303. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 6, 1956, 10:35 a.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretary Hoover
- Colonel Goodpaster
Mr. Hoover handed the President a message from Secretary Dulles reporting on his Suez meetings in New York on October [Page 651] fifth.2 Referring to the passage reporting the Secretary’s discussion with Shepilov, the President said he was glad the Secretary had thrown Shepilov’s words “into his teeth.” Mr. Hoover left the message for the President.
Mr. Hoover next showed the President a copy of a note from Nehru to the Secretary giving his ideas how further action might proceed. Later, State Department sent over a copy of this note.3
In the course of discussion, the President said he thought Secretary Dulles can go along with the British so long as it is understood that what is being put forward now is simply a proposal,4 and that we stand ready to take it into negotiation. The President felt there must be some kind of international participation in any acceptable solution, so that the whole power of control of the use of the Canal is not left to one little country. He did not feel that all the details could or should be spelled out in the treaty. He felt that a broad provision on the powers of a general manager might be of central importance—for example, the board (which would have international representation) might have authority to disapprove the actions of the manager by a majority vote, and fire him by a two-thirds vote. The manager must, however, have the operating authority subject to these controls.
Mr. Hoover next reported that the Egyptians seemed to be trying to split off the U.S. from the U.K. and France, using the American press in the process. The President indicated he might have himself fostered, at an early stage in this incident, one of the ideas they are now using—that of a private consortium. Mr. Hoover saw merit in a management group coming in to operate the Canal as had been done with the oil fields in Iran. The Egyptians appeared to be suggesting this in an effort to split us off from our allies. If something like this were done, it should be formalized in a treaty, in which our Allies would join. The President indicated that there might be merit in commercial users making a deal with Egypt [Page 652] (possibly including the deepening and improvement of the Canal) with the arrangement confirmed by the treaty. While there was some question whether the French would want a peaceful solution, the British might accept it.
The President saw the development of the matter in terms of our offering SCUA as our proposal, Egypt making a counterproposal, and then trying to reach agreement.
Summarizing, the President said he was highly pleased to have the Secretary’s report. He thought we could go along with the U.K. and France in presenting the proposal. However, if there is any “give” on the other side, we should try to work for constructive negotiations.
Mr. Hoover reported that the studies of super-tanker development looked quite good. The optimum size might be 60,000–65,000 tons; these could transit the Canal empty and round the Cape when loaded. The key to this effort might be a statement by the Government guaranteeing to take the tankers off the shipbuilders’ hands if they are unable to dispose of them otherwise.
Colonel, CE, US Army
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The time of the meeting is from the record of the President’s Daily Appointments. (Ibid.)↩
- Supra.↩
- Not printed. The message from Nehru was transmitted to the Department of State in a letter dated October 5 from the First Secretary of the Indian Embassy, B.K. Massand, to Secretary Dulles. In the message, Nehru informed Dulles that he had asked Krishna Menon to travel to Cairo and London, and then possibly to New York. He also noted that the Indian Government felt that the gap between the two sides on the Suez issue was “capable of being bridged” and that Menon’s informal approaches to the parties involved might “yield better results than mere public assertion of rigid viewpoints in the Security Council.” The Department of State transmitted a copy of this message to Dulles in New York in Tosec 3, October 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–556) A copy of Tosec 3 in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File, bears a marginal inscription by Goodpaster: “Noted by President 6 Oct 56”.↩
- Reference is to the draft U.K.-French resolution submitted to the Security Council on October 5. See Document 299.↩