Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

120. Record of a Bipartisan Legislative Meeting, White House, Washington, February 20, 1957, 8:30-10:55 p.m.¹

Washington, February 20, 1957, 8:30-10:55 p.m.

THE FOLLOWING WERE PRESENT

• President Eisenhower
• Vice President Nixon
• Sen. Wm. F. Knowland
• Sen. H. Alexander Smith
• Sen. Leverett Saltonstall
• Sen. Alexander Wiley
• Sen. Everett Dirksen
• Rep. Joseph W Martin, Jr.
• Rep. John Taber
• Rep. Leslie Arends
• Rep. Leo Allen
• Rep. Charles Halleck
• Rep. John Vorys
• Rep. Carl Albert
• Rep. Robt. B. Chiperfield
• Sen. Lyndon Johnson
• Sen. Theodore Green
• Sen. Richard B. Russell
• Sen. Mike Mansfield
• Sen. Carl Hayden
• Sen. J. W. Fulbright
• Sen. Thomas Hennings, Jr.
• Speaker Sam Rayburn
• Rep. Carl Vinson
• Rep. Clarence Cannon
• Rep. John W. McCormack
• Rep. Thomas S. Gordon
• Rep. Thomas E. Morgan
• Secretary Dulles
• Asst. Sec. of State Robert Hill
• Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge
• Gov. Adams
• Gen. Persons
• Mr. Hagerty
• Gen. Goodpaster
• Mr. Harlow
• Mr. Minnich

The President opened the meeting with a quick review of US relationships and actions in regard to the Middle East since the beginning of the crisis last July. He then stressed the importance of obtaining peace in the area which would open the way for urgently needed financial assistance to Israel through the Export-Import Bank, for developing solutions to the basic problems of the area including transit of the Canal and termination of Israeli-Arab feuding, and which would remove any excuses for Arab retaliation against Israel. He then stressed that noncompliance with the UN resolution would mean that none of these things could be accomplished, that economic stagnation would increase, and that the UN would be forced to take some action. Such a situation could lead to increased influence of Russia in Arab states, interruption of the flow of oil through the remaining pipeline and continued blocking of the Canal, the threat of a serious crash in the French and United Kingdom economies, and finally an increased possibility of general war.

The President said he was aware of Congressional opposition to sanctions against Israel. He pointed out, however, that sanctions might take various forms and that it has long been recognized that the UN cannot apply sanctions against a major power. He stated that the United States had already applied a variety of sanctions against Russia, had applied them against Egypt, and had in effect acted against the United Kingdom and France by delaying initiation of oil moves to those countries until certain of their withdrawal from Egyptian territory. He again directed attention to United States interests in the Mid-East and the question of how to protect those interests if not through the UN. He believed that if the United States refused to go along with the UN, the United States would be dealing a serious blow to that organization and would thus increase changes of a future war. He agreed that nobody liked the idea of sanctions and he asked what could possibly be done to reach a settlement if it were not possible to encourage Israel’s withdrawal to the 1949 line, especially since the Arabs assert that the withdrawal is the sine qua non of any settlement. The President then asked Sec. Dulles to express his view of the situation.

Sen. Johnson intervened to comment on his letter to the Secretary of State² concerning sanctions, and he stated that the letter had leaked to the New York Herald Tribune from a source other than his own office. He noted that he had not discussed the matter with Sen. Knowland and that it was coincidental that each of them had come to the same conclusions. He added that there were times when the Congress must of course express its viewpoint. The President quickly replied that he had no objection to that, and Sen. Johnson closed the exchange with a “thank you.”

Sec. Dulles stated his view that if Israel should not withdraw there would be increased guerrilla warfare, stoppage of oil supplies, and growth of Russian influence. In short, he believed there would occur all those disasters that the United States has been trying to fend off since creation of the State of Israel.

