Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

129. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, January 7, 1960—2 p.m.

847. Paris for Assistant Secretary Parsons. Reference: Deptel 1649 to Bangkok, Phnom Penh 537;² FTB 4462.³ Following our assessment current support of and opposition to Sihanouk within Cambodia. Although it represents our best estimate of situation, allowance must be made for some margin error in view marked reluctance Cambodians to discuss Sihanouk with foreigners except in terms of adulation, a reluctance which even more pronounced today in present quasi-police state atmosphere.

1. Support strongest among peasants who venerate Sihanouk almost as God–King and regard him as an unquestioned father and prime defender of nation’s independence. Peasants, who comprise over 80 percent of population, usually politically apathetic but in emergency would undoubtedly respond forcefully to appeal of Prince. Same sentiments shared by urban proletariat who retain close attachment to soil, with possible exception stevedores who some extent Communist influenced. Armed forces believed now to be solidly behind Sihanouk. Those elements among them which were once sympathetic to Dap Chhuon have either seen light since their full reintegration into army or reportedly have been liquidated. National police, whose effectiveness and power have substantially increased during past year, also considered staunch in support of Prince. He has backing legislature, especially because their livelihood and sinecure largely depend on him, as well as that of great majority government functionaries. Buddhist clergy, which in first years of independence displayed certain sympathy for Son Ngoc Thanh, seems to have taken heed Sihanouk’s warnings that they stay out of politics and in general now believed to give him their support. Press, including Communist, sycophantic their treatment of Sihanouk who depicted as omniscient and paragon all virtues. While this doesn’t necessarily reflect their real feelings toward him, they fully aware any appreciable deviation from this approach would lead to reprisals. Radio virtual mouthpiece of Prince. Vietnamese and Chinese minorities play no role Cambodian political life at present, and as long as Sihanouk does not oppress them or shift from current neutralist line, will continue remain quiescent.

2. Attitude intelligentsia and students varies between vociferous, although in some instances lukewarm in support to deep but unarticulated dissatisfaction. While left-wing and Communist elements among them could become disaffected should he veer toward West, they generally satisfied manner in which he now conducting policy.

3. In speeches re “traitors” Sihanouk has stated that 10 percent population against him. While figure may be somewhat low, this opposition does not represent any real threat at present since it unorganized and leaderless. Also, given Sihanouk’s control army, police and propaganda media, it is likely remain so. Apart from supporters and sympathizers Khmer dissidents who believed to be relatively in-significant in number, opposition now largely confined some former democratic party elements, disgruntled functionaries, certain businessmen who concerned trend toward statism or bear personal grudge against Sihanouk, and handful convinced pro-Westerns.

4. Criticism Sihanouk’s internal policies unquestionably exists although rarely of his person and almost never in print. It largely concentrated in urban areas, particularly Phnom Penh. Such criticism and dissatisfaction is however factor some importance because it occurs among class which although numerically is small is most directly affected by his policies and in a position, at least indirectly, to influence him because of his sensitivity their attitude.

5. Criticism usually focused on following:

a. Increasing cost of living, although up to present peasants not affected.

b. “Voluntary” manual labor campaign which, apart from personal inconvenience involved, is felt to be uneconomic and unnecessary.

c. Economic pressures to join Sangkum, which ipso facto involves substantial financial contribution to sponsors.

d. Dictatorial methods of Prince, [1½ lines of source text not declassified].

e. His favoritism and penchant play off one against another.

f. Widespread corruption within government, including venality police.

g. Increasing lack of employment opportunities which young [high?] school and college graduates feel commensurate with their education status.

h. Reliance on elder statesmen such as Penn Nouth, Nhiek Tioulong and Son Sann who allegedly tainted by service under French. However, this complaint is largely confined to young intellectuals who themselves ambitious for power.

i. Wastage foreign exchange on Sihanouk’s junkets abroad.

6. Generally speaking, foreign affairs not issue. Neutrality policy has almost universal support. Concern that Sihanouk may carry Cambodia too far to left presently limited to court, small but influential group entrepreneurs, landowners and rice millers, and few deputies. On other hand, there is widespread feeling of smug satisfaction at France’s [Prince’s] astuteness playing East and West against each other and thereby obtaining aid from both. Likewise he not felt to blame for recurring troubles with Thailand and Vietnam, but rather that Cambodians innocent and injured party.

7. Atmosphere fear which dates from Bangkok plots and Dap Chhuon affair has become intensified since August 31 bombing attempt. Paradoxically this has been nourished not so much by growth opposition as by Sihanouk’s obvious preoccupation with security of self and Royal Family. This, like criticism, is urban phenomenon and to large extent concentrated in Phnom Penh. Increasing authoritarianism and reliance on police and army has led to perceptible uneasiness. Where we have been able penetrate discretion based on fear, growing dissatisfaction found because of inability to express opinions without endangering one’s life or livelihood. Although potential importance such unhappiness with exisiting situation cannot be under-estimated, no present indications any ability convert it into political force.

8. Essential gap in possibility for organizing opposition is absence of leaders who command significant support among urban element or population at large. Free Khmer movement has no broad backing. Sam Sary is completely discredited. Son Ngoc Thanh has lost most popular appeal he possessed during independence movement. Former democrats, although not particularly happy with their lot, are disorganized and ineffective. Nhiek Tioulong lacks following and, further, has made number political enemies. Conceivable he might seek subvert Lon Nol who close friend and political ally, but highly doubtful whether latter would go along unless he loses favor with Prince and, in any case, most unlikely Lon Nol could carry army. Penn Nouth has many friends in upper echelons of government and understood to have been secretly nursing grievance against Sihanouk for years. However, he believed too old and ill to assume active opposition role. Son Sann [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] like Tioulong, has many enemies. Monireth, Sihanouk’s uncle and who in theory probably best qualified to rally support against him, has made it clear he possesses no political or dynastic ambitions and, furthermore, has drawn closer to Queen and Palace since bombing incident. Younger politicians largely Sihanouk’s creatures and, moreover, lack prestige and popular appeal.

9. Our conclusions are (a) discontent, although still discreet, is more outspoken than 12 months ago and will probably continue to grow, but doubtful whether in next year or so this will reach proportions which could seriously endanger Sihanouk. Also, thanks to army and police, his control of situation probably stronger today than year ago. (b) Internecine struggles in government for power and Sihanouk’s favor will continue, but this cannot be equated with opposition to him. (c) Possibility organizing successful revolt seems remote at present. Therefore should Sihanouk’s enemies seek to remove him, assassination seems the only recourse presently available.

Trimble

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files 751H.11/1–660. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, London, and Vientiane.
2. In this telegram, January 2, the Department agreed with the Embassy in Bangkok’s suggestion that U.S. and Thai officials meet to discuss the threat of Communist subversion in Cambodia. (Ibid., 751H.11/1–260; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Not futher identified.