Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

4. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 31, 1986, 1555Z

18874. For the Secretary from Hartman. Subject: Your Meeting With Shevardnadze.

1. Secret—entire text.

2. As you prepare for next week’s meetings with Shevardnadze,² let me offer the following thoughts.

3. In Reykjavik we came close to striking an important arms control deal.³ The possibility of getting such an accord remains very much alive, but, after two weeks of public exchanges between Washington and Moscow, your talks with Shevardnadze are now crucial for getting things back on track.

4. I do not believe the Soviets intended to entrap us in Reykjavik; what they have been playing is a two-track approach. When Reykjavik did not produce agreement, they went public to generate support for their positions.⁴ Much as we did.⁵ When we went on the record with interpretations of Reykjavik they disputed, they went further by citing their own protocol. It is in our interests to turn off this approach. And the failure of Europe, and our own public and Congress, to embrace the Soviets’ proposals may have sobered them up. If they want to deal, it’s going to be with the administration, not around it.⁶

5. Shevardnadze will thus go to Vienna prepared to negotiate and may even have some new ideas. That’s the word around Moscow, and it would explain Karpov’s presence here rather than Geneva.

6. Your time with Shevardnadze will be limited; we will want to cover the items of interest to US (regional, bilateral, human rights)—at least in bullet form. As to arms control, I suggest you focus on SDI and the question of ABM Treaty interpretation. We are not as far apart on this as we thought October 12.⁷ While the Soviets desire tighter limits on SDI than even the ABM Treaty’s restrictive interpretation, both Shevardnadze and Dubinin have indicated since Reykjavik that there is give in the Soviet position.⁸ For example, both have emphasized that their concept of laboratory testing encompasses more activities than just those that take place within four walls and a roof.

7. We have told the Soviets we are ready to observe “strictly” the provisions of the ABM Treaty for ten years.⁹ This seems to me to open the way to compromise between the Soviet position and those who favor a broader reading of the treaty: We should make explicit to the Soviets that for ten years we would abide by the treaty’s restrictive (i.e., 1972) interpretation, with a negotiated understanding as to exactly what limits that would entail—and not entail—for the development and testing of SDI, particularly the testing of SDI in space. (A clearer understanding of the ABM Treaty limits is essential; ambiguities could be used against us in the future. We might, for example, run the risk that Congress would hold us to tighter constraints while the Soviets exploited grey areas to push further in the field of strategic defense.)

8. We might also consider translating the President’s position that SDI be non-nuclear into explicit assurances to the Soviets that we will not pursue x-ray lasers beyond a certain point (e.g., beyond underground concept tests).¹⁰ The Soviets appear to have an inordinate fear of Excalibur, which I understand is, in fact, less likely to produce results in the near-term than other SDI technologies under investigation.¹¹ Moving to placate this fear could make the Soviets more amenable to other aspects of SDI, and would reduce our current vulnerability to charges of misleading the public (by asserting SDI is non-nuclear while pressing forward on the x-ray laser).

9. These changes, granted, would place additional constraints on SDI beyond 1991 than we now may intend.¹² However, we need to show some flexibility in this area to clinch a deal for deep reductions. The Soviets feel they made the bulk of the concessions in Reykjavik on START and INF, and with some justification, since they essentially accepted the basic elements of U.S. proposals. Likewise, the Soviets accepted our overall approach on the testing question. But it would not be realistic to expect them to come around to our current position on SDI and the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.¹³

10. My other suggestion is that you and Shevardnadze set aside the issue of what would be eliminated in the second five-year period.¹⁴ It is a time-sink with virtually no prospect of agreement at this stage. Moreover, this is the aspect of our approach in Reykjavik that has given the Europeans—and some Americans—the greatest heartburn. It is also unrealistic: Neither we nor the Soviets can agree to give up nuclear arms or offensive ballistic missiles without bringing in third countries, and it’s difficult to see that happening before major U.S. and Soviet reductions are underway. If we focus attention in the negotiations, and in public statements, on the first five years’ offensive cuts, we will be better off.

11. Finally, I believe we should put down a marker and some specifics on verification. We must be clear with the Soviets—and with the public—that this is a major question. We don’t want anyone to be surprised when, once the principles of an accord are agreed, hard work is still needed to dot the i’s and cross the t’s.

12. The changes in our approach in paras 7, 8, and 10 will be contentious among some in Washington, but they seem to be in our interests, and would open the way to an arms control agreement of great significance. I look forward to seeing you in Vienna.

Hartman

1. Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, Background Book for Vienna Meeting. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Adam. Special Encryption. Poindexter initialed the top right-hand corner of the telegram.
2. See Documents 6 and 7.
3. Poindexter wrote a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
4. Poindexter underlined “Rekyjavik did not produce agreement, they went public to generate” and wrote a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
5. Poindexter underlined “Much as we did” and wrote a question mark below it.
6. Poindexter drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote “yes?”
7. Poindexter wrote in the right-hand margin next to this sentence: “!!!”
8. Poindexter wrote in the right-hand margin next to this sentence: “!”
9. Poindexter circled the number of this paragraph.
10. Poindexter circled the number of this paragraph.
11. One of several options considered as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative, Excalibur was a proposed X-ray laser that would shoot down Soviet missiles.
12. Poindexter circled the number of this paragraph and drew a vertical line down the right-hand margin next to the first two sentences.
13. Poindexter drew a vertical line down the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
14. Poindexter drew a vertical line down the right-hand margin next to this sentence.