Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, March 24, 1978, 2150Z

77059. Deliver to Ambassador opening of business. Subject: Report to Sadat on President’s Talks With Begin.

1. In an early meeting with Sadat, please convey to him, on behalf of President Carter, the following report on the Begin visit and appraisal of where we stand.

2. You should tell Sadat that the President wants to share with him a candid and very private assessment of the results of the Begin visit. The President did what he told Sadat he would do. Throughout the two days of the visit President Carter kept the conversation focused on the critical issues of withdrawal and the Palestinian question and left Begin in no doubt of the critical decisions Israel must make to keep the peace process going. Begin in these talks did not go beyond present positions, but the President believes that Begin will go home deeply aware that these decisions are now before the Israeli Government and cannot be avoided. The public handling of the talks was such that the public here and in Israel knows that these were difficult meetings where the issues were squarely joined. The issues have been clearly identified and aired. The President believes the talks served the purpose we set for them and mark an important point in the peace process.

3. The President opened the meetings by stating forcefully that the United States itself has a deep national interest in achieving peace in the Middle East. He offered his flat commitment for U.S. support and help to the parties in every way possible to remove obstacles to progress in the negotiation. He stressed the need for early conclusion of a meaningful declaration of principles. He held firmly to the position that the declaration must deal with the withdrawal issue and the Palestinian question in terms that would provide a credible basis for broader negotiations. He spent a long evening alone with Begin going over the key requirements as he and Sadat discussed them,² for a true solution to the West Bank/Gaza problem including meaningful interim arrangements to give time to deal with Israel’s serious security concerns. The President reiterated the U.S. position regarding Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. In a separate meeting, Foreign Minister Dayan told Secretary Vance that there will be no new settlements in Sinai while negotiations are underway and that each new settlement in the West Bank will require specific Cabinet approval. The Secretary repeated what the President had said and emphasized that we would view any new settlements with the utmost seriousness.³

4. The central focus throughout two days of conversation was on the necessity for Israel to accept unequivocally that all the principles of Resolution 242, including withdrawal, apply to all fronts. The President made clear that acceptance of withdrawal, including on the West Bank, is essential to progress in the peace negotiations.

5. Begin reiterated his views on these issues in terms with which Sadat is familiar. He argued that Egypt insists on total withdrawal from all of the occupied territories and on the creation of an independent Palestinian state as preconditions for negotiation, which Israel would never accept. He alleged there had been a hardening in the Egyptian position for example in Egypt’s insistence on a security presence beyond the Sinai passes. President Carter responded with his own view that Sadat was not insisting on a fully independent Palestinian state and was prepared to work for a moderate outcome involving demilitarization and, following an interim period, Palestinian links to Jordan. He pointed out that Sadat does not oppose mutually accepted modifications in the armistice lines on the West Bank. He urged Begin to direct his attention to these facts. Begin repeatedly said that, if it is indeed Sadat’s position that there should not be total withdrawal on the West Bank or an independent Palestinian state, Sadat should submit language for the declaration of principles which makes this clear. He asked the President to convey this to Sadat.

6. Begin argued that nothing in Israel’s peace proposals is inconsistent with 242; that everything is negotiable; and that there should be no preconditions for negotiations. The President stated his view that the Israeli position avoids the basic issues of whether Israel will withdraw and allow the Palestinians a real voice in determining their own future. Begin continues to assert that his self-rule proposal for the West Bank/Gaza is a reasonable plan meeting the requirements of 242. The President, as he told Sadat he would, went over in detail the kind of changes in the Begin plan that would be required in order to provide a possible basis for West Bank/Gaza negotiations, along the lines he discussed with Sadat at Camp David.⁴ He made clear that we would start discussions from the self-rule plan but do not consider the plan, as it now stands, to offer adequate arrangements for the future of the West Bank/Gaza. Press reports Sadat may have been, that the President put certain ideas to Begin, refer to the ideas the President reviewed with Sadat at Camp David with respect to the future of the West Bank and Gaza and how to overcome the obstacles in the Sinai negotiations. We did not, as some reports allege, put forward a formal U.S. proposal to the Israelis.

7. While Begin showed little sign of movement, Dayan discussed the West Bank and Gaza in some detail, agreeing that Israel should be more explicit about what will happen after the five-year interim period, in two long, separate meetings with Secretary Vance, Dayan showed a genuine interest in exploring new ways of trying to achieve a satisfactory declaration and a satisfactory basis for West Bank/Gaza negotiations. He undertook to come up with some further ideas on both the declaration and the West Bank/Gaza.

8. The President believes these meetings went farther than we have ever been able to go before toward engaging the Israelis on the real issues and accomplished most of what he had thought would be possible in this session. He believes we are squarely on the course he and Sadat had envisaged. What is needed now is a short time for the effects of this visit to be digested in Israel, for Begin and his colleagues to rethink among themselves the difficult decisions ahead, and for them to work these decisions through the Israeli political process. The President believes that Dayan and Weizman, in particular, are genuinely seeking to avoid a breakdown in negotiations and a solution. We are seeing, as we are sure Sadat is, the signs in Israel of the profound reappraisal that is going on and will now accelerate. We intend to continue pressing our views both with Israel and in the public debate.

