Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, July 14, 1959—9:02 p.m.

27. Re: 15th GA Presidency. Dept shares your concern re apparent stimulus being given Nosek candidacy for presidency 15th GA. Also agrees we must seek avoid “irresistible trend” in favor Nosek (urtel 1179²). At same time, US should not be in position stimulating Boland candidacy until clear he preferred choice West Europeans and clear satisfactory assurance re Chi Rep can be obtained. US should also avoid formal commitment this matter so far in advance in order not establish awkward precedent and retain for US as much latitude as possible in circumstances. Mission should therefore seek early opportunity discuss Nosek candidacy with UK and French delegations in first instance as follows:

1) We recognize with LA President this year it European turn to have GA presidency next year.

2) We assume they and other friendly European members agree with us on undesirability at this time of Soviet-bloc president, whose election we would anticipate having actively to oppose.

3) Open fight against Soviet-bloc candidacy if it has gained substantial support likely affect unfavorably atmosphere whole GA mission.

4) We hope therefore Western Europe can reach early agreement on acceptable non-Communist candidate so as present united front and thus discourage build-up Soviet-bloc candidacy.

5) Following our usual practice, we would give full weight West European choice and would expect be able support it when taking our own position on 15 GA president. Boland acceptable if West European choice provided problem presented by Irish position on Chi Rep issue can be resolved, and we intend ourselves indicate this Boland privately unless there serious objections.

Mission should indicate Boland that our only difficulty respect his possible candidacy next year, which we agree is European turn, is Irish failure support moratorium formula. We hope he can persuade his Government modify its stand this question, which so far as we can foresee would assure our support provided he West European choice.³

Mission should immediately make clear SYG and Cordier, Soviet-bloc candidate not acceptable US for President 15th GA in present circumstances and also make points covered in (3) and (4) above. Mission should point out:

1) election Soviet-bloc candidate to office such prominence as GA presidency would give USSR and its satellites aura respectability and international prestige unwarranted by their present conduct and might have seriously adverse effect on US opinion toward UN;

2) quite aside any difficulties Soviet-bloc president could create at regular GA session, opportunity presented him for trouble-making by any Emergency Special Session could have most serious consequences.⁴

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/7–1459. Confidential. Drafted by Hartley on July 7; cleared by Green, Nunley, NEA, Monsma, and Bacon; and approved by Walmsley who signed for Dillon.
2. Document 78.
3. At this point in the source text the following sentence was deleted before transmission: “We would hope even be able support him if he West European choice on basis his personal assurances that he would not be influenced by Irish position on moratorium formula in his actions as presiding officer.”
4. Barco reported in telegram 194 from USUN, August 14, that he had not spoken with Boland, who was away from New York, but that Beeley had indicated the British would probably support Boland and had already begun working quietly to develop his candidacy. Roux of the French Mission noted U.S. opposition to a General Assembly president from Eastern Europe and stated that Paris had not reacted to Boland’s possible candidacy. Hammarskjöld stated he must remain detached from the election of General Assembly officers, but indicated that he felt personally that the United States should not try to block an Eastern European presidency. Barco observed that Cordier would probably speak in favor of an Eastern European president and, by virtue of his position in the U.N. Secretariat, would appear to be speaking for the Secretary-General. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/8–1459)