Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

403. Memorandum for the Record, by Colonel James I. Muir of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam¹

Saigon, November 5, 1957.

The Country Team discussed the provision of funds in the 1958 budget for the Self-Defense Corps at a Country Team meeting in the Ambassador’s office on Tuesday, 5 November, beginning at 1000 hours. The following personnel attended: Ambassador Durbrow, General Williams, Mr. Barrows, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Chapman, Mr. Haraldson, Capt Brookings, Mr. Opal, [name deleted], Lt Col Haley, Mr. Price, Mr. Bowie, Colonel Muir, Lt Col White, Major Gildersleeve.²

Ambassador Durbrow discussed the various reports concerning the operations and administration of the SDC which had been received from … MSU, pointing out that it appeared the SDC was badly infiltrated with Viet Cong agents, that it had no real training in police work, anti-subversion operations, political warfare or military training, and that pay was not uniform throughout the Corps; there was no real screening of personnel inducted into the Corps, and that they had no equipment worthy of the name. He went on to say that the lack of MAAG reports from the Southwestern area of Viet Nam seemed most ominous to him, and indicated that the VN were trying to hide something from the MAAG Advisors.

Major Gildersleeve discussed a written report submitted by the 5th Region advisor, and an oral report made by the 11th Division advisor, pointing out specifically that there was no indication of Viet Cong infiltration in either of these reports from the Southwestern area.

Colonel Muir explained that training of SDC was about to be taken over by the DOD, in accordance with an agreement between [name deleted] and Secretary Chau, and that MAAG had prepared a training program for SDC that would be sent to DOD shortly.

Mr. Durbrow said that Mr. Chau, 10 days before, had told him that training of the SDC would be done by the Civil Guard, and not by the DOD. Colonel Muir explained that DOD had confirmed only three days before that ARVN would conduct training for SDC, and that DOD was awaiting the training program from MAAG.

Mr. Barrows said in his opinion the new letter from Mr. Chau on the subject of the Civil Guard changed the whole picture, and that an attempt should be made to find out where a solution of the Civil Guard program would take us before any decision was made on SDC. It might be determined that it would be better to spend funds, which might otherwise go to the SDC, on improving the Civil Guard, or on some other project.

Major Gildersleeve quoted from the guidance provided by the Operations Coordination [Coordinating] Board of the National Security Council dated April 1957,³ and Mr. Barrows explained that the guidance from OCB had been based on reports from Viet Nam, and in his opinion the situation had changed.

Mr. Durbrow asked supposing funds were not provided for the SDC, were there any other projects that might be undertaken with the money that was so saved. Colonel Muir explained that the Budget Advisory Committee, in considering the budget, had approached each request on its own merit, actually including one project not requested by the Vietnamese (the formation of animal pack units) because it was felt that it was a requirement. In view of the fact that each request had been considered entirely on its own merit, there did not appear to be any areas where more money could be logically applied in the event funds were refused for SDC.

Ambassador Durbrow reiterated his concern about the apparently poor administration and questionable operations of the SDC, and agreed with Mr. Barrows that the letter concerning the future of the Civil Guard⁴ would have many implications affecting the SDC. He asked General Williams if he wished to join him in a discussion with Mr. Chau on this letter, and General Williams pointed out that [name deleted] should also be present in order to clarify the matter of training for the SDC. He also explained that he did not want to have any discussion until he had had time to study the proposals in the letter and have his staff comment on them. Ambassador Durbrow said he had thought that clarification of the obvious loop holes in the letter might make staff consideration of the letter simpler, and Mr. Barrows agreed. Ambassador Durbrow said he would arrange for a meeting with Mr. Chau on Tuesday or Wednesday, 12 or 13 November.⁵

Mr. Barrows stated that he had not yet heard any evidence that had led him to believe that the U.S. should not support a 30,000 SDC, despite the reports from MSU …, nor had he heard any conclusive evidence that the U.S. should instead support 43,500. He suggested that approval of the budget to support a SDC of 30,000 would solve the immediate problem of the budget. Mr. Haraldson suggested that the entire military budget for the SDC might as well be supported by the United States, since the U.S. would directly or indirectly be supporting the Vietnamese contribution to the budget in any case. Ambassador Durbrow expressed concern at the fact that the SDC had been in being for two years, and that we had poured money into it for two years, and that still it was not working, and appeared to be infiltrated with Viet Cong. Colonel Muir objected that it was working very well except in the South and that it was unfair to state that the SDC was not working and was no good. Major Gildersleeve pointed out that the SDC was working very well in sensitive areas of Quang Tri, Hue and Tourane. Mr. Barrows said he thought this was because the villages in this areas were good villages, rather than because the SDC was particularly good. Lt Col White reviewed the basic ideas which had been behind the formation of the SDC, pointing out that it had been intended that the SDC be a static force in the villages, while the Civil Guard should provide a mobile force to assist in pacification operations. General Williams asked if Ambassador Durbrow desired to cut out all funds for the SDC, and Ambassador Durbrow said no, but that he thought some caveat should be applied to the expenditure of funds which might be made available for the SDC.

A general discussion followed concerning the controls which might be placed on funds made available through MAAG, and it was agreed that controls should be established that would permit MAAG to withhold funds even though they had been approved in the budget.

After considerable additional discussion along the same general lines as the above, considering the pros and cons of support for the SDC, it was agreed that:

(1) The budget presented by MAAG to the Country Team would be approved, with a specific caveat concerning the SDC, stating that funds would not be released for the SDC until the GVN has agreed to certain improvements and clarifications in the administration and overall operations of the SDC.

