Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

68. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SET/MC/24

Bonn, June 22, 1962, 11:30 a.m.

SECRETARY’S EUROPEAN TRIP

(June 18–28, 1962)

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Dowling
  • Mr. Bohlen
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Mr. Manning
  • Mr. Morris
  • Mr. Hillenbrand
• Germany
  • Chancellor Adenauer
  • Foreign Minister Schroeder
  • Dr. von Eckhardt
  • Dr. Carstens
  • Dr. Krapf
  • Dr. Von Hase
  • Dr. von Braun
  • Dr. Osterheld
  • Dr. Reinkemeyer

SUBJECT

• Berlin

After the private meeting had terminated between the Chancellor and the Secretary,¹ with only an interpreter present, the discussion resumed in a larger group including Foreign Minister Schroeder and other senior officials. The Chancellor announced he had had a good and frank talk with the Secretary. Mutual trust had been increased “if this were possible”. The Chancellor repeated, “if this were possible” (wenn dies moeglich waere). The Secretary expressed his appreciation for the Chancellor’s words and indicated the primary purpose of his visit to Europe was to consult with the Federal Republic and to make sure that no accidental misunderstandings persisted which could be eliminated by discussions. He noted that this was his first visit to Bonn.

Schroeder said he also wanted to express his gratitude that the promise which the Secretary had made at Athens about the visit had been carried out. While this had started out as “a little promise”, the way the trip had developed it had turned into a considerable commitment of time and energy by the Secretary. He was therefore all the more grateful that the Bonn visit had remained possible.

The Secretary then reviewed his recent talks with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. He said it was not always pleasant to talk with the Soviets, but this was always easier when the Western Powers are united and going together on the policies involved. He was grateful for the basic unity which existed. He had initiated these additional talks with Dobrynin because his Geneva talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko had arrived at a point of no agreement on the most elementary Western vital interest: our troop presence in West Berlin. Other subjects had been discussed with the Soviets but there had been no real exploration of these. We kept coming back to the fact that the Soviets were trying to eliminate or cripple the Western forces in Berlin. At one stage in Geneva the Soviets did not seem to be completely adamant on this point. They hinted that they might abandon their position. The Secretary had now seen Dobrynin four times; the talk on June 18 had been at the Soviet Ambassador’s initiative. Dobrynin, in effect, admitted that he had nothing new to say, and the Secretary said he had nothing new to add. Dobrynin complained that there were no new ideas from us, but that the Soviets keep coming up with new ideas, for example, the various formulae for replacing the Western troop presence in Berlin. The Secretary noted that he had pointed out to Dobrynin that it was not very helpful to produce a number of variations to accomplish what was not acceptable to us. This did not amount to putting forward new ideas. However, the Secretary added, we did not have the impression that the Soviets now wanted a military crisis or a diplomatic impasse, although we could not be sure of this. We seemed to be getting to the point where there was not much more to say unless we get into details which are attractive to both sides and which might help to ease tensions while the basic disagreements continue, for example, easing of border incidents in Berlin by a meeting of the commandants, procedures so that families and friends could meet with one another, et cetera. There is no reason to think that any agreement on the broad issues of Berlin and Germany is likely in the near future.

The Secretary noted that, in his talks in Paris, he had found the French much more relaxed on Berlin than previously. The differences with the French were proving much narrower than had been feared. He indicated that he had to admit to President De Gaulle that the French view on the impossibility of finding a satisfactory basis for negotiations had so far proved correct. In return, De Gaulle admitted that the Secretary’s talks had not caused the disturbance and crisis within the Alliance which he had feared.

There seemed to be general agreement on policy with the French although not on tactics. The French had not said they would join the activities of the Washington Ambassadorial Group for consultation on our talks with the Soviets, but they are, of course, fully participating in Berlin contingency planning.

Reporting on his trip to Berlin, the Secretary said he had been gratified by the good morale and the steadiness of the Berliners. He noted that the German NATO representative, Von Walther, during the recent NAC meeting, and Mayor Brandt during their discussions in Berlin, had expressed concern about the possibility of a build-up in pressures in East Germany which might lead to renewed pressures on Berlin itself. If the pressures in the GDR could be relieved somehow, this might reduce the crisis in the Berlin area.