Sec. Dulles stated that the sanctions proposal must be considered in the light of the probable consequences of inaction, or alternatives must be found. He thought that to allow Israel to defy the withdrawal agreement would involve the breakdown of the whole world order we are trying to create through the UN—an order where nations could not take the law into their own hands. The first effort in this crisis was to liquidate the use of armed forces, which had been achieved with respect to Britain and France. Israel, on the other hand, and despite Ben-Gurion’s promise to withdraw when the UN force could be created and be in the area, has continued to occupy Egyptian territory for four months. He continued that when Mr. Hammarskjold’s negotiations had reached a deadlock some two weeks ago, the United States began to talk directly with Israel, Mr. Hammarskjold having given his concurrence. In furtherance of these talks, Amb. Eban had been given a memorandum approved by the President which attempted to assure the Israelis that the ultimate outcome would be a better situation for Israel than what it was prior to the attack. He said that Ben-Gurion had replied to the President that Israel would withdraw provided there would be freedom of transit of the Gulf of Aqaba and that administration of the Gaza Strip would not remain with Egypt. He noted that the United States aide-mémoire of February 11th stated that the United States would undertake, through the UN, to arrange for a UN force to move into the Gaza Strip and provide necessary protection. In this connection, Amb. Eban was informed privately of the possibility that Egypt would accept, subsequent to Israeli withdrawal, some new form of administration of the Gaza Strip. In regard to Aqaba, the aide-mémoire stated that the United States considers these to be international waters, that the United States is prepared to exercise its own right of free passage and to join with others in accomplishing free passage for all. Mr. Dulles reported that this aide-mémoire had not yet produced any positive result but that some hope remained. Mr. Dulles believed from his talks with Mr. Eban that the Ambassador believes Israel ought to accept this as the best offer of the United States and the UN and that it would be the most likely means of preventing developments adverse to Israel.

Sen. Wiley asked if Sec. Dulles had any idea as to what Ben-Gurion’s forthcoming statement would contain. Mr. Dulles responded negatively, then added that he thought Israel would soon withdraw if that government were convinced the United States would stand firmly against it, lacking withdrawal. The firmness of the US position thus constituted the crucial issue particularly since much of the world, including the Israeli government, believed Israel could in crucial moments control US policy. Should the Arab nations see any confirmation of this belief, they would feel compelled, according to Sec. Dulles, to turn to Russia. He added that this did not mean the United States had to follow an anti-Israel policy.

Rep. McCormack questioned the status as to rigidity of these views within the Executive Branch and the UN. Sec. Dulles replied to the effect that the Administration thinks it is necessary to maintain pressure on Israel for withdrawal and believes that Israel will withdraw if that is done. He went on to state that he did not consider such action as constituting a “double standard”, since all sorts of sanctions might and in some instances have been applied. He recognized that the UN has an inbuilt double standard resulting in part from our action in agreeing to the veto procedure and ratifying the Charter with the veto included. But, he continued, the veto does not preclude use of moral sanctions which we have applied without let-up in respect to Russia. Similarly, we have applied economic and cultural restrictions in dealings with Russia and have attempted to make clear that we do not consider the Soviet Union worthy of being treated as a member of the family of nations. He believed that the most severe measure we could take against Israel would be to subject it to the same sort of treatment that we have applied to Russia—and of course the Administration has nothing that severe in mind for Israel. He repeated that he thought it entirely wrong to assert a double standard in regard to the proposed sanctions on Israel. With regard to Egypt, Sec. Dulles said that the United States has taken actions which the Administration has thought to be legitimate and proper, though we would not want them to be advertised as sanctions. He recounted the actions concerning the restriction of tourist traffic, cessation of aid, and the non-use of P.L. 480.

Sec. Dulles continued that should Israel withdraw there could be the assurance that the United States would for its part continue such support as it had given to Israel in the past, a matter which ought to be thoroughly understood by now. He noted that Israel’s use of massive armed forces in seizing Egyptian territory constituted an action in quality like the invasion of Korea. He concluded by asserting his belief that all of these matters can and will be worked out if there is a solid US policy.