9. The President did not want this meeting to be diverted from the central issues, and Southern Lebanon was discussed only briefly. The Israeli Government had already agreed to comply with UN Resolutions 425 and 426⁵ and had declared a unilateral ceasefire, and the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister assured us that Israel will withdraw from Lebanon. The President wants Sadat to know that he appreciated Sadat’s letter to him on the subject on March 17 and Sadat’s generous message of March 22.⁶ As Sadat will have observed, they were thinking along the same lines. The President feels that the successful establishment of a UN force in South Lebanon will itself substantially improve the climate for peace negotiations. Difficulties lie ahead, but the President believes we are on the right course.

10. Sadat will have observed that there was no press statement at the end of the visit. We were unwilling to make an anodyne statement and chose to make the public aware of our positions in other ways, beginning with the President’s remarks at the end of the second day’s meeting.⁷ FYI: You should point out to Sadat that March 23 Washington Post carries four-column headline about “grim talks” and “sharp conflict on the issues,” and featured President Carter’s statement that “peace still seems far away.” Atherton did backgrounder immediately after conclusion of meetings, sent septel,⁸ which clearly stated the U.S. position. The President met the same day with the HIRC and at breakfast Thursday morning with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.⁹ The Secretary also addressed these issues in his press conference Friday.¹⁰ End FYI. The President believes there is increasingly clear public and Congressional understanding of where we now stand. He has been gratified by the expressions of support from key members of Congress whom he has briefed.

11. The President feels that things are going according to the plan we outlined to President Sadat. He believes that the clear presentation to Israel of the U.S. position on the key issues during this visit should make obvious that the U.S. is determined to move the peace negotiations forward. It is essential now, as debate intensifies in Israel, that both we and Sadat do everything we can to hold out to those Israelis looking for serious compromise the prospect of realistic progress on grounds that promise security for Israel. The actions Sadat has taken and his statements over the past weeks have already contributed a great deal to this process, as well as enhancing understanding for his position, particularly in the United States. The issue now is what more can be done in the coming weeks to encourage the positive forces in Israel now working in the direction of constructive decisions.

12. FYI: You should draw on this paragraph as you think best to elaborate on the point just above. You should use your own judgment as to how far you can load the circuit. End FYI. We intend, as planned, to put forward in the near future our own proposals, at a time when we think this will be most effective, as the political debate within Israel develops. Sadat’s continued demonstration of his commitment to the peace process and of his constructive approach to such issues as security and the need for interim arrangements in the West Bank will be of great help. It is important to convince the Israelis that they are not being asked to choose between two extremes for a Palestinian solution—between continued de facto occupation on the one hand; and, on the other hand, total withdrawal to the 1967 armistice lines on the West Bank, with a radical, independent PLO state. We recognize the difficulties for Sadat in stating his views publicly on this issue, but anything he can say showing his readiness to take leadership in developing a solution that does not threaten Israel would be most helpful.

13. FYI: It is equally important, in our view, that Sadat and those around him, as well as Egyptian press, avoid as far as possible statements that are unhelpful. Recent example is Boutros Ghali’s 23 March statement as reported FBIS NC231038Y¹¹ that direct dialogue with Israel “will not be resumed unless Israel withdraws from all the occupied territories.” Similarly, tone of editorial comment by Sadat supporters reported Cairo 9161¹² is unhelpful, though we recognize political considerations involved. We leave to you how best to get the point across to Sadat but hope you can encourage him to be sensitive to effect in Israel of what Israelis hear coming out of Cairo. Egyptian image in Israel can be of critical importance in the internal debate there and we are sure Sadat will want to be helpful to his friends in Israel and not give ammunition to other side. End FYI.

14. In sum, we believe the Israelis will need the next week or so to sort out their response to the positions we have taken. What we both can do over the coming weeks that will be most helpful to the peace negotiations is to act in a way that helps the Israelis move to what are in Israel extremely controversial decisions. We ourselves do not yet have a clear view on when we should take our next step and will be in close consultation with Sadat during this crucial period.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1314. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Brubeck; cleared by Atherton, Saunders, Quandt, and Tarnoff; and approved by Secretary Vance. Sent immediate for information to Tel Aviv.
2. See footnote 2, Document 234.
3. Vance met twice with Dayan. See Document 233 and footnote 15, Document 234.
4. See Document 211.
5. For U.N. Security Council Resolution 425, see footnote 2, Document 232. U.N. Security Council Resolution 426 established that UNIFIL would stay in place for 6 months or longer if the Security Council deemed it necessary.
6. In the March 17 letter, transmitted in telegram 8652 from Cairo, Sadat urged Carter to “personally intervene” with Israel to immediately remove its troops from Lebanon. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071–1530) In the March 22 letter, transmitted in telegram 9076 from Cairo, Sadat referred to the U.S. effort in the passage of the U.N. resolutions calling for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon and establishing UNIFIL as “timely, quick, and marvelous.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780126–0600)
7. See footnote 16, Document 234.
8. Not further identified.
9. Carter briefly described his March 23 meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in White House Diary, p. 180.
10. In his March 24 press conference, Vance described the talks as “difficult” and acknowledged the “differences of view between ourselves and the Israelis on certain issues.” Vance also remarked though “that in no way was the atmosphere of the talks unfriendly or ugly-I want to make that very clear.” He continued that the “frank exchanges” were between “allies and friends” and that the United States remained “fully and unequivocally committed to the security of Israel, and there should be no doubt about that.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 1978, pp. 24–28)
11. FBIS NC231038Y has not been found.
12. Telegram 9161 from Cairo, March 23, analyzes editorials by the writer Ihsan Abdul Qaddous and the journalist Ahme Baha al-Din (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780129–0933)