711.56396/4–254
No. 360
The Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the
Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of
Defense (Davis)
My Dear Admiral Davis: I refer to your letter of April 2, 1954, and to previous discussions and correspondence, including a letter from Assistant Secretary Nash dated December 3, 1953, regarding the use of United States military and naval bases in the Philippines by vessels and aircraft of third powers.1
This subject has been dealt with in paragraph 33 of NSC paper 5413/1,2 which reads: “Seek under circumstances compatible with [Page 601] paragraph 15 to improve the arrangements which provide for unrestricted access by the United States to military bases in the Philippines for its own and allied forces.”
Paragraph 15 reads:
“Conduct United States relations and activities in the Philippines in a friendly and helpful manner, while avoiding actions which appear to ‘direct’ or ‘control’ Philippine activities or leaders.”
The Department of State will, of course, make every effort to seek to improve the arrangements now in effect with a view to obtaining maximum freedom of action for the United States in this matter. As you state, however, successful negotiation with the Philippines to achieve this end will depend in large part upon the timing and the manner of approach which we select.
The question of third power access has presented difficulties for several years, since each approach to the Philippines on the subject has revealed that the Philippine Government adheres strongly to the view that the Military Bases Agreement does not give the United States the right to authorize unilaterally the entry of third power vessels and aircraft into our bases. An attempt to solve the problem was initiated in 1949, when negotiations were started which culminated in an exchange of notes in late 19513 granting to “integrated” foreign warships the same status enjoyed by United States ships. The Department’s records reveal that the correspondence leading up to this exchange of notes was closely coordinated with COMNAVPHIL by the Embassy in Manila, and that the final version of the agreement was based upon a memorandum sent to the Department by Rear Admiral J. H. Thach, Jr., then Director, International Affairs, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
On the basis of the agreement embodied in this exchange of notes, the Embassy in Manila has subsequently attempted to facilitate the operation of our bases in the Philippines by entering into arrangements with the Philippine Government regarding third power aircraft. (The documents providing these arrangements were transmitted to the Department of State by the Embassy’s despatch number 791, dated January 20, 1954,3 copies of which were sent to the Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.) The Department of State has been informed by Ambassador Spruance that, “I am of the opinion that the documents enclosed in despatch No. 791 provide an adequate solution. I have discussed this question [Page 602] with Admiral Cruzen4 and General Sessums5 who feel that the arrangements to which the Philippines have agreed are quite workable and satisfactory and we need anticipate no trouble whatever”.
It is apparent from our negotiations with the Philippines that the Philippine Government would not accept, as a matter of law, the view that we have the right to authorize unilaterally the entry of third power vessels and aircraft into our bases. This being so, it would appear that our best approach would be to recognize the fact that there may be differences between the two countries on the interpretation of the Military Bases Agreement, and to seek new and more favorable arrangements on the ground that unrestricted flexibility in the use of our bases in the Pacific is vital to the defense of the Pacific area, including the Philippines.
The Department of State will undertake to approach the Philippines along these lines, but I do not believe that the present time is propitious, or that we would be able at this time to secure Philippine agreement to an improved arrangement. I cite below extracts from a recent letter from Ambassador Spruance setting forth his reasons for opposing action on third power access at present.
“I think that the position advanced by the naval officers who talked to you completely overlooks the fact that if we approach the Philippine Government at this time, the preparation of the Philippine reply would be handled by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Guerrero. He has just received a great deal of publicity on the doctrine of ‘Asia for the Asians’ which he expounded in a recent speech. This is just the sort of an argument that Guerrero loves and, ably seconded by Senator Recto, he would cite the Navy position as being exactly the kind of thing he had in mind. He is quite capable, if we take an extremely technical position, of taking a leaf from the Russian book and pointing to the language of Article III of the Bases Agreement, which says that we are given all rights, power and authority we need ‘which are necessary to provide access’, and to say in effect: ‘As we have no certain means of identifying United States planes, it is necessary for our protection and security that all planes approaching Clark Field come in along a designated corridor and at certain heights’, such as by way of Subic Bay or the Gulf of Lingayen. He could point out that we had acquiesced in such an arrangement in Germany and he could put forth an argument which would be most persuasive to the Filipinos that this was an entirely reasonable suggestion.
“The question of what we do in comparable situations in other foreign countries is one which the Filipinos watch very closely. That is why we recently requested copies of the United States-Spanish [Page 603] Bases Agreement6 because there have been frequent references in the press recently indicating that Senator Recto and others have some knowledge of the provisions of that agreement and believe that our arrangements with the Spanish Government are much more favorable to Spain than is our arrangement with the Philippines. I am not familiar with the details of the Spanish Agreement or with any of the arrangements for bases in other foreign states, but I would doubt very much if we have taken such an extreme position in other cases. It is all very well to say that the Philippines agreement is quite a different matter—as it undoubtedly is—but it is something else again to convince people like Recto and Guerrero that the situation is different.
“I can appreciate the fact that the Navy Department, in considering this question, may have been looking forward to some future period when a government perhaps not so friendly was in power. But an unfriendly government could find many other ways, if it wanted to be technical, to harass us in the operation of our bases—as for example, the question of limited access routes which I mentioned above which might be much more serious. As mentioned in despatch No. 799 [791], if President Magsaysay were to agree to the Navy position, we would expose him to the most vicious sort of attacks and I would strongly urge that our answer to the Navy position should be to ‘let sleeping dogs lie’. I don’t have anything to add to the views contained in despatch No. 799 [791]. When it was in preparation I communicated with Admiral Cruzen. His suggested modifications were incorporated in the despatch before I sent it on.
“I am sorry that I cannot concur in the views expressed by my old Service. I can fully understand the desire for the utmost freedom of movement, but in this case I feel that the political realities of the situation override the hypothetical risk involved. I appreciate your writing me about this whole question.”
I agree with the Ambassador that we have more to lose than to gain by attempting to carry out the intent of Paragraph 33 of NSC paper 5413/1 under present circumstances, but assure you that the Department of State will seek to conclude the desired arrangements as soon as there seems to be a good chance for successful negotiation with the Philippines. In the meantime, the Department and the Embassy will make every effort to eliminate any inconvenience which may arise under the arrangements now in effect on an ad hoc basis.
Sincerely yours,