Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983

114. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Brussels, December 9, 1981, 7:45–11 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• FRG

  • Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
  • Political Director Franz Pfeffer
  • Mr. Hans von Ploetz, Aide to the Minister

• FRANCE

  • Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson
  • Political Director Jacques Andreani
  • Mr. Denis Delbourg, Aide to the Minister

• UK

  • Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington
  • Deputy Undersecretary Julian Bullard
  • Mr. Brian Fall, Private Secretary to Lord Carrington

• U.S.

  • Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
  • Assistant Secretary Lawrence S. Eagleburger
  • Mr. George F. Ward, Jr. (notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Secretary Haig began by noting the importance of Soviet eagerness to continue the dialogue begun in September with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. The next meeting would be in Geneva on January 26 and 27. The Secretary recalled that at the September meeting he had tabled U.S. concerns about a number of Soviet activities. These activities had continued unabated. The Soviet Union had supplied 60,000 tons of military equipment to Cuba in the first nine months of this year. That was three times the flow of recent years. The Soviets had stated that their objective was to modernize the Cuban forces, but the U.S. was skeptical.

In September Secretary Haig had spoken frankly to Gromyko on finding a solution in southern Africa within the framework of the Contact Group. Gromyko had not rejected Haig’s approach, but neither had there been Soviet movement in the meantime. The subject of southern Africa would be high on the U.S. agenda for Geneva. There had been increasing evidence of Angolan, front-line state, and even Cuban interest in a Cuban withdrawal from Angola.

The Secretary said that since the first meeting there had been clear indications that the Soviets were looking for a way out of Afghanistan. It was important for the West to remain unified on that subject. The Secretary thought that the Soviets might well make specific proposals on: withdrawal of forces, Western assurances on cross-border “interferences,” return of refugees, and some sort of tricky formula on self-determination contingent on the implementation of the first three elements. The Secretary promised to be back to the others by telegram in order to coordinate positions.

On the subject of Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), the Secretary mentioned that he hoped soon to have U.S. positions on venue and starting date.

The second meeting with Gromyko, the Secretary continued, would also touch on bilateral issues such as a long-term grain agreement, a maritime agreement, and the status of the U.S. Consulate in Kiev.

As for the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet summit, the Secretary said it was too early to suggest that the Haig-Gromyko discussions could open the door to a summit. President Reagan was well disposed toward the idea of a summit, but only if something meaningful could result.

Summarizing the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, the Secretary said that the tone of exchanges was better. Both sides seemed to have a constructive attitude, which promoted dialogue. However, the U.S. had not found any flexibility in Soviet positions on the more difficult issues. Of course, the U.S. welcomed any advice or counsel from the Allies.

Lord Carrington asked whether it was the U.S. intention to continue the Haig-Gromyko contacts. Those contacts seemed to the UK an admirable channel. The Secretary responded that continuation was probably inevitable because so many topics had been opened.

Carrington went on to say that the question of a U.S.-Soviet summit was of a different scale. A summit required a great deal of preparation. One of the most important purposes the U.S. could achieve in contacts with the Soviets was to lay down the limits of Western tolerance for Soviet activities. Had those limits been clearer in 1979, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan might not have occurred.

The Secretary agreed wholeheartedly. Despite the criticism which was often directed at the U.S. for anti-Soviet rhetoric, the fact remained that the Soviet Union had not undertaken any new aggressive initiative since the beginning of the Reagan Administration. That was partly because the Soviets had overextended themselves, but also was due in part to Soviet perception of new U.S. firmness.

French Foreign Minister Cheysson thought that the pattern of Soviet behavior was also determined to a large extent by the “remarkable sclerosis” of the whole Soviet system. It was important for the Allies to focus on specific subjects like Afghanistan, but there seemed to be little likelihood of positive Soviet responses.

The Secretary observed that while the public focus of U.S.-Soviet relations seemed to be on arms control, he personally did not view arms control as a centerpiece. Soviet aggression in regional disputes was the real threat to peace. The U.S. had to take steps to resolve these threats, but knew that it would be futile to give high priority to situations that could involve serious loss of face by the Soviets. For that reason, the U.S. had to emphasize ambiguous situations, such as southern Africa and support for revolutionary movements in other parts of the Third World.

German Foreign Minister Genscher turned to the subject of the recent visit by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev to Bonn. One of Brezhnev’s principal aims, Genscher asserted, had undoubtedly been to test German solidarity on both tracks of the NATO double decision. The Soviets were also interested in whether the West would be negotiating seriously on INF. With this in mind, Genscher would stress at the forthcoming NAC Ministerial that the most important thing any NATO Ally could do to contribute to the Western negotiating position on INF would be to declare willingness to deploy INF weapons. Overemphasis on negotiations was not wise.

Commenting on the atmosphere of the Brezhnev visit and on Brezhnev’s health, Genscher said that the Soviet President had read all of his papers and never made an ad hoc statement. It was clear that Brezhnev had little endurance, but he was still clearly number one in the hierarchy. It was also clear, however, that those who control the flow of information to Brezhnev had enormous power.

Carrington suggested that another of Brezhnev’s objectives in Bonn had been to end the isolation imposed by the West in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. Genscher agreed, but said that the first Haig-Gromyko meeting had been a preliminary step out of that isolation. The visit had not been an easy one for the Soviets to undertake; they had to cope with demonstrations organized by the CDU and FDP against the Soviet position in Afghanistan. President Reagan’s November 18 speech had been right on target, and took away 50 percent of Brezhnev’s negotiating offers.

Secretary Haig expressed pleasure at Genscher’s intentions for the NAC Ministerial, especially because the Dutch Foreign Minister seemed to be looking for ways to further weaken communique passages on INF deployments. It was important to prevent that.

Carrington agreed that weakening of the NATO position on deployment would seriously harm the U.S. negotiating position in Geneva.

On Afghanistan, the Ministers agreed that Western unity was essential, and that a return to normal relations with the Soviet Union was not possible as long as Soviet troops were there.

Turning to the general nature of Soviet involvement in regional problems, Carrington asked for the Secretary’s views on coordination between Cuban and Soviet policy.

The Secretary responded that he had always believed that Soviet advisers, not Cubans, were running the Nicaraguan armed forces. In Angola, Soviets, not Cubans, were running SWAPO. That had been confirmed by the government of South Africa and by UNITA leader Savimbi. There were thousands of Soviets in Libya, and they make the key decisions there also.

Carrington asked how that affected Central America. The Secretary said that because the Soviets made the key decisions in regional situations, they could resolve those situations if they were interested in improving relations with the West. The results of a strong U.S. demarche to the Soviets on their activities in Cuba after the assassination of President Kennedy had demonstrated that the Soviets could regulate Cuban behavior precisely. To be sure, insurgencies would continue, but without Soviet exacerbation they would not become threats to world stability. This meant, continued the Secretary, that the West had to continue to press the Soviet Union and the Cubans and also to work at the roots of the economic and social problems which created the basis for successful insurgencies.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box 61, December 9, 1981. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Ward; cleared by Eagleburger; approved by Haig. The meeting was held at the residence of the French Ambassador to Belgium. Haig was in Brussels December 9–13 for a NATO Ministerial meeting.