Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

386. Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, October 11, 1979, 2315Z

5835. Subj: Situation in El Salvador. (S). Ref State 264095.²

1. (S-entire text)

2. As instructed reftel A, reconfirmed by Oct 10 Hemenway-Howard telecon, DCM and I met at 10:30 this morning with Archbishop Romero and two of his closest advisors.³ Drawing from we presented the questions in its para 8.

3. In responding, Archbishop and associates made following points:

A. Government position is bifurcated one. On the one hand it offers free and honest elections, while on other hand it steps up level of violence and repression;

B. It is incorrect to speak of conflict between GOES and Church—conflict is between GOES and people of El Salvador. Church is with the people and would have best possible will toward GOES if it would reconcile its differences with people;

C. Parties of moderate opposition have tried to point up for GOES the road toward better relations and acceptable electoral climate; in return they have been threatened by “Mano Blanca”;

D. In Church meeting with parties of moderate opposition and enlightened elements of private sector, agreement has been reached on five indispensable elements for free election;

(1) Cessation of repression, this to include inter alia change of attitude of heads of security services and reorganization of ORDEN;

(2) Explanation of all the missing persons (desaparecidos);

(3) Freedom to organize for both workers and peasants, and recognition of organizations which already exist;

(4) Effective freedom for political parties to organize and to campaign;

(5) Observance of and respect for constitutional rights of all citizens.

E. If GOES were to comply with points (1) through (5) it would create a climate permitting necessary discussions. Moderate opposition has made these requirements known publicly through its “popular forum”;

F. Church strongly supported effective dialogue with GOES aimed at meaningful democratic opening but President’s deeds have contradicted his words. USG assumption that President Romero has taken some meaningful steps which merit positive response while understandable in terms of what Romero appeared to be promising, is a mistaken premise; President Romero’s so-called steps taken to date have represented no effective advances in five areas outlined above in today’s world, President Romero has lost his credibility and his words have no real backing or impact;

G. Even so, some response has been forthcoming from moderate opposition in form of political telecasts demonstrating that people are considering and commenting on the political approach which he suggests. Similarly, Church has tried to be a moderating force but finds so little real good to comment upon that archbishop’s homilies nearly always sound negative. Nevertheless, Church for its part, remains alert for good or positive news upon which to comment and in this way is trying to respond;

4. We turned then to question of alternatives. Archbishop Romero said he was not sure it was for Church to define these. He hears public clamor from the left for a popular insurrection, and he hears much talk about possibilities of a coup d’etat, either by ultra-rightist or by progressive elements within the military. He agreed with our suggestion as to the danger of a coup d’etat splitting military and opening the way for far left. He suggested however that this would depend on the mentality and character of the coup itself. For the Archbishop, an autocoup (#) or coup by the rightist military would change nothing of today’s situation and would heighten the chances for armed insurrection. In contrast, a coup by progressive military who would offer change—or chance for recent transition to something new—could well win public confidence and isolate far left.

5. At this point one of Archbishop’s advisors interjected that in his view USG and Embassy pressure had led President Romero to make his Aug 16 declarations in favor of free elections. Could we not now exert similar pressure to move President Romero to compliance with five “indispensable elements” (cited in para 3 above)? We explained that we have discussed exactly these matters with President in the past and always received from him and his associates pat GOES position that charges are untrue. For President to accept suggestions from us now on these points would entail complete reversal of GOES position as conveyed to us on previous occasions and therefore seems somewhat unlikely.

Note by OC/T: (#) as received.

6. Archbishop’s other advisor then summed up present list of unpalatable alternatives as:

A. Popular insurrection;

B. Elections in an atmosphere completely inappropriate and inhospitable for same; and

C. Coup d’etat.

He then asked as to USG preference among these. We responded that all our recent actions have been directed toward alternative “B” and finding ways and means to improve the climate for meaningful elections. He said that was clearly Church preference as [garble], but that one must look at matter with realism. In real, practical terms, at this late date, prospect of any free, meaningful election looks completely theoretical and highly doubtful.

7. Church officials said that coup d’etat could conceivably be least among evils facing the nation. They pointed out that it could conceivably open way for free, meaningful elections. We pointed out it might also open way for popular insurrection. They agreed and said danger lay in how the popular forces would react. But, they said, trying to hold elections under present circumstances could easily bring on popular insurrection. On balance, they appeared clearly to believe that coup d’etat route offers more manageable risks than electoral route in today’s conditions.

8. When we inquired about points of contact and sources of information, Church representatives were not particularly forthcoming.

Admitted to some contacts with opposition political parties, limited contact with military, some with progressive elements in private business sector, but denied seeking or initiating contact with “illegal” groups or organizations.

9. As a closing comment, our visit—under instructions—to archbishop is very unlikely to go unnoticed. Depending on events of immediate future, it will almost certainly be interpreted and misinterpreted in many ways.

Devine

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2508. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Caracas, Panama City, and San José.
2. See Document 385.
3. Minutes for the October 10 telephone conversation between Hemenway and Howard have not been found.