telegram 4084 from Amman, June 6, reported that the King could not afford to accept a unilateral cease-fire; he wanted a decrease in punitive destructive actions. He wanted to reduce his own military effort but could not do so unless the Israelis responded. (Ibid.)
3. Barbour reported in telegram 3953 from Tel Aviv, June 6, that he had passed to the highest level Israeli authorities the U.S. position as instructed in telegram 208420. (Ibid.)
4. At 7:40 a.m., Radio Cairo began broadcasting the charge that U.S. aircraft had participated in Israeli attacks and air defense and that King Hussein had given Nasser evidence of this. (Telegram 8565 from Cairo, June 6; ibid.) Telegram 4086 from Amman, June 6, reported that after hearing the broadcast, the Embassy had contacted King Hussein, who said he had made no such statement. The Embassy had been informed that the report was given to Nasser by the UAR Commander of the Jordanian Army, Lieutenant General Abdul Munim Riyadh. (Ibid.)