Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

279. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 28, 1956, 12:38 p.m.¹

Washington, September 28, 1956, 12:38 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Israel Raids on Jordan; General Near East Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• The Ambassador of Jordan, Mr. Abdul Monem Rifa’i
• The Secretary
• Mr. Rountree, NEA
• Mr. Bergus, NE

The Secretary expressed his pleasure at the Ambassador’s return to the United States.

The Ambassador referred to the magnitude of the last three Israel military operations into Jordan.² Military aircraft and heavy weapons had been used. In the September 25 raid, the Jordanians believed that two Israel battalions (2000 men) had been involved. The MAC had confirmed that at least one battalion had been used by the Israelis. Furthermore, the Israelis were now officially announcing and boasting about these raids. This meant that they represented Israel policy. Jordan had information that Israel intended to continue the raids.

This situation presented Jordan with three alternatives: first, to take the matter to the Security Council. Mr. Rifa’i had discussed this possibility in New York recently with the Secretary General and various delegations. He found that the consensus of opinion was that Jordan should avoid Security Council action in view of the fact that the Suez Canal matter was under discussion there. Mr. Rifa’i tended to agree with this thinking, as he did not like to see the Arabs in action on too many UN fronts, such as Suez, Algeria, and Arab-Israel, at one time. Furthermore, if Jordan did go to the Council they might succeed in getting a condemnation of Israel, but Israel has disregarded such condemnations in the past. Nevertheless, Jordan still might decide to take the matter to the Council. A second alternative was for Jordan to take military measures in connection with the other Arab states to prepare to protect itself from Israel. This might complicate the present situation and involve the whole area but Jordan might have no other course. A third alternative could be for the United States, perhaps in concert with Britain and France, to take economic and political measures against Israel— something more than diplomatic pressure—to make Israel stop these acts.

Mr. Rifa’i said he could not guarantee that Jordan could keep the frontier absolutely calm. Jordan was doing its very best. He could state privately that the Jordan Army was no longer under tight foreign control but in the hands of young Arab officers, some of whom were hot-headed. Israel was prone to provocative acts along its side of the border. This matter was so important that Mr. Rifa’i was bringing it to the Secretary personally to urge that something be done.

The Secretary said that first he wished Mr. Rifa’i to know that he deplored these large-scale outbreaks of violence. He had expressed this publicly on September 26³ and wished to repeat it privately. Secondly, he was glad that the Jordanians felt that they could come to the United States as a friendly Government and talk over these matters frankly. The question of what to do was a very difficult one, largely because the delicate balance that had been maintained in the Near East had been disturbed by the seizure of the Suez Canal and the new forces thus released. Some of the things which we could have done to restrain Israel were now more difficult in the face of new issues such as anti-Western propaganda emanating from the Arabs. This had worried the Secretary, not only because of its direct consequences, and he had exerted himself to prevent a war over the Suez Canal. There were also interim consequences of upsetting the balance which had in the past restrained Israel. The Israelis might well feel that these other issues give them a protective shield behind which they can take strong measures. The Secretary hoped that the Jordan Government would realize this and exert its influence on Egypt to adopt a peaceful attitude in the Suez matter. He had been disappointed when the Egyptians simply rejected the proposals of the Committee of Five, rather than putting forward counter-proposals which could have been a basis for negotiation. He hoped that something constructive would come out of the Security Council handling of the matter. Those who did not wish Israel to take advantage of the present situation should do what they could to get the situation settled.

Mr. Rifa’i stated privately, off the record, that in the course of his sojourn in the Near East the King of Saudi Arabia had told him that he would give all reasonable support to Nasser but would not back him if he chose to challenge the West militarily or if he brought the Soviets into the area. Lebanon and Jordan had a similar attitude. He felt the British were going too far in describing Egypt’s attitude. Both parties agreed to freedom of navigation. If it were a matter of lack of confidence in Egypt, the other Arab states were prepared to share the responsibility for free navigation. Mr. Rifa’i said he understood that Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi would be coming to New York prepared to “take an easy attitude” in negotiations in the corridor. Mr. Rifa’i wished to compliment the Secretary personally for what he had done to prevent war.

The Secretary pointed out that this Administration had gone much further than its predecessor in preventing Zionist elements from dictating our foreign policy. The tragic difficulty is that despite these efforts our relations with some Arab states, at least, have never been so bad. We were thus being told publicly that our policy had failed. Mr. Rifa’i did not think that US relations with the Arab states were so bad. The outstanding difficulties arose from acts committed during previous administrations.

As the Ambassador took his leave, the Secretary said that the United States valued its relations with Jordan and wished to be Jordan’s friend. This was our desire, even though the present situation might make it hard for us to do everything which Jordan would like.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/9–2856. Secret. Drafted by Bergus. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. A “Chronology of Recent Jordan-Israel Border Incidents,” prepared as part of the briefing material for a meeting between Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Eban later on September 28 (see infra) listed eight violent exchanges resulting in fatalities along the Israeli-Jordanian border between August 21 and September 25, including Israeli cross-border raids on August 21, September 11, September 13, and September 25. (Attached to a memorandum from Rountree to Dulles, September 28; Department of State, Central Files, 601.84A11/9–2856)
3. Dulles’ remarks were made during a press conference. The transcript is printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 8, 1956, pp. 543–549. For excerpts pertaining to the Middle East, see United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957, pp. 87–98.