201. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara0
Dear Bob: I am most anxious to draw your personal attention to a problem which all of us here regard as of great and urgent importance to our relations with Korea. The Korean Government has intermittently raised the subject of a status of forces agreement since 1955, and in recent times this has developed into a major popular issue with increasingly serious implications.1 As things stand now, this issue essentially involves two basic questions: The Korean Government apparently wants us to pay some compensation to private Korean owners of facilities used by our forces in Korea; and it desired to have at least partial, and presumably nominal, criminal jurisdiction over our troops there. Korea is the only nation where we have exclusive jurisdiction over our forces, except for Taiwan, where this subject is under negotiation.
We have always held, and, I believe, should continue to insist that the Korean Government take full responsibility for any property claims involving our forces in Korea. I am convinced, however, that the time has come when we should proceed to negotiate promptly a full status of forces agreement with Korea, including some politically realistic formula on criminal jurisdiction which would in actual practice preserve for us a maximum degree of jurisdiction over our forces in Korea. In my view the foregoing conclusion remains valid despite the fact that a technical state of suspended hostilities still exists in Korea.
The Koreans are well aware that we have status of forces agreements with many other countries around the world, and believe that their sovereign status should be treated with equal consideration. They are especially sensitive over the fact that we have concluded a status of forces agreement with Japan including an agreement on criminal jurisdiction [Page 423] comparable with those signed with our European allies.2 Inevitably, many Koreans regard our present position as one of discrimination against a country which has shed more blood than any other since World War II in the common cause of resisting Communist aggression.
In view of the fact that in Korean eyes the conclusion of a status of forces agreement has now come to be a real symbol of Korean sovereignty and legitimate nationalism, I am convinced that in the long run it will best serve our national interests to reach such an agreement with the present ROK Government. This Government is moderate, conservative, and striving to meet the natural and justifiable expectations of its people. It is currently under heavy pressure in connection with the series of vital but unpopular economic reforms which we have insisted are necessary for further progress. It would be a disservice to our interests to attempt to place such a Government in the impossible position of resisting strong popular opinion on the status of forces issue and at the same time to expose our own Government to increasing criticism by broad and important segments of the Korean public, as well as a large and vocal parliamentary opposition. I think there is good reason to hope that, if we move now in a resolute and constructive way, we will be able to arrive at an agreement more advantageous to us than any we could reach later with any succeeding Korean administration, when nationalist sentiments would surely have become stronger in Korea.
I hope that you will agree that we should commence negotiations with the Republic of Korea as soon as possible on a full status of forces agreement, and look forward to an occasion to talk with you further about this matter in the very near future.3
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Korea 013. Confidential.↩
- In telegrams 1063, 1087, and 1088 from Seoul, February 22, 28, and 28, the Embassy in Korea reported growing public pressure for a status of forces agreement and recommended high-level exploratory talks with the ROK as a prelude to opening negotiations on the issue. In telegram 1087 Ambassador McConaughy reported that CINCUNC General Magruder thought that the Embassy was exaggerating the force of the public pressure for a status of forces agreement, but agreed with the Embassy’s recommendation about the need for preliminary discussion. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B7/2-2261 and 611.95B7/2-2861)↩
- At a State-JCS meeting on March 17, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lemnitzer expressed strong opposition to a status of forces agreement that would include provisions on criminal jurisdiction. Lemnitzer stated that a “suspended state of war” existed in Korea and that the American people would rather see U.S. forces withdrawn from Korea than agree to turning U.S. servicemen over to Korean courts. (Ibid., State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328)↩
- Responding for the Department of Defense in a March 10 letter to Rusk, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric agreed that, “to the extent possible, Korea should be accorded the same treatment as our other allies.” The problem the Department of Defense forsaw was the Korean desire for criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel in Korean courts. The Department of Defense was engaged in a study of whether it was possible to work out a satisfactory agreement on that issue with the ROK. Until that study was concluded, the Department of Defense could not agree to negotiations. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Korea 013)↩