157. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
9710. Subject: Meeting With Begin on Sadat Visit. Refs: A) State 277205, B) Tel Aviv 9708.2
Summary: Begin and Dayan this afternoon gave me letter to President and report on Sadat visit. Begin and Sadat agreed to establish two continuing channels, one for military liaison, one for peace negotiations. Sadat is not interested in procedural issues, wants substantive negotiations settled in advance, with Geneva as ceremonial ratification. He will not make separate deal, wants agreement in principle on Palestinian problem before negotiating Israel-Egypt issues. Begin is less clear on how Assad and Hussein are to be brought into the process. He urges, however, that USG should not press for early Geneva but should support continuing negotiations among interested parties as preparatory. Both Begin and Dayan pleased with Sadat’s and their own performance, show few signs that they feel they came in second.
1. I met with Prime Minister Begin and Dayan at PM’s home at 1800 local today. Brubeck and Avner also present. Begin and Dayan were in a relaxed mood, obviously very pleased with the results of the Sadat visit. They show little sign of being perturbed by criticism of Israeli performance in local or foreign press. Begin, in particular, shows no signs of feeling he came in second best to Sadat. On the contrary, they seem equally pleased with performance both sides and very satisfied with results. Begin is obviously concerned, however, that any leak about diplomacy set in motion would be highly damaging and made a special plea that his report be held very close.
2. Basic result of visit, as indicated in Begin letter to the President (ref B) is that Israel and Egypt have established two channels for on-going peace negotiations. Weizman and Gamasy will open a negotiating track in next several weeks on arrangements to avoid misunderstandings and military tensions. Dayan and an Egyptian counterpart yet to be named (probably not Butros Ghali) will, during the same period, begin negotiating toward peace. Begin emphasizes that these will be serious, substantive talks, aimed at tangible results. Both sides accept there are serious differences but agree everything is negotiable (“whatever Sadat may say in Egypt,” says Begin). Next move is up to [Page 778] Sadat; GOI is now waiting for specific proposals from Sadat on where and when, for next move.
3. Sadat told Begin he cannot make a separate peace (“we never even discussed that,” according to Begin). First issue on the agenda is the Palestinian question on which, Begin says, they expect to reach “agreement in principle” though not in detail. Following that will be Israel-Egypt issues. How and where Syrian issues are to be settled was not explained, nor how details of Palestinian issue to be settled. However, Sadat was emphatic that he is not interested in procedural questions. Dayan tried to engage him several times along lines of President Carter’s letter (ref A) and got no response. According to Begin, Sadat wants substantive issues settled in private negotiations before Geneva, with Geneva as a ceremonial occasion to ratify agreements. Sadat believes it impossible to have serious negotiations in Geneva atmosphere. Problem, as Begin says he and Sadat see it is “how to negotiate the substance of a comprehensive settlement before going to Geneva.”
4. When I pressed them on how this scenario leads to Geneva, Dayan reiterated Sadat’s disinclination to discuss procedures and said that if President and Brzezinski think Sadat is interested in procedural questions they are wrong. Next stage is Weizman-Gamasy talks on cooling military situation, second stage is Dayan-Egyptian political talks. Rather than further USG initiative at this time, we should simply support further discussion among the parties, not press for early Geneva. Begin and Dayan agreed that Sadat is not pressing for an early conference, thinks intensive preparations more important. He does not believe present momentum leads directly to Geneva, especially given Syrian, Russian and PLO reaction to his visit.
5. In response to my questions, Begin had no thoughts on how to engage Syrians in negotiation. Assad is very difficult; “I tried to invite him, but no response.” They would like to open dialogue with Jordan and have the means, but think it better to wait till later in Israel-Egypt negotiations. Dayan does not think Hussein is prepared yet for negotiations, would not come if invited, and cannot at this stage negotiate on West Bank-Gaza. Re PLO, Dayan had urged Ghali on arrival to avoid mention and, whether because of that or not, Sadat had [not?] done so (I think from other evidence that the advice had an effect). Begin had urged Sadat to meet with West Bankers to show their support for visit but Sadat said he would be guided by Prime Minister’s wishes. He did not want to seem to be asserting role as spokesman for Palestinians. There was no discussion of Palestinian representation at Geneva, including “American professor” idea.3 When I asked about discussion of [Page 779] Syria, Begin said only that Sadat had shrugged off protest in Arab world. (Begin thinks was partly self solace but that he may mean it and be right).
6. Both Begin and Dayan pictured Sadat as essentially sharing Israeli unhappiness over US-Soviet communique. They quoted Sadat as saying it “brought in the Russians,” and that he did not want to go to Geneva with the Russians involved.
7. Begin showed some sensitivity over Sadat’s failure to give him specific invitation to Cairo, attributing it to security concerns and saying Sadat had suggested “Sinai or Ismailia” for a meeting. Dayan, I think more accurately, cited Sadat as saying as long as Israelis hold Egyptian territory, it is very difficult for him to issue invitation. They were defensive about criticism that Israelis did not “give Sadat something to take back”, which they attributed to American and European press (when I noted it was also in Israeli press they did not answer). Dayan’s argument was that it would have been unwise to offer something of bilateral interest to Egypt, Sadat had not asked for anything re Palestinians, and they could not usefully make an offer for Syria. They had been concerned Sadat would maneuver in order to go home and say he had unveiled Israeli motives, they didn’t really want peace. Instead, when asked what he wanted to make his trip a success, Sadat has asked only that they talk honestly and sincerely. All conversations were in that spirit. Sadat had been much impressed by warmth of Israeli welcome and Begin thought Israeli handling of visit (except for translators) had been “almost perfect.” Begin thought that Sadat was “beginning to understand” the real problem of Israeli security by end of visit, as evidenced in his Monday press conference emphasis on security as well as peace as legitimate Israeli interests.4
8. Dayan sees Sadat as preoccupied with his economic problems and complaining about the burden of military spending. Sadat, he says, is not taking this initiative to get back Sharm which has no political or economic significance. Begin concurred and they elaborated on Egypt’s economic problems. They urge that USG hold out hope to Sadat of large-scale economic assistance, but make it conditional on reaching Israel-Egypt peace. They see this as key to Sadat’s effort now for settlement.
9. Comment: I hesitate to say much until we are able to compare Begin’s to Sadat’s version of the visit. From Begin’s account, it looks as though our Geneva scenario has been considerably modified and the new track has, obviously, a heady odor of Israeli-Egyptian bilaterals. Both Begin and Dayan, however, were very open and enthusiastic, and [Page 780] Begin genuinely thinks that his report to the President is good news for both of us. I really feel, at this stage, that they believe they are still moving constructively toward Geneva and that Begin and Sadat are working for a comprehensive rather than a bilateral settlement. The Israeli perspective may be myopic but, for now, it does not really seem Machiavellian. Begin talked like a man sharing a success with us and feeling that he, with Sadat, is engaged in seeking goals that they share with the President. He gave no sign of concern about the stubborn substantive differences that, presumably, still divide him from Sadat on the issues, or particularly the West Bank/Palestinian issue has been sidetracked. Whatever he may think is the solution to these apparently intractable problems, I suspect his engagement in seeking a comprehensive solution is still genuine. That may be a tribute to the potent effect Sadat has had, not only on the Israeli public, but on Begin himself.
10. Suggest Department repeat this message to Cairo.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2367. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cherokee.↩
- Telegram 277205 is Document 149. Telegram 9708 is Document 156.↩
- The American professor is apparently a reference to Professor Edward Said. See footnote 1, Document 119.↩
- November 21. See Document 152.↩