Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

102. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, May 28, 1961, 10 p.m.

Confe 68. For the Secretary from Harriman.

Should this conference be able to resolve immediate issue of effective cease-fire and move forward into problems of control and neutrality, future role of French in Laos will assume cardinal importance. Seems increasingly apparent large majority of conference envisages elimination of U.S. military presence and influence in Laos and re-institution of French monopoly in this field as established by 1954 Geneva Accords. Communists have been equivocal on this point but there good chance they will use tactic of offering this “concession” in order to carry conference with them on other points they deem more important. Prospects for conference deciding future training and guidance Lao forces to be made responsibility of Asian or European neutral or neutrals seem very remote at this juncture.

There is, therefore, strong possibility that France may emerge from this conference in the position, internationally recognized, of primary agent of the free world in Laos.¹ I am sure all of us view this with mixed feelings. Performance of French, during period of fourth French Republic, was totally inadequate. French never made full use of military facilities accorded them under 1954 Geneva Accords. Efforts made in training Lao forces fell far short of the mark. Legend arose that French were using Laos as dumping ground for inferior military and civilian officials.

From what we gather here, French military are far from enthusiastic at prospect of taking on this heavy and very costly responsibility in an area which to the French is now geographically remote.

On other hand we gather that Quai d’Orsay are strongly of belief that if international community indicates desire for re-establishment of substantial French presence in Laos, France must accept this challenge. De Gaulle reportedly supports this view. This of course fits in with his concept of global interests of France which elevate it to status beyond other European countries and into full membership of a tripartite hierarchy of the West.

Problem therefore seems to be one of assuring, from the outset, that French will return to Laos with sufficient resources, initiative, and determination to do their utmost keep Laos truly neutral. Our influence over French in this regard is probably greater now than it will be in future. Once, as a result of international agreement, we are militarily out of Laos and French are in, they will doubtless feel much less inclined to accept our advice.

Assurance we seek from French is a major one and open-ended as to time and magnitude of commitment. It would seem that best way to go about getting it is to engage personal honor of De Gaulle and seek from him personal undertaking that fifth French Republic will not shirk responsibilities it accepts in name of West. De Gaulle might well respond to such a proposition if put to him directly by the President. You may wish to suggest to the President the possibility of him making an approach along these lines to De Gaulle in the course of the Paris visit.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–2861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris and Vientiane.
1. In telegram 5239 from Paris, the Embassy concurred with Harriman’s analysis in this telegram and suggested that France probably was now prepared to assume both a training and equipping role for a much reduced in size and lightly armed FAL. The Embassy seconded the idea of the President raising the issue with President de Gaulle during his trip to Paris, May 31–June 2. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–3061)
2. In telegram 5253 to Paris for the President, repeated to Vientiane as telegram 1317, May 30, Rusk endorsed the idea of Kennedy asking De Gaulle what France would be prepared to do in Laos and pledging U.S. support for a strengthened French role there. (Ibid.)