Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus⁰

Washington, April 4, 1963, 7:49 p.m.

371. Ref: Ankara’s 1170 and 1184 to Dept; Nicosia’s 438, 441, 443, 444, 446, 447 and Toaid 313 to Dept.¹

We agree that recent Makarios statements unhelpful in both content and timing. In absence clear-cut evidence his immediate motives, it not possible to tell whether he reacting to Erkin’s talks in Rome, attempting placate die-hard pro-enosis elements among backers, or trying to exacerbate situation to point that Cyprus question is in effect reopened, presumably to his advantage.

We conclude Makarios’ long-term objective is not union with Greece but rather elimination or neutralization those provisions London–Zurich agreements and constitution which in effect circumscribe sovereignty of Republic. Among these would be most of special guarantees for Turkish community and intervention rights of Guarantor Powers. We assume that his recent statements and in fact all his actions relating to communal matters are designed to carry out this ultimate objective while maintaining his position and strength on island.

Makarios appears prepared make move toward objective whenever he feels attitudes of interested powers will let him get by with it. In this frame of mind, he may interpret US and UK counsels of restraint and moderation as evidence of reluctance to reopen issues, become further involved, or see problem escalate. Furthermore, he cannot fail be aware of US and UK concern over current tensions between NATO allies Greece and Turkey, of which Cyprus problem one part. Consequently, he may feel he can with reasonable impunity take hard or defiant line with island Turks and Ankara, and in final analysis rely on UK and US keep GOT off his neck for sake of peace and quiet.

He also appears confident he can always refer issue to UN and receive wide support uncommitted and neutralist nations in his struggle against outside (i.e., Turkish) intervention (Nicosia’s 447). In our judgment, Makarios’ ability to utilize UN instrumentalities and to mobilize support in UN would be decisively influenced by circumstances in which possible Turkish intervention might arise. In general, without making any final judgment re merits of case, we feel there would probably be a good deal of sympathy and support for Makarios in UN where members would have reserved attitude re intervention of other powers, regardless of provisions of Treaty of Guarantee. Makarios may believe, therefore, that referral to UN, or (more probably) threat to do so, would impel UK and US exert pressure on GOT to be “reasonable”, i.e., to give him what he wants. From US viewpoint, he is mistaken in this belief, but perhaps present sensitive period not appropriate time to make point.

(We believe Turkish attempt at direct military intervention most unlikely even though in last analysis intervention not involving recourse to force would not be meaningful. Move against Cyprus by Turkish military might mean clash with Greece and might also bring down great pressure by interested outside powers. This does not mean, of course, that GOT will not continue hint darkly at possibility such intervention when it considers such a tactic useful.)

With regard to immediate problem rising from recent Makarios statements, we consider Embassy Ankara and Embassy Nicosia have fielded question in best possible manner in contacts with Turks.

Embassy Nicosia: Ambassador, at his discretion, should utilize appropriate opportunity make following points to Makarios:

1. We having great difficulty finding anything in his recent statements which makes contribution toward solution problem. On contrary, coming on eve Constitutional Court decision, statements appear even to sympathetic outside observer as deliberately provocative.

2. We forced reaffirm our view re continuing validity London–Zurich agreements and constitution, although we realize that all constitutions subject to gradual changes in interpretation based on experience and general consensual acceptance by citizenry.

3. We assume, if Constitutional Court rules against both Greek and Turkish recourses and Government assumes responsibility municipalities administration, Government will attempt forestall critical Turkish reaction by making it publicly clear this is interim measure to provide local authority while efforts find permanent solution continue.

4. We note with great concern that communal differences have reached point where program as sensible as development bank jeopardized. Not only have Greek and Turk differences succeeded in postponing availability US and German aid funds earmarked for bank but actions will discourage inflow of badly needed foreign investment as well as return of Cypriot money from abroad.

5. We believe a future Cyprus in which two large communities remain at daggers drawn, immobilizing all initiatives for progress, spells nothing but hardship and sorrow for all Cypriots. A Cyprus in which one-fifth of the population is effectively denied a voice in determining national destinies would be equally tragic. It is task of true statesmanship to avoid these dead ends and build a true Cypriot nation. As Makarios must be aware from his sojourn in US, we Americans know from bitter experience of century ago that all must be willing compromise cherished objectives within flexible framework of constitutional democracy or national tragedy is inevitable.²

Embassy Ankara: Ambassador may wish follow up subject with Erkin by pointing out when suitable occasion arises that US regards London–Zurich settlement (including Cyprus constitution with, of course, its provisions for amendment and change) as still valid. At your discretion, GOT may also be informed of general nature of our approach to Makarios, including content of first and second points outlined above. Has Erkin considered a letter to Makarios along lines his “formula”, as follow up to Makarios’ visit to Ankara?³

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by King; cleared by GTI, UNP, NEA, L, and BNA; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Ankara and repeated to Athens, London, and USUN.
1. Telegram 1170 is printed as Document 277. Telegram 1184 from Ankara, April 2, reported on Turkish reaction to Makarios’ March 31 speech commemorating the 1954 uprising against British colonial rule and suggesting his commitment to eventual enosis. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp) In telegram 438 from Nicosia, March 28, the Embassy reported that Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin’s talks in Rome apparently were a critical factor in Makarios’ decision to take a tougher stance on both the municipalities issue and possible Turkish intervention. (Ibid.) Telegrams 441 and 443 are not printed. (Both ibid.) In telegram 444, March 29, Wilkins reported on his discussions with Turkish Cypriot leaders. (Ibid.) Telegram 446, April 1, transmitted the text of Makarios’ March 31 statement commemorating the 1954 uprising. (Ibid., POL 17–4 Cyp) In telegram 447, April 2, Wilkins reported on his discussions with the British High Commissioner in Cyprus. (Ibid., POL 18 Cyp) Telegram Toaid 313 has not been found.
2. In telegram 454 from Nicosia, April 5, Wilkins reported that he had met with Makarios and delivered the demarche outlined here. Makarios downplayed the differences between the two communities and underlined his plans to seek a negotiated solution. (Ibid.) On April 25, the Cypriot Constitutional Court held that both the Greek Cypriot Municipalities Boards and the Turkish Cypriot Municipal Councils were unconstitutional. On April 26, President Makarios stated that the Court’s decision required immediate action in order to continue the provision of basic services. He announced that he would meet with Vice President Kutchuk on April 27 to seek a solution that would lead to the restoration of former unity and cooperation.
3. In telegram 1227 from Ankara, April 9, the Embassy reported that Erkin, while expressing gratitude for U.S. efforts, was suspicious about Makarios’ objectives. (Ibid.)