Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

467. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 24, 1959—2 p.m.

Delga 517. Re: Outer Space; Gadel 138.²

1. I believe it would be undesirable for me to speak to Kuznetsov about composition problem on basis Dept’s latest instructions. If this was our position we should not have started to negotiate at all. In light of conversations I have already had with him it is clear that USSR will not agree to any composition placing combined Soviet bloc and neutral members in unfavorable proportion to countries associated with US.

2. However, if we are in position to accept comite of 24 composed on 12–6–6 basis (which we have some indications may be acceptable to Soviet Union), I can see tactical reasons for moving to this proposal in stages. It could help US maintain satisfactory relation between Communists and neutrals. At same time I believe we should not prolong negotiations by sticking now on proposal we know is unacceptable. To do so risks embarrassing public disclosures by Kuznetsov re earlier discussions which could seriously affect our position with other dels.

3. I therefore recommend I be authorized to proceed as fols:

A. Propose as first step 12–5–6.

B. When Kuznetsov rejects this, suggest 12–6–5.

C. Assuming Kuznetsov again responds negatively, indicate that in interest of reaching agreement we are prepared agree on comite of 24 members. In this way we would appear reasonable in agreeing to size of comite proposed by Khrushchev and could take precisely same line as reported in Delga 487 that only question remaining is what states should be members. I would then go on to propose composition of 12–6–6. I think we have definitely reached point where any proposal should be specific. Therefore I believe I should propose list including 12 present members of comite (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Italy, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, US, UK, France, Japan, Iran); 6 neutrals (India, UAR, Sweden, Austria, Tunisia, Malaya); and 6 Communist states (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania).

4. I recognize that this formula gives Soviet Union disproportionate share of representation. My estimate is that it will nevertheless be acceptable to other UN members who are anxious to obtain Soviet participation and who want a UN body on outer space. If negotiations break down on 12–6–6 proposal, we are in strong public position. If this should happen, I believe we should put this composition into our res and go ahead with it. In such circumstances I think Soviet Union would be in extremely vulnerable position and we could expect other UN members to put pressure on them to participate.³

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11–2459. Confidential; Priority.
2. Supra.
3. On November 25, in a telegram cleared by Wilcox, Kohler, and Herter, Lodge was authorized to accept 12–6–6 as the final U.S. position. (Gadel 146; Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/11–2459)