Sen. Russell recalled the earlier statement with regard to Israel’s unconditional pledge to withdraw. Sec. Dulles recounted Ben-Gurion’s statement of November 10th concerning the proposed UN force. Sen. Knowland underscored the phrase in Ben-Gurion’s statement concerning “satisfactory arrangements with the UN” as being the key to the situation. Sen. Russell subsequently asked for a copy of the Ben-Gurion statement.

Sen. Johnson asked if the US position on sanctions would be decisive in the UN voting. Amb. Lodge replied that if the United States voted for the proposal or merely abstained, the resolution would be approved. Sen. Johnson then asked what our position is. Sec. Dulles replied that we had no final view pending completion of this meeting. He said that he and Amb. Lodge set out to stave off heavy pressure for a statement of position. At the request of the Israelis, we had attempted to gain time in the UN and we had succeeded in postponing action until Thursday. He repeated the President’s indication that unless the Administration’s thinking is changed at this meeting, it would seem necessary to take some action to encourage Israeli withdrawal. Sen. Johnson asked if sanctions were the best move, in Sec. Dulles’ opinion. The Secretary repeated that there are various kinds of sanctions and that within the UN there are various views as to how specifically to effect the sanctions. He cited German reparation payments to Israel, world-wide sale of Israeli government bonds, and US aid as possible areas for consideration.

Sen. Smith asked what would be the language of the UN resolution and Speaker Rayburn expressed his own interest in that question. Sec. Dulles said that no draft had as yet crystallized.

Sen. Knowland, after recalling some past events with regard to Egyptian actions against Israel, the ineffectiveness of UN activity at that time and the absence of sanctions then, went on to stress the need for continuing our efforts toward effecting restoration of peace in the area. He reiterated his view that a double standard was involved whether resulting from the UN Charter or otherwise. He then set forth his proposal for a resolution to be introduced by the United States stating (1) that all members have an obligation to comply with the UN Charter, to refrain from aggression, and to respect UN resolutions; (2) that failure to comply within 30 days would properly subject the offender to economic, moral and diplomatic sanctions; and (3) that all Israeli troops be withdrawn from Gaza and Aqaba which would be occupied by UN forces until there occurred either a UN settlement or an Egypt-Israeli agreement. Sen. Knowland pointed out that UN forces are in the Suez area only by virtue of Nasser’s consent and would have to be withdrawn at his demand. Sen. Knowland recommended the establishment of a neutral zone. He believed that the actions he outlined would allow us to maintain our moral position, would constitute pressure on Israel for withdrawal, and would avoid any “double standard” treatment.

Sen. Mansfield said that Sen. Knowland had made a very constructive statement. He then expressed his view that should Israel withdraw, the United States ought to take the lead to keep the UN in Gaza and Aqaba and even expand the UN force, for he believed Egypt will not abide by any assurance given to Israel. He thought also that the UN force might eventually be strengthened into a permanent fire fighting force. He definitely believed that the situation should not revert to the status quo and that some action should be taken to get a hold on Nasser, perhaps as suggested by Sen. Knowland.

Rep. Halleck spoke of a meeting in the State Department sometime ago when Sec. Dulles set forth the objectives of maintaining friendly relations with Israel and preventing the loss of Mid-East oil supplies. He recalled that the question had been raised then as to the possibility that Israel might be the aggressor. At that time the Secretary had said it would be too bad for Israel, foreseeing the possibility of the present situation.

