Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

259. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Jerusalem, July 1, 1978

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
• Vice President Mondale
• Ambassador Lewis
• Deputy Assistant to the President Aaron
• Assistant Secretary Saunders
• Israel
• Minister of Defense Weizman
• Ambassador Dinitz
• Col. Tehilla

After a preliminary exchange during picture taking, the Vice President said that he would be going to see Sadat² and would urge him to “turn down the temperature” of public comment on Israel’s negotiating position. The Vice President said he would be interested to hear about Weizman’s meetings with Gamasy and Sadat.

Weizman said: “I like the man. Whatever he says publicly is correct, although he may not tell the whole story.”

The Vice President said he knows Sadat better than Gamasy because of the time they spent together in various meetings, including the meeting with the President at Camp David. He said he thought we would be getting an Egyptian counterproposal on the West Bank and Gaza soon. He had little hope that it would meet Israel’s needs, but he felt it could be useful to the negotiations.

The Vice President continued, saying that his visit is designed to accomplish two purposes:

1. He is reaffirming the solid, unswerving U.S. commitment to Israeli security and trying to allay fear that aid would be held hostage to Israel’s negotiating positions. Being a politician, he said he could feel the tenseness in Israel today.

2. He said he was here to see whether there are ways of getting negotiations started again. He said he would be interested to have Weizman explain his meetings with General Gamasy. He was interested in what prospect there was for another meeting. He explained that we are trying to arrange another meeting between Foreign Ministers Kamel and Dayan in July.

The Vice President commented that the Egyptian counterproposal would have some things in it that Israel would not like and some Israel could use. Whatever the case, he strongly urged that the Israelis keep the temperature down and emphasize a positive intention to develop the negotiations.

The Vice President said he is concerned about the passage of time. He said he is no Mid East expert. Nevertheless he thought Sadat might try to keep the negotiations going just a little longer and then he might move back into a more pan-Arab style. Walter Cronkite recently quoted Sadat as talking about two more months. Sadat will be in trouble if the perception gets out that he went to Jerusalem and then failed.

Weizman said he takes Sadat’s October deadline seriously in the respect that he will do something about the Sinai II agreement.³ It is not that balloons will go up; it is simply that Sadat will have to take some step.

Weizman noted that he had met Sadat more than any other Israeli. He feels that mutual trust has developed between them—as much as is possible between states.

Weizman noted that Sadat has talked about an October deadline ever since they first met together.

The Vice President noted that we were concerned about whether Sadat might use the occasion of his July 23 speech⁴ to pull some sort of surprise.

Weizman suggested that this could be the recall of the Israeli team from Cairo (a team that has stayed in place to staff the Weizman-Gamasy talks).

He agreed that time is a major factor. Sadat is unpredictable. (Weizman then gave as an example Sadat’s announcement of Weizman’s first visit to Egypt after having said that the visit should be kept secret. Weizman did not seem to take account of the fact that the news of the visit was made public in Israel and that was the cause of Sadat’s making it public at the last minute.)

Weizman said that he had been interviewed a few days before on TV and had been asked whether he trusted Sadat. He said he does. He acknowledged that to trust completely would make him a fool, but he did consider Sadat worthy of his trust. Weizman continued that people in Israel had built up a distrust of Sadat and, conversely, he has built a distrust of Begin. Weizman felt it would be desirable for Begin and Sadat to meet again in order to repair some of the damage in their relationship. To be frank, he continued, Ismailia was a failure.⁵ “The twain did not meet.” Weizman said he and Gamasy respected each other. But the two leaders bombard each other publicly with what they think of each other.

“Begin is hurt.” Sadat believes that what he did was unbelievable. Weizman said he had told Sadat that Sadat was like the first man on the moon, but the first man on the moon is now back on earth.

The problem is not whether Gamasy and Weizman can meet. The question is what they talk about when they do meet.

Weizman said he reminds the Cabinet that U.S. aid to Israel since 1973 is more in terms of quantities of equipment than the whole Israeli army had in the 1967 war. Israel is the only military force in the world outside the U.S. with the F–15 aircraft. Security, though, is not just a matter of military equipment. In this case, it is more a political question. The problem that concerns him, he said, is not hardware but what will be the political situation in the Middle East.

The Egyptians and the Syrians have a case on return to the international border because there once was a recognized border. The situation on the West Bank is different. In 1967, Hussein stabbed Israel in the back.

But back to ’67 lines with minor modifications will not hold water with anyone in Israel today. Each political party sees the Jordan River as Israel’s security border; no one favors an independent Palestinian state.

Begin [ Weizman?] said what worries him is that if Sadat did an unbelievable thing, so did Begin. Begin changed a great deal in putting forward his peace plan. The only ones who did not change their approach were the Americans who continue to stick with the formulation of the ’67 borders with minor modifications. Weizman reiterated that the problem is not where the borders are but what the political arrangements will be after withdrawal. The problem is what is the political solution when all parties say that Israeli settlements must stay and there must be no independent Palestinian state.

Ambassador Lewis asked: If a political solution could be roughed out for the West Bank and Gaza, you (Weizman) and Gamasy could hammer out a Sinai agreement, could you not?

