Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

203. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 8, 1957, 4:16–4:50 p.m.¹

Washington, March 8, 1957, 4:16–4:50 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Governor Herter
• Ambassador Dillon
• Mr. Rountree
• Mr. Phleger
• General Goodpaster

The President said that the reason he had asked State for a summary of what we are asking of Egypt, how we are making it known, and what would be done if they oppose us, was that he had received a report he did not like from Ambassador Whitney earlier in the day.²Whitney reported that Lord Salisbury had told him that the British public opinion was “simmering” and was likely to explode if the Egyptians required tolls to be paid to them directly for Suez passage— even if the United States opposed the Egyptian action. There were certain features of pressure almost amounting to blackmail in this.³

Mr. Rountree reviewed a memorandum that had been prepared in draft in answer to these questions.⁴ In the discussion which took place as the memorandum was presented, Mr. Phleger recalled that the United States, together with the British, French and Norwegians, had given a proposition to Hammarskjöld for him to present to the Egyptians with the hope that they would put it forward as their own. The British, however, broke the story in London presenting the proposition as a “demand” upon Egypt. Apparently they did this for domestic political reasons, but their action has greatly lessened the chances of achieving an effective solution.

At a later point in the discussion it was suggested that, with Israel now in compliance with the United Nations, the Egyptians must take great care as to the propriety of their position. The President agreed, stating that if they do not cooperate, world opinion would mount against them. He recalled that because of the pressure that had to be put on Israel, the Israelis have lost a great deal of sympathy and support in the United States and elsewhere.

The President questioned closely the statement that we “hope” Egypt will stay out of Gaza, indicating that he thought we were committed to more than that. Mr. Rountree said that the United States made clear throughout that we were seeking a de facto non-return of Egypt to Gaza and that we could not and would not go further than that. Governor Herter referred to a statement by Hammarskjöld which “assumed” that the UNEF and UNRWA would handle the Gaza situation alone for the time being.

With regard to the interim Suez arrangement, Mr. Phleger said that Egypt may put the matter on a first-come, first-served basis. He said the Secretary wants to pay tolls to the SCUA, and let the SCUA make payments to Egypt, thus creating a body which can bargain with Egypt.

The President said that he thought our influence should be devoted to getting Egypt to make a proposal. He thought we have been compromised by the premature British release, which is all the more provoking because anything we try to do now may result in the British saying that we are “reneging” on them.

G
Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 9. The time of the meeting is from the record of the President’s Daily Appointments. (Ibid.) Another memorandum of the conversation by Rountree is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversations: Lot 64 D 199.
2. Rountree’s memorandum of conversation identifies the telegram as telegram 4686 from London, March 6. (Ibid., Central Files, 974.7301/3–657)

3. The following day, the Department of State dispatched the following message to the Embassy in London: “You should make it clear to Salisbury and others who may comment to you in same vein that US is doing everything possible to achieve just and fair solution of this problem. While it may not be advisable for you to over-emphasize fact that we responded promptly and generously to sterling crisis, this fact nevertheless shows our concern for and readiness to help in solving British problems, and we would hope that British would bear this in mind as an indication of US feeling toward Great Britain.

   “Finally, it would be well to point out that we have no magic means to compel Egypt to accept solutions which we desire and that such solutions can only be reached by patient and persevering negotiation which is the course we are following and will continue to follow.” (Telegram 6231 to London, March 9; ibid.)

4. According to Rountree’s memorandum of conversation, at Herter’s request Rountree gave the President an oral briefing in response to the three questions. Subsequently, the briefing was put in memorandum form and sent on March 9 to Goodpaster. The memorandum is printed as Document 206.