Office of the Historian

428. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand1

Washington, October 25, 1960—5:42 p.m.

533. For Parsons. Vientiane’s 742, 744, 745, 746 and Bangkok’s 663, 664 and 666.2 Your reports contained Reftels extremely helpful in giving Department more complete picture of current stage of developments. While you are undoubtedly now engaged in analysis of situation prior to submission your recommendations for action the follow few observations and suggestions are passed on:

1.
Accurate transcript of your press statement was exceedingly useful in correcting extremely erroneous reports current here that negotiations had practically broken off and that “mission had failed”. Your assurance that Laos still receiving aid and that idea of neutrality not repugnant to us and Souvanna so informed very helpful. We have attempted to get this correction into press here.
2.
Your action re release of funds for continuation aid heartily approved.
3.

Your conversation with King and Souvanna Phouma reveal very wide differences of understanding between the two with reference to the Soviet mission and reception their credentials by the King. Believe you should consider on urgent basis passing message to King telling him at least delay receiving Soviet mission and if in fact he was not informed of plans accrediting them to Laos that he use his royal prerogative in refusing to receive them. His Majesty should be informed that Fedorov, member of delegation, is well known agent with long experience in subversive activity acting in number of places under variety of aliases and obviously dangerous character. Consideration is being given to surfacing this info here.

FYI. If there is any basis under Lao Constitution on which King as Supreme Head of State or as Supreme Commander of Armed Forces could appeal for assistance in protecting his country, some thought should be given to encourage him to appeal to us over the head of his Prime Minister for this assistance if he feels presence of uninvited Russians, dangerous negotiations with Pathet Lao are in fact posing grave threats to throne.

5.
Some of the above action is of course based on promise that Souvanna Phouma will not move to Luang Prabang and will not effectively resist Pathet Lao in the negotiations.
6.
Your Bangkok 666 will be subject of separate message when your view has been coordinated with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].3

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1560. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Steeves and cleared with SEA, Dillon, and Cumming in substance and with L/FE. Repeated priority to Vientiane.↩
  2. These telgrams, October 14 and 15, contained reports of meetings, accounts of Lao press comments related to the Parsons mission, and Parsons’ observations on U.S. aid to Laos and on detailing an Embassy officer to Savannakhet. (Telegrams 742, 744, 745, and 746 are ibid., 751J.00/10–1460; telegram 663 from Bangkok is ibid., 751J.5–MSP/10–1460; and telegrams 664 and 666 from Bangkok are ibid., 751J.00/10–1560; all included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  3. Not found.↩