(2) Needed clarifications and improvements in the SDC would be discussed with representatives of the GVN, and it would be explained to GVN that funds would not be released until the Country Team was satisfied that improvement could and would be made. Ambassador Durbrow would discuss these matters with Mr. Chau, and thought it might prove desirable for him and General Williams to discuss them also with the President at a later date.

(3) The decision as to the amount of funds to be applied to the support of SDC should be reached, if possible, before 1 January 1958 by the Country Term [Team].

(4) If possible, MAAG should assume the additional duty of checking on the performance of the SDC. General Williams pointed out that this may not be feasible, and that it would require study on the part of MAAG before he could agree to it.

(5) USOM would continue check on the status and performance of the Civil Guard pending clarification.

(6) USOM would check with Mr. Chau on the exact meaning of the provisions of the letter concerning the future of the Civil Guard.

(7) The caveats to be presented to the Vietnamese Government would be developed by Mr. Bowie, assisted by Colonel Muir. In this connection, General Williams pointed out that the only caveats he required were those submitted in paragraph 6 of MAGCH 6540;⁶ and that since the exceptions taken to the proposed budget support had been voiced by the Ambassador, USOM, and MSU, he wished the caveats based on their concern to be prepared by them.

(8) The caveat to accompany the budget to Washington, in connection with the support for the SDC, would be prepared by Mr. Bowie, and Colonel Muir.

Subsequent to the meeting Mr. Bowie, Colonel Muir, and finally the Ambassador agreed that the following paragraph should be included in a covering letter, which should become an integral part of the budget.

“In respect to funds for the Self-Defense Corps, information has recently come to the attention of the Country Team which has led it to conclude that it is important to require certain improvements and clarifications in the administration in the overall operation of this Corps before finally releasing funds for its support. In addition to the stipulations established in paragraph 6 of radio MAGCH 6540 and approved by CINCPAC in radio 162305Z,⁷ and DOD in radio 242237Z,⁸ concerning the SDC, additional caveats must be worked out with the Vietnamese Government before funds will be released by MAAG.”

At the same time, the Ambassador agreed that the military budget approved by the Country Team should be presented to representatives of DOD, with the clear understanding that funds for the support of the SDC had not been approved by the Country Team, and would be forthcoming only if certain provisos concerning the SDC were met by the Vietnamese Government.

General Williams later approved the paragraph concerning release of funds for the SDC to be included in the covering letter submitted with the budget.

James I Muir, Jr.
Colonel, Infantry

1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Memos to and from Advisor Sec Def 1957 (27). Confidential. Colonel Muir served as an adviser in the Ministry of Defense.
2. Alan L. Campbell, Jr., and Christian G. Chapman were both Political Officers with the rank of Second Secretary. Wesley G. Haraldson, Deputy Director of the U.S. Operations Mission; Captain Robert S. Brookings II, Naval Attaché; Chester H. Opal, Country Public Affairs Officer; Lieutenant Colonel John J. Haley, Assistant Army Attaché; Darrell M. Price, Deputy Public Affairs Officer; Thomas D. Bowie, Counselor for Political Affairs. Lieutenant Colonel White and Major Gildersleeve were members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group.
3. “Outline Plan of Operations with Respect to Vietnam,” April 12, not printed. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Vietnam)
4. See footnote 3, Document 399.
5. A meeting between Durbrow and Chau took place November 7. See ibid.

6. In this telegram of October 8 (081001Z) Williams had given CINCPAC his “military evaluation of SDC and overall requirement justified for US support.” The MAAG Chief noted that since the combined efforts of the Army, the Civil Guard, and the Self-Defense Corps had brought about a long-range improvement in the internal security situation, it was hard to isolate the SDC’s contribution, but that it had “contributed substantially to the cause of the Vietnamese Government by serving as a deterrent to communist and rebel activity in areas not protected by other police, para-military or military units and by assuming in conjunction with the civil guard security missions in remote areas which previously had been responsibility of the Army.” After a description of the SDC’s command structure and its training, Williams concluded:

   “SDC units should be located in villages and towns along the Laos–Vietnam and Cambodian-Vietnam borders, in other remote villages along possible avenues of approach in pacified but still vulnerable areas which are not protected by other static units. Units should be provided only for villages with population of 5000 or less. Size of units should vary, dependent on village. population, remoteness from other security forces and security requirements. After relating these factors to the total number of villages of under 5000 population in Vietnam, this MAAG concludes that 43,500 SDC personnel will meet the minimum military requirements for static SDC units in villages. US support for not less than 43,500 SDC personnel is recommended for CY 1958.

   “The SDC still holds promise of giving a big return for a relatively small investment. Properly deployed and trained SDC units will not only give villagers assurance of governmental protection but will add materially to the development of both short and long range military capabilities. Realization of the full potential of the SDC requires that the organization be divorced completely from the Civil Guard, that training be standardized, improved and modelled along para-military lines, and that missions and dispositions be reoriented toward the original static concept. MAAG efforts are directed toward accomplishment of these improvements.” (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, TWXs 1957 (14)

7. In this telegram to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated October 17 and repeated for information to MAAG Vietnam, CINCPAC concurred in U.S. support of SDC forces at the 43,500 level recommended by MAAG Vietnam. (ibid.)
8. In this telegram to CINCPAC, dated October 25, repeated for information to MAAG Vietnam, OSD stated it had no objection to informing the Vietnamese Government of U.S. support of the SDC at the 43,500 level, though it warned that this might mean a cut in some other segment of the Vietnamese military budget. (ibid.)