Sen. Dirksen asked Amb. Lodge about the actions the UN might take and how decisive would be its vote if the United States abstained. Amb. Lodge replied that he had been attempting to gain time over a long period, that on a recent Saturday evening the UN passed by a two-thirds vote a resolution that the UN force should continue its role in the area until settlement is reached. He indicated that he could not gain any more time. He said that the Arab states had been circulating informally a draft resolution, which he read, condemning Israel for noncompliance with the UN resolution of last November and calling on all states to deny all aid to Israel. He said that the vote on such a resolution would have been much closer ten days ago but that sentiment for Israel has greatly declined in view of the statements made by Sec. Dulles designed to reassure Israel. He believed the United States would have to oppose sanctions if the resolution were to be defeated. Sen. Knowland commented in passing that voting against sanctions did not seem to be feasible, which he regretted, then asked how much support could be found for sanctions against Russia for noncompliance with the outstanding UN resolution on Hungary. Amb. Lodge replied that the UN will never vote sanctions against either Russia or the United States. After a comment by Rep. McCormack, Amb. Lodge went on to recall the UN Charter debates and the unlikelihood that the United States would ever have ratified the Charter without the veto. He commented briefly on the UN being designed as a means of preventing war rather than of establishing perfect justice throughout the world.

Sen. Johnson asked a series of questions as to the possibility of an alternative for the Arab resolution. Messrs. Dulles and Lodge made clear that they did not believe there could be no change in the specific Arab resolution but that something of that nature was inevitable. Mr. Lodge believed that Sec. Dulles would be able to come up with an improvement over that draft. He went on to review his talks with the Arabs. He took note of the increased respect they have for the United States since last November and he concluded that the Arabs would feel we have abandoned our position if we do not support some effective measures to accomplish Israeli withdrawal. Lacking withdrawal, the Canal would not be opened and we would have to face much harder decisions at a future time. He believed the Arabs will be more tractable after Israeli troops are removed from their territory.

Sen. Smith reverted to Sen. Knowland’s proposal. Amb. Lodge said that in effect that had been done in the UN resolution of February 2nd which had involved long negotiations. He referred to the UN view of the current situation from a parliamentary standpoint. Rep. McCormack asked if Egypt and Krishna Menon did not construe that differently. Amb. Lodge believed some of these constructions to be face-saving operations. He repeated that the Arabs had told him privately that they would accept the presence of a UN force once Israeli withdrawal is accomplished.

Sec. Dulles referred to Amb. Lodge’s comment on the primary purpose of the UN and added a few comments on Sen. Vandenberg’s efforts to promote justice through the UN. He said that he and Amb. Lodge fully believed that any resolution adopted should help to insure the subsequent establishment of conditions that would be in keeping with international law. He agreed that the United States has a powerful voice in the UN but that it is much more effective in stopping things than in securing agreement to what the United States would like to do. He repeated that the UN must take action and that should the UN fail to deal with the situation the United States will inherit the disaster. He believed the United States effort should be to get the best resolution that would satisfy the UN majority even though it fell short of what the United States would like. He again confirmed his view that Israeli withdrawal was the key to the situation and that unfortunately it must be effected before final agreements can be had on all the matters with which Israel is concerned. He felt that the views expressed at this meeting had been very helpful, that perhaps the UN could offer a resolution entirely acceptable to us but that our objective must be to get some resolution approved even though not exactly what we would desire.

Sen. Dirksen asked if it were certain that a resolution would be offered in the UN on Thursday. Amb. Lodge said the Arabs certainly would introduce theirs and perhaps the Soviet would introduce one. He believed there would be approximately three days debate. Sen. Wiley asked if we could introduce a substitute resolution. Amb. Lodge said we could. Sec. Dulles added that he did not think we could put through a one-package resolution dealing with Russia, Israel and Egypt.

Sen. Fulbright asked why Israel refused to comply prior to UN action on sanctions. The President said that they wanted an absolute guarantee, such as a security treaty with the United States. Sec. Dulles agreed, then emphasized the role of the UN in all this action precluding our control. Mr. Dulles said that he had told Amb. Eban that we are prepared to discuss some refinements of our statement if Israel is prepared to approve something less than what they have been demanding. He said that Amb. Eban did not know of any conditions short of those presently demanded that would be certain to command Israeli acceptance, hence Eban was pressing for acceptance as is. Sec. Dulles added that the United States does not believe Aqaba or Suez should be closed to Israeli transit or that Gaza should go back to the status quo.

