194. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State0

246. Reference: Embtel 244.1 Helsinki has been full today and yesterday of rumor and conjecture regarding circumstance surrounding announcement Parliamentary elections. Some persons have contended that main initial purpose Soviet action initiated by October 30 note was to insure re-election Kekkonen and taken for granted that arrangements had been made by him with Soviets before he announced elections. This belief found some support attitude local communist leaders and press who immediately express approval elections, probably for primarily tactical effect locally.

Other persons have thought that elections were clever move that would gain time for Finnish Government and have felt that Soviets had enough faith in Kekkonen to approve his action or at least let him appear get away with move.

Wishful thinking has prevented most from facing possibility that Finland might be on way to satellite status though some have expressed such fears.

Until Wuori arrives and reports, no one here can know for sure precisely what Soviets intend or how far and how fast they mean to go. I believe, however, it unlikely that Kekkonen had advance agreement from Soviets for Parliamentary elections. Soviets are notoriously and from their point view rightly distrustful such unpredictable things as free and uncontrolled elections.

Intention behind Soviet action may have included some small element of desire to help re-election Kekkonen, though that difficult believe in view circumstance his re-election considered almost certain. Main intention must be draw Finland closer into Soviet orbit. It hard to see how this process can be begun without being carried on at accelerating speed. Finnish efforts slow or stop process by holding Parliamentary elections may have been futile and to Soviets provocatory action that may be all more irritating to them because it undertaken by person hitherto regarded as inclined take “realistic and understanding view” their attitudes and wishes.

Since Soviet note became known Finnish public on morning October 31 sentiment has swung from deepest depression and conviction [Page 414] that “1939 is here again” to hopes that somehow Kekkonen would save the situation. Reports that Soviets dissatisfied his action and attitudes will send Finnish morale plummeting to bottom. With borders undefensible by comparison with 1939 and an inadequate military establishment, all Finns convinced there can be no question of repetition of 1939 resistance. All Finns subscribe to Paasikivi line. If this proves insufficient satisfy Soviets, there is in reality nothing for the Finns to do except realize that degree of independence, if any, that Finland will be able maintain depends entirely on the Russians and not on anything they or the most skillful of Finnish leaders can do.

Gufler
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11–1661. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Oslo, Stockholm, Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow.
  2. Telegram 244, November 16, reported that the situation with regard to Germany and Berlin seemed to be worse. (Ibid.)