Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, January 16, 1960—2:14 p.m.

627. Re: 15th GA Presidency. Acting Secretary informed British Minister January 13² we greatly concerned over delay reaching any agreement on WE candidate, that Nosek completely unacceptable President Eisenhower, who sees nothing inconsistent “Camp David spirit” in opposition Nosek, and that we hope British will use their influence to encourage Western Europe reach agreement on candidate and discourage advancement Italian candidacy. Acting Secretary said we reaching point where we must make our position known or lose now next September’s battle. We wish to be in position soon begin work actively for WE candidate and we plan ourselves encourage our friends in West Europe make up their minds. In our view every day lost is to advantage Nosek for whom Soviet bloc actively campaigning. We cannot put off indefinitely making our support of Boland known.

British Minister took position that situation re 15th GA presidency and delay last summer over SC candidate not comparable view difference in time factor. He contended that with Boland announced candidate clear Nosek candidacy would be contested and other countries will wish take position in light political situation existing when GA convenes. British therefore consider any decision now both unnecessary and possibly counter-productive as it might be regarded as another “cold war exercise”. British wish consult West Europeans and Old Commonwealth and would consider requested approach to Italians. However regardless result consultations British will still not wish make firm commitment this early. They plan make “warmly sympathetic” reply Aiken letter while avoiding firm commitment and hope US in its reply will not go beyond suggested formula contained Deptel 602.³

It clear from above there basic difference between us and British on necessity and desirability early decision. British FonOff apparently, basis this conversation and urtel 566,⁴ considering possibility decision re GA presidency may be affected by posture at Summit as result which we may be forced go along Nosek candidacy. Mission and Amembassy London should therefore advise British Dept believes US and UK cannot allow hypothetical Summit developments delay speedy action in obtaining strong alternative to Nosek. Important that we concentrate at this juncture on (1) obtaining generally agreed WE candidate as soon as possible and (2) actively supporting his candidacy. Have no present basis for assumption 15th GA presidency will become issue or bargaining point at Summit, or that other Summit developments will warrant Western agreement to Soviet bloc control of GA presidency. Unless we make early and vigorous stand against Nosek, he may win by default.⁵ Moreover, we believe best way preventing Nosek candidacy becoming cold war issue is by keeping this question out of Summit discussions and by early decision on WE candidate. Therefore hope UK will proceed with consultations as rapidly as possible along lines suggested by Acting Secretary.

Dept recognizes Communist as chairman First Committee less objectionable than as GA President but would not wish consider this possibility at this time when it is not clear that it is necessary in order defeat Nosek. To inform other delegations now, as British suggest, we willing accept Communist as chairman. First Committee would almost certainly result in having Communist as chairman regardless of how Summit meeting goes or whether this concession necessary defeat Nosek. You should accordingly strongly impress UK with need avoid discussion of this with other delegations.

For Embassy London: Dept hopes Embassy will do everything feasible expedite favorable UK response to Acting Secretary’s approach.

For Embassy Rome: Embassy requested institute discreet inquiries current Italian intentions concerning candidacy for presidency 15th UNGA, with particular reference determining Italian reaction to conversation reported New York’s 559.⁶ If no decision yet reached and if Italians seek US views or if suitable opportunity otherwise presents itself, Embassy should make following observations to Foreign Office:

1. Soviet bloc making vigorous campaign in behalf Nosek of Czechoslovakia for presidency of 15th GA. US believes important defeat Nosek since there is general agreement that 15th GA will be “European turn” for president. Best method defeating Nosek is early agreement on strong Western European candidate.

2. Boland of Ireland has already announced candidacy for 15th GA presidency. US has not yet made any commitments, since would prefer Western Europe’s consensus before making final decision re particular candidate. Moreover, US would prefer knowledge re Italian intentions before making any final commitment. On other hand, believe cannot afford wait for indefinite period, since absence early and active campaign for Western European may permit Nosek win by default.⁷ US hopes Italian Government will carefully consider implications putting forward Italian candidate at this time. Boland unlikely withdraw, and additional WE candidacy would tend to split vote of non-Communist countries and give Nosek overwhelming advantage. In any event, hope obtain definitive Italian thinking on this matter soonest.

FYI. Embassy will appreciate that object of above approach is to suggest delicately to Italians undesirability of Italian candidacy in light of fact Boland is already in field. While we have no commitment Boland, he has been told informally we would look favorably on his candidacy if he WE choice.⁸

Merchant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–1660. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hartley and Nunley on January 15; initialed by Cargo; cleared by Seip, Ludlow, Wilcox, Bacon, Kohler, and in substance by Herz and Monsma; and approved by Merchant. Sent also to London and Rome and repeated to Dublin.
2. A memorandum of Merchant’s meeting with Hood is ibid., 320/1–1360.
3. Regarding Aiken’s letter announcing Boland’s candidacy, see footnote 2, Document 120. Regarding telegram 602 to USUN, see footnote 4, ibid.
4. Telegram 566, January 6, reported that the Foreign Office favored Boland’s candidacy, but was not ready to commit itself to supporting him, and that Beeley and Moore of the British Delegation hoped the United States could help them persuade the Foreign Office to change its position. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–660)
5. At this point in the source text, the following sentence was deleted before transmission: “If UK thinks that presidency may become bargaining point at summit, believe it will agree it important build up Western strength on this issue by developing strong support for WE candidate.”
6. Telegram 559, January 5, reported on the mission conversations with other delegations regarding the presidency of the 15th General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–560)
7. At this point in the source text, the following sentence was deleted before transmission: “Danger is illustrated by recent SC contest between Turkey and Poland where Poland obtained numerous free world commitments before Turkey announced candidacy.”
8. Telegram 614 from USUN, January 18, reported on Lodge’s meeting with Beeley. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/1–1860) Telegram 3570 from London, January 19, reported on Deputy Chief of Mission Barbour’s meeting with British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Millar. (ibid., 320/1–1960) Telegram 2612 from Rome, January 20, reported on a conversation with Italian Vice Director General for Political Affairs Grillo. (ibid., 320/1–2060)