Sen. Fulbright then inquired if a Senate resolution incorporating a statement that Israel should withdraw—if overwhelmingly passed— would help Israel to know the firmness of United States intentions. Mr. Vorys called attention to the time factor and suggested the alternative of an agreed statement following the meeting that would urge Israel to withdraw. Sec. Dulles recognized the time factor and the difficulties of an emotional debate, but agreed that there was some possibility that the balance could be tipped by the added factor of showing that Executive Branch policy is also the policy of the Congress. Sen. Fulbright believed that a concurrent resolution, if agreement could be reached on one, might lead to Israeli withdrawal and thus eliminate the reason for action by the UN. The President commented that everybody seemed to want to avoid undertaking sanctions against Israel alone when many countries have some share of guilt. He thought it would be helpful if this group could reach agreement on a position which might then be incorporated in a House resolution, but he wasn’t sure that Amb. Lodge could secure further delay in the UN. Mr. Lodge asserted clearly it was not possible to do so.

Speaker Rayburn could not see how a joint or concurrent resolution would be very helpful since it would incite unfortunate debate; it remained an open question as to what Congress would commit itself to, especially whether the United States would enforce the matter. Sen. Fulbright explained that a resolution would serve to give Israel the assurance that the UN cannot presently give, along with telling Israel to withdraw. He did not want any resolution that would appear to be a commitment to go to war to enforce withdrawal.

The President thought it would be much better if this group could agree to a statement containing what Sen. Fulbright suggested rather than becoming engaged at this time in a long Congressional debate. Congressional action could be considered later if still desirable. Sen. Johnson had some reservations as to a statement by the group and suggested that Sec. Dulles first attempt to ascertain whether a substantial Senate and House vote pledging support to the policy outlined in the Secretary’s aide-mémoire would bring Israel to withdraw. He felt the Congress could move quickly if it were ascertained that Israel would withdraw given Congressional action. The President again pointed to the pressures of time. Speaker Rayburn asserted flatly that he did not want any part of a Congressional resolution.

Rep. Martin asked again about the possibility of a statement by this group. Mr. McCormack said he would not be a party to one, and Speaker Rayburn believed it impossible for the group to agree on the language of such a statement.

Mr. McCormack raised a question about future developments under certain circumstances. Amb. Lodge said it was clear that the UN force could stay in the area. Mr. McCormack cited Krishna Menon’s interpretation of the matter and his own understanding of Amb. Lodge’s comment. Mr. Lodge denied that meaning and said his own words were clear. He then recounted how it was necessary to modify the language in the earlier UN resolution in order to obtain two-thirds approval with the participation of countries like India and Indonesia. Mr. Lodge felt from his talks with Amb. Fawzi that Egyptian agreement could be secured after Israel ceased to occupy Egyptian territory.

Sen. Saltonstall inquired if the United States might offer in the UN a resolution giving the substance of Sec. Dulles’ aide-mémoire. Amb. Lodge cited the reduced chances of getting any assurances into a withdrawal resolution. Sen. Knowland thought the UN delegates might change their view if they knew the United States might oppose any resolution that did not include assurances to Israel. The President asked if we might not in a resolution make our help conditional on Israeli withdrawal. Sen. Saltonstall said that he shared Mr. Rayburn’s view about a Congressional resolution. He believed a policy statement by Amb. Lodge in the UN regarding our readiness to support the Israeli position after withdrawal would be helpful.

Rep. Martin then urged issuance of a White House statement.

Sen. Johnson inquired if the proposed UN resolution might be amended to show that the UN force goes into the area at the same time that Israel withdraws. Amb. Lodge believed that we had already obtained from the UN all that was possible in that respect in the resolution adopted early in February. Sen. Knowland asked why the UN could not put its seal of approval on what Sec. Dulles had said in the aide-mémoire. Mr. Vorys reasserted that it is undesirable to establish a precedent in the UN where an aggressor can demand guarantees prior to rectifying the aggression.

