Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

198. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Eric Johnston, Chairman of the International Development Advisory Board, Washington, August 18, 1955, 3:10 p.m.¹

Washington, August 18, 1955, 3:10 p.m.

The Secretary telephoned Eric Johnston in New York and said he understood the Arab League was getting into Mr.Johnston’s party.Johnston said they had kept them out up to the present time and he felt they would take only a negative attitude. He said they would tell the States involved they would do business with them on this project, although they can consult with whom they wish.Johnston said the project was the key to the solution to the difficulties in the area. Until the backbone of the resistance was broken, he did not see how the problem could be solved. The best way, he said, of solving the Arab refugee problem was this water project. The Secretary agreed that if it went into the Arab League it would be a morass. On the other hand, we are not prepared to beat down Colonel Nasser at the moment. He is probably using this as a device to restore his prestige in relation to the Arab League. That is maybe what he is up to.Johnston thought this perhaps might be true. J. said a cable had come in a while ago to the effect that Lebanon was behind the move to put this in the Arab League.² This was not true of Egypt and if this is correct that puts quite a different aspect on the situation.Johnston said if he could have a talk with Nasser he would stress the futility of allowing this to go into the Arab League. He said he realized the difficulties of trying to put this over and was not nearly as sanguine of success as he was a month ago.Johnston said he knew how helpful it would be to the Secretary if he could put this thing over and he still hoped it was possible.

The Secretary said he may have to make his statement sooner than he thought.Johnston said if there were repercussions he might be able to temper them while he was over there. The Secretary asked if J. felt he should go right away in spite of this business.Johnston said he did think he should go. He said that Saudi Arabia and Iraq were at each other’s throats and did not appear to be interested in a solution. We appreciated Egypt’s help and were delighted she was taking a renewed interest in the project.Johnstonreiterated how important it was for him to get out there and said if we waited two or three weeks the different States would not have the courage to resist and it will get into the Arab League and never get out.Johnston said he thought there was so much involved that he should do what he could for the Secretary’s sake. The Sec. said he didn’t believe the statement would be such that it would interfere with Johnston’s operation. If we don’t do something to keep it out of the Arab League it will sink anyway.

Johnston said that to be perfectly honest with the Secretary he would prefer that the Sec. not make the statement now but if in his judgment he thought he should it was OK with Johnston, but he did think he would make the trip in any event.

The Secretary said the reasons he wanted to make the statement were: If the Russians began to get into the scene, particularly in Egypt with various devices which they are now using at the present time and the situation becomes intensified, we would have to alter our entire position from one of neutrality in the area. The situation is rapidly changing and we should do something soon. It is more or less perhaps backing Egypt against Israel. There are risks involved.³

Johnston said Nasser and the King of Jordan were all right but Lebanon and Syria would do nothing to keep the project out of the League.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Mildred J. Asbjornson.
2. Reference is presumably to telegram 139 from Baghdad, August 18, in which Gallman informed the Department that the Lebanese Government had asked Iraq to “side with latter in insisting that Johnston discussions be conducted with A[rab] L[eague] in Cairo rather than with individual Arab States.” (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/8–1855)
3. On August 23,Dulles informed Johnston that “I can now confirm my plan to make public statement on Israel-Arab problem in NY on Aug. 26”; that the Chargé in Amman was to make the text of the speech available to Johnston; and that Johnston was free to say that his water negotiations “stand on their own merits” and were separate from the goals to be outlined in Dulles’ speech. (Telegram 77 to Amman;ibid., 684A.86/8–2355)