Schroeder said that his impression of the Dobrynin talks was that they had gone on in a good atmosphere without bringing any real change. The Soviet concentration in recent talks on the point of the Western troop presence and their general stress on Berlin proper rather than on broader subjects might be a Soviet tactic so they could say this was the really important issue which had to be solved first when the East Germans applied pressure on them to move ahead with signature of the peace treaty. He referred to a recent talk which he had with Ambassador Smirnov in which the latter had placed stress on Berlin, and also to a more recent talk with FDP leader Mende and Smirnov which, if correctly reported, indicated continued Soviet interest in some form of access authority. This to him seemed to confirm the limited nature of the present Soviet interest in concluding a peace treaty. It seemed clear that the Soviets would have little purpose in signing such a treaty without prior agreement on a modus vivendi with the Western Powers. If they did go ahead and sign such a treaty, then they would presumably have to consider inserting some separate Berlin clause in the peace treaty. He thought therefore there was a possibility the Soviets might eventually accept the unavoidability of continued Allied presence in West Berlin; hence their interest in possible access arrangements. This spoke for the probability of drawn-out discussions. As to the situation in the GDR, Schroeder expressed the view that despite the increasing unrest which reflected stronger refugee pressure, he believed it unlikely that the regime would lose control in view of the overwhelming Soviet military presence in the GDR. He outlined West German thinking on the East German request for credits. The basic considerations were to do as much as possible to preserve the economic ties of the GDR with the Federal Republic and favorably to affect Berlin access. The population of the GDR, to the extent this could be determined, would argue against extension of credits as further strengthening the regime preferring to suffer rather than to see this happen. However, this would not be an obstacle to a positive decision if other factors were in favor of it. Extension of long-term credits also had the disadvantage of seeming to accept the long-term existence of the GDR and would also create an incentive, after the period of initial deliveries was over and the period of repayment of credits starting, for the GDR to upset any arrangements. The Federal Republic had the problem under active consideration. It was clear that the GDR was very greatly interested in these credits. The economic interest of the Federal Republic was minimal, and the political interest was not yet precisely defined.

The Secretary said we appreciated Bonn’s assurance that we would be consulted before a final answer was given to the East Germans. While such credits would be important politically, it was not easy to know in what direction they would go. Khrushchev had used the existence of talks between Moscow and Washington as a pretext and possible reason for the postponement of the deadline on the peace treaty and the ending of further harassments. Whether an additional trade relationship between the Federal Republic and the East Germans would serve as a further pretext to defer signing of the peace treaty was a relevant question. Moreover, if these credits were as important to the GDR as they seemed to be against the background of economic difficulties in the Bloc, then an extension of credits might create a value which the East Germans would feel it important to protect and thus give them a stake in calm relations. He was inclined to discount somewhat the argument that credits would support a regime from those who prefer hardship to loss of freedom, since no amount of hardship was likely to overthrow the regime unless the West were prepared to fight a war. In summarizing he said we would be generally sympathetic to the idea of credits if the Federal Republic thought they were a good idea, if they did not involve highly disadvantageous trade features, and if they did maintain pressure on the other side to keep the situation peaceful because of its interest in continuing deliveries. Schroeder said the Federal Republic still wanted to consider the various arguments pro and con, and felt no need to begin formal negotiations today or tomorrow. It would discuss the matter with its Allies when the Germans knew their own minds better.

Schroeder raised the possibility of dramatizing the incidents at the Berlin wall and demarcation line by bringing the situation before the UN Human Rights Commission. While the Federal Republic did not categorically reject this up to now it had generally not favored it on the ground that the other side would try to bring the whole Berlin question as well as the question of the peace treaty and the German problem before the UN, once an opening were provided. The UN as now constituted could not be relied upon to consider the issue favorably. The Secretary said there were two separate questions involved: What can be done to help the people of East Germany and how can we make the Communists pay for what they are doing? He did not believe that conditions could be improved by a propaganda approach. Hence the question might first be explored through International Red Cross contacts. If we had determined that improvement was not possible, then we could decide how to achieve a maximum propaganda effect. He agreed that, once the question got into the UN it would be unpredictable what many UN countries would do, particularly in the light of the Soviet position that UN forces might be substituted for Western occupation troops.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–RU/6–2262. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on June 25 and approved in S on June 28. The meeting was held in Chancellor Adenauer’s Conference Room at the Palais Schaumburg. A detailed summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 39 from Bonn, June 22. (Ibid., 611.62A/6–2262)
1. For a brief report on the private meeting, see Document 69.
2. At 3 p.m. on June 22 Rusk and Schroeder discussed various aspects of the positions to be taken in continued talks with the Soviet Union on Berlin. A memorandum of this conversation (SET/MC/27) is in Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–RU/6–2262.