86. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Embassies in Lebanon and Syria1
Secto 8139. Subject: Southern Lebanon. For Ambassador From Secretary.
1. There are aspects of my talks in Israel about Southern Lebanon which I believe should be passed on to Boutros and Sarkis. I will report to Khaddam and Assad in Damascus on Thursday.2
2. For Beirut: Ambassador Parker should pass following message from me to Boutros for Sarkis: “During my talks in Israel, I had a full discussion of the problem in Southern Lebanon. The Israeli presentation concentrated on two main points: first, from their contacts with leaders in that area across the border, they see a cumulative despair about the future of the people in Southern Lebanon because of persistent attacks by the Palestinian forces and because of their lack of a supply line and normal economic contact with the north. They increasingly speak of the problem of Southern Lebanon as a ‘moral question’ having to do with the future of these people. Second, they are concerned that the Palestinians are again consolidating a position in Southern Lebanon from which they can in the future resume cross-border infiltration into Israel. On the question of a UN force, the Israelis for the most part doubt the ability of such a force to curb Palestinian activity. The Israelis have no objection, however, to a UN force along the border. They see two steps as essential: first, the Palestinians must cease attacks and preferably pull back from the southern part.
Second, an acceptable peace keeping force must be introduced, preferably a Lebanese force but perhaps a UN force for a transitional period if there is no alternative in the area north of the border. I will be informing the Syrians of the above and will particularly tell them that the Israelis see them as the key to forcing the Palestinians to stop their shelling and to withdraw to positions less threatening to the Christian positions.”
3. For background in Beirut and Damascus: In Damascus on Thursday, I will be making following points to Assad:
A. The Israelis are deeply concerned about the situation in Southern Lebanon. They believe that the Syrians bear a heavy responsi [Page 462] bility for the continued instability there. First, they have reports of a secret understanding between the Syrians and Palestinians there which exempts the Palestinians from application of the Shtaura agreement there.3 Second, they cited the presence of Syrian officers with the Palestinian forces around the Christian enclaves and small Syrian units in Saiqa uniforms.
B. The Israeli Government is increasingly seeing itself as responsible for ending what it regards as the threat to the Christian enclaves in the south, and the danger of an Israeli move is once again increasing with the failure to enforce the ceasefire in the south.
C. The key question is how to pave the way for the prompt pacification of Southern Lebanon. We hope that Syria might insist on strict adherence to the ceasefire at a minimum. A next step should be the prompt introduction of a security force, preferably an effective Lebanese force. If it is necessary to move the Palestinians away from that southern area so the [garble—force?] can operate successfully, that should be considered.
D. The Israelis would not oppose introduction of a UN force to help keep peace throughout the southern area—not just on the border—but they doubt it could be effective and believe Syrian action would be quicker and more decisive.
E. It is important to leave the Christians with the means of defending themselves.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2544. Secret; Nodis. Sent immediate for information to the Department of State. Sent for information to Tel Aviv. The telegram was sent from the Secretary’s aircraft.↩
- August 11.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 76.↩