Office of the Historian

690B.9321/3–154: Telegram

No. 148
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State1

secret
priority
Rangoon, March 1, 1954—3 p.m.

835. Deptels 7552 and 760.3

  • Part I. Called on Permanent Secretary Foreign Office who handling KMT problem. Pursuant to committee’s request received February 24 through Pe Khin GUB has worked out extension ceasefire in certain areas as follows:

    a.
    Until March 15, cease-fire in area ten mile radius each Mong Hsat, Mong Kwan, Mong Yawng, Mong Yang and Pangyang.
    b.

    Until March 15, three miles on each side road Mong Hsat-Mong Tum-Mong Kwan-Tachilek.

    Comment: Cease-fire points have been selected on theory that KMTs could concentrate at any one or more of points mentioned. Permanent Secretary said when troops desire proceed Mong Hsat, committee should be notified and usual arrangements for safe conduct made through Burmese liaison.

    c.
    March 16 until March 31: Mong Kwan (ten mile radius) and three miles each side road to Tachilek.

    Comment: Permanent Secretary said above cease-fire plan represents considered view GUB and after March 31 question of further extension will not be considered. He expressed belief above plan would be sufficient facilitate evacuation those who agree evacuate.

  • Part II. Permanent Secretary fully informed by Pe Khin re desire KMTs in Tenasserim evacuate. Stated no objection on part GUB if KMTs desire leave from Myawadi or Palu, but latest information from Bangkok indicates KMTs themselves have chosen Palu in view confused situation Myawadi.

    He stated Myawadi would soon be attacked by Burma Army but should KMTs serve notice their desire evacuate from Palu, latter place would not be attacked. Suggests however evacuation be undertaken without delay in view Burma Army operations against KNDO’s Tenasserim area.

  • Part III. Permanent Secretary unresponsive suggestion GUB pay Mae Sod-Lampang airlift but agreed consider. Reiterated Burmese commitment pay all expenses within Burma.
  • Part IV. Pe Khin leaving for Bangkok March 2 with complete instructions concerning cease-fire parts 1 and 2 which already telegraphed Burmese Embassy Bangkok.
Sebald
  1. Repeated to Bangkok and Taipei.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. Telegram 760, Feb. 27, instructed the Embassy in Rangoon to stress to the Burmese Foreign Office the importance of the Burmese agreement to the continuation of the evacuation. (690B.9321/2–2754)↩