Weizman replied: My problem is not Gamasy and Sadat but Begin, my party, and myself. He felt that the West Bank should really have autonomy.

The Vice President asked what would free Sadat to make that move now.

Weizman replied that had there been more direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt, new ideas might be produced.

Weizman said he had tried to convince Sadat that Israel has been isolated. Israel is closer to Paris and New York than to Nablus and Cairo. He said he told Sadat to open Egypt to Israeli tourists. That might help allay the basic mistrust in Israel if more Israelis could talk to Egyptians.

It had been very dangerous for Sadat to think his trip to Jerusalem would change a generation.

Aaron asked why it is good to get Begin and Sadat together now. What would make it work now when it had not before?

Weizman replied that it would get others together. He said, “Don’t talk only to me. Dayan is available. Let Sadat invite Dayan to Egypt. Perhaps Sadat should invite Cabinet Ministers to Egypt from Israel. Then we will have hard bargaining.”

The Vice President said, “Let me go back to the security points.” The problem is we cannot have a political settlement on the West Bank until you have a security settlement.

On the security side, we are thinking of demilitarized zones, buffers, permanent IDF cantonments, a security treaty, and the possibility of a permanent U.S. base.

The Vice President said he did not believe withdrawal had to be total.

The Vice President asked how Weizman thought the Israeli answers to our questions could have been changed.

Weizman felt that if Egypt really wants full peace and security it would deal with Israel on these terms.

“If I have to come to grips with Gamasy again,” Weizman continued, “it would break my heart.”

The Vice President asked what we could do to be more helpful.

Weizman replied saying he wanted to try out one idea. From the Arab viewpoint, Sadat has misbehaved. He has prostituted himself to Israel. He needs to show something for the Palestinians. Let’s assume that we came up with a statement that Egypt’s agreement with Israel would not be a separate agreement but the “first one.” Weizman still expressed the belief that the best way to pull the Arab world into a treaty is for Egypt to go ahead.

The Vice President agreed that what Sadat needs is generated by his own situation. He needs an umbrella under which to move to his own agreement with Israel.

Weizman complained that as long as the U.S. stand favors withdrawal to the 1967 borders, Sadat has no reason to negotiate.

The Vice President replied that he had taken the position that withdrawal would be negotiated.

Aaron asked: “Don’t you really think the question of the lines is the key question?”

Weizman responded by asking whether it isn’t contradictory to speak about withdrawal from the West Bank while at the same time making arrangements to leave Israeli forces there. The real question is what would be the status of the West Bank. The possibilities include a continuation of something like the present situation if an Israeli military presence is required. In any case, there should be no independent Palestinian state. There is ultimately the possibility of a federation with Jordan including Israel.

Weizman emphasized that it is important to bear in mind the differences between the Sinai and the Golan on the one hand and the West Bank/Gaza on the other.

He also noted in passing that it is an absurdity that the Begin Government is blamed for Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, when the previous Labor Government was responsible for initiating them.

The Vice President asked what Weizman wanted us to do.

Weizman replied along several lines. He felt that the U.S. takes Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza too seriously. He wished we would not talk about complete withdrawal; Israel is talking about autonomy on the West Bank.

Weizman noted the importance to Sadat of ending the war with Israel in order to solve problems in his own country. He suggested that one of the solutions is for Egypt to take over Libya and to form a Sudan-Egypt-Libya association.

He commented that it is a shock to go back to Cairo after all of these years. It is so rundown.

He suggested that we might try to convince Sadat to see Yadin, Dayan, Sharon, or others. He concluded by asking the Vice President to give Sadat “my salaams.”

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Trips/Visits File, Box 110, 6/30/78–7/3/78 Vice President Trip to Israel: 7/78. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders on July 10. The meeting took place in the Vice President’s suite at the King David Hotel.
2. On July 3, Mondale left Israel and traveled to Cairo to meet with Sadat. No memorandum of conversation has been found of Mondale’s July 3 meeting with Sadat, but according to telegram 16388 from Cairo, July 5, Sadat gave Mondale Egypt’s peace proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, 850056–2349) The proposal is in telegram 169126 to Tel Aviv, July 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–2714) The Egyptian Foreign Ministry released the details of the six-point proposal on July 5. It called for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza over 5 years, ceding transitional sovereignty to Jordan and Egypt. After the 5-year transition period, the Palestinian Arabs would be allowed to decide their future and would exercise direct authority in the area in cooperation with Jordan and Egypt. (Christopher S. Wren, “Egyptians Say Plan for Peace Contains Compromise Leeway,” New York Times, July 6, 1978, p. 19)
3. See footnote 6, Document 252.
4. A reference to Sadat’s upcoming speech to commemorate the 26th anniversary of the Free Officers’ Movement’s overthrow of King Farouk on July 23, 1952. For excerpts from this speech, see the Los Angeles Times, July 23, 1978, p. OC1.
5. A reference to the direct talks between Begin and Sadat in Ismailia December 25 and 26, 1977. See Documents 180 and 181.