Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

136. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 25, 1977, 11:05 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• President’s Meeting with Prince Saud ibn Faisal al-Sa’ud, Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• The Secretary of State
• Ambassador John West
• Mr. Robert Lipshutz
• Mr. Alfred L. Atherton
• Mr. David Aaron
• Mr. Jerrold Schecter
• Mr. William Quandt
• Prince Saud ibn Faisal al-Sa’ud, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia
• Abdallah Muhammed Alireza, Deputy Foreign Minister
• Ahmed Sirraj, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Ali Abdallah Alireza, Saudi Ambassador to the United States
• Nizar Madani, First Secretary, Saudi Embassy, Washington

President: We only have a short time today, so I would like to start directly to discuss the situation of the Middle East peace settlement. We have reached a critical point, and we have done the best that we could, after long debate, to bring the parties to a point of maximum compatibility prior to the Geneva Conference. We have seen evidence of flexibility on the part of all of the leaders, that we have gone as far as we can go as a mediator to alleviate each of their concerns. It is a matter now of each party quibbling over words, and we need to break away from this and go to Geneva for the common purpose of reaching peace. I recognize that there are special problems among the Arab nations, and that there are differences of opinion between Egypt and Syria on how to organize a delegation, on whether there should be bilateral or multilateral groups to do the work, on the role of the plenary, and on how the Palestinian question should be addressed. We cannot resolve all the differences between Presidents Assad and Sadat. King Hussein seems to be more amenable to compromises.

Israel after a long debate has finally agreed to two difficult points: a unified Arab delegation at Geneva, which they opposed for a long time, and which they now accept; and the representation of Palestinians, not in any of the national delegations. This has been difficult for them, but it was done with our influence. The Cabinet agreed. We think that the concerns expressed by the Arab leaders have on the whole been met, but it would be a mistake to try to write down all of the details in a document that would become public. We don’t believe that Israel will oppose PLO members in national Arab delegations, and they will let Palestinians represent the West Bank and Gaza and will not inspect their credentials. They