Sen. Mansfield said the United States should not be acting alone in this matter but should be tied in with the UN, especially since a UN force is involved. Sec. Dulles stated that the UN should not be engaged in bargaining, whereas the United States alone properly could work toward assurances provided withdrawal took place.

Amb. Lodge then read the earlier UN resolution, stating that it appeared to be the resolution that Senators Knowland, Mansfield, and Fulbright were now urging. He added that, in view of recent developments, two-thirds of the UN would probably not now go even that far.

Sen. Fulbright asked Mr. Lodge if there was now any way in which we could assure Israel and obtain agreement to withdraw, and Sen. Knowland inquired if we could get the UN to postpone action for two weeks. Amb. Lodge recounted the difficulties of securing any further postponement especially since we would thus appear to be opposing UN action.³

Mr. Vorys then asked if everybody in the group agreed that Israel should withdraw. Sen. Fulbright was not so sure all agreed unless it could be certain that Israel would get justice in the future.

Mr. Taber read a draft statement that might be issued following the meeting, stressing the need for Israeli forces to withdraw and UN forces to occupy the area. Mr. McCormack was afraid that Egypt would become stubborn following Israeli withdrawal and then the United States would have to recapitulate or resort to force. Mr. Vorys commented that if the UN failed to handle the situation and if Egypt should attack Israel with Russian support, the United States would then be in a much worse dilemma. Sec. Dulles concurred in the possibility of some such situation, since Israeli refusal to withdraw would bring an end to the cease fire and guerrilla warfare would be resumed in Gaza and the Straits of Tiran. He foresaw an increasingly difficult situation which would ultimately harm the economy of one or more European nations who would then be tempted to use force in the area—and again Russia could virtuously support Egypt against aggression by one of our friends.

Senators Saltonstall and Knowland again tried to urge delay in the UN action. Amb. Lodge restated the difficulties.

Sen. Russell saw the need for immediate solution of the problem. He could not see any possibility of unanimous agreement by this group. Consequently, he felt that action rested with the President and that he might make a statement to crystallize public opinion along the lines of the statement made at the opening of this meeting. The President said he had been giving thought to this for about ten days and he ran briefly over the possible highlights of such a statement. Sen. Russell affirmed his belief that the President could crystallize the thinking of the American people.⁴

Sen. Smith asked what comments might be in order for the press. The President could not see any feasible limitation that might be in order on comments to the press, but he did ask that all of the group be moderate in their comments. Sen. Smith ascertained from the President that he was not asking the specific question of whether the members of the group agreed in the Secretary’s position. The President added that he wanted the group to meet primarily for the purpose of having opportunity to look at the situation since those present did bear heavy responsibilities.

Senators Saltonstall and Russell suggested the possibility of advance notice by telephone to Ben-Gurion regarding the President’s statement. Sec. Dulles pointed to the lack of privacy in telephone conversations to that area.

Speaker Rayburn commented that America has either one voice or none and the one voice was the voice of the President even though not everyone agreed with him.

The meeting ended with an expression of thanks from the President to the group for attending.

LAM

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by Minnich.
2. Document 83.
3. Later that day in New York, Lodge spoke with Jordanian Representative Rifai, Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi, and Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik in an effort to gain a 24-hour postponement in General Assembly consideration of the Middle East question. Fawzi expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts and agreed to delay the Assembly’s consideration until Friday, February 22. Rifai, who was chairman of the Afro-Asian group for the month, agreed to recommend the postponement to the group; he subsequently informed Lodge that the group had agreed to the postponement. (Delga 770 from USUN, February 20; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–2057)
4. At 9 p.m. that evening, President Eisenhower spoke to the nation over radio and television concerning the Israeli withdrawal situation. In his address, the President noted that he had met earlier in the day with Congressional leaders from both parties and that the general feeling of the meeting was that the President should lay the situation before the American people. For text of Eisenhower’s remarks, see Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1957, pp. 387-391, or United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957, pp. 301–307.