Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

601.56D11/8–453

No. 249
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)

secret

[Washington,] August 4, 1953.

Subject:

• Farewell Call On Indonesian Ambassador

Participants:

• His Excellency Ali Sastroamidjojo, Ambassador to [of] Indonesia
• PSA–Philip W. Bonsal

I called on the Indonesian Ambassador in order to say goodby to him prior to his departure for Djakarta next Friday. He stated that he will arrive in Djakarta about August 11.

After the usual exchange of amenities and courtesies, together with a very sincere expression on my part of regret at the Ambassador’s departure, I said I was glad he was seeing the President on August 6. I inquired whether there was any particular subject which he would like to take up with the President the discussion of which might be facilitated by prior advice. He replied in the negative stating that he envisagad merely a courtesy call and that he would not wish in any way to embarrass the President by bringing up subjects on which the President was not prepared and that, at most, he would merely refer to some of the topics which he has discussed from time to time with his friends in the Department.¹

I stated that I had been to some extent concerned at press reports regarding the character of the new Indonesian Government which Dr. Ali is to head. I said that I felt these reports, originating from Djakarta, were undoubtedly inaccurate to the extent that they contributed a pro-Communist tendency to the new Government; that I wondered how Dr. Ali accounted for this sort of analysis of the political situation in Indonesia. The Ambassador replied by stating that it was ridiculous to consider that these stories reflected the truth. He stressed that his own position in opposition to Communism was well known and that his party had not forgotten the many victims it had suffered in the Madiun uprising in 1948. He said that, of course, the Nationalist Party is a party which originated in the Indonesian revolution and that it undoubtedly has aspirations which some people characterize as “socialistic” but he expressed in strongest terms the democratic foundation of the party’s philosophy. The Ambassador also referred to his own conviction as to necessity for foreign investment in Indonesia and that the position which he has stated in the United States on this subject continues to be the position which he will further as Prime Minister.

Referring again to the press stories regarding the Government which he is to head, the Ambassador said that both the first Vice President Wongsonegoro of the PIR and the second Vice President Arifin of the Nahladatul Ulama would not have been allowed by their parties to participate in a Government with Communistic tendencies. He said that the first Vice President belongs to a party which draws its strength chiefly from senior public officials who are far from being “Red” and cannot even be described as being “pink”, while the second Vice President belongs to a very old established Moslem crowd of markedly conservative tendencies.

The Ambassador said that even without the support of the Communists which had been promised his Government as long as his Government’s policy meets with the approval of the Communists he felt that he would have a small but comfortable majority in the Indonesian Parliament. His calculation seems to have been reached by adding to the 114 votes (of the total 212 votes) controlled by the Governmental parties, the votes of a certain number of independents and of smaller groupings who would not vote against the Government.

The Ambassador then took occasion to state that he had been much concerned at the poor press Indonesia has been receiving in recent months not only with respect to the new Government but also in general. He said that he contributed [attributed?] this bad press very largely to the activities of reactionary Dutch elements principally businessmen, who, according to the Ambassador, desire to maintain a monopolistic position in Indonesia by frightening other capitalists who might be inclined to invest there. I expressed surprise and regret at this allegation if true, stating, as I had frequently done to the Ambassador, that it seemed to me that a smooth cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands could be extremely beneficial to both countries and that it need not involve the elimination of cooperation between Indonesia and other friendly governments.

The Ambassador agreed in general to this proposition but stated that unfortunately we must face the fact that there are two issues preventing good relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, in addition to the hostility of the business interests to which he had referred. These two issues are, first, the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and, second, “Irian” (Western New Guinea). He said that both he and Ambassador van Roijen thought the Union might as well be dissolved since it serves no purpose. The Ambassador took occasion to speak very highly of van Roijen and the personal relations which he enjoyed with him. Turning to Irian, the Ambassador stated that this remained the key issue between the Netherlands and Indonesia. He said, as he has frequently done in the past, that the U.S. by recognizing the legitimacy of Indonesia’s aspirations in the matter could convert the already friendly feeling in the U.S. into a feeling of great sympathy and ardent friendship. He said that he thought we should assume in this matter a clear-cut anti-colonial attitude although he recognized the difficulties of the problem from our point of view. He referred to a recent conversation which he had with the Secretary in which the latter described to him the increasingly successful efforts which we are making to induce the French to drop colonial attitudes in Indochina. He said he hoped we would take some sort of similar attitude in the matter of New Guinea. In reply I outlined for the Ambassador our well known position of neutrality in this matter and the hope that the two parties concerned would work out a solution. He recognized that this hope had been somewhat dimmed by the passage of time. I asked the Ambassador whether in the event that a direct settlement would not appear possible, he envisaged any initiative to secure a settlement on the part of his country by means other than direct negotiation. He made no clear-cut reply, merely reiterating his statement of hope.

The Ambassador stated, in reply to a question, that it was the policy of his Government to proceed with plans for the holding of elections. He said that the Minister of Justice and other officials were well known to him and he felt full preparations would be activated although the problem from the mechanical point of view is a difficult one.

In the course of conversation the question of rubber came up. I expressed appreciation for the economic and political problems which Indonesia is facing as a result of the present state of the rubber market. I also expressed appreciation of Indonesia’s adherence to the UN resolution as evidenced by her failure to ship rubber to Communist China. I said that I hoped this attitude would be maintained, particularly through the present highly critical period when it seemed to us and also to other members of the UN that any relaxation of measures of this sort would be highly damaging. The Ambassador said that he had received in most vigorous terms a similar statement from Mr. Robertson and he gave every indication of agreeing that no action would be taken at present. The Ambassador also took occasion to express his satisfaction with the recent Congressional legislation on the disposal of synthetic rubber plants and agreed with me that the points which the Indonesian Government has been concerned with are, to some extent at least, being remedied by recent legislation.²

In closing, I said that while it would be difficult to replace him as Ambassador, I hoped that his Government would not delay in the selection of his successor as long as we have delayed in finding a successor for Ambassador Cochran. He replied that he would give the highest priority to the appointment of a new Indonesian Ambassador here and that he hoped it would be possible to make a prompt and highly suitable selection. He said also that one of the first orders of business upon his return would be the consideration of our request for an agreement for a new American Ambassador to Indonesia. I expressed appreciation and said that the person in question was an old personal friend of mine and that I thought he would do a very good job in Indonesia. This remark was taken in good part by the Ambassador.

1. See Part II, section entitled “Respect for Indonesia’s ‘Independent’ Policy,” of Document 251.
2. Reference is to S. 2047 and H.R. 5728. H.R. 5728 was subsequently enacted into law as the Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Act of 1953, approved Aug. 7, 1953. (67 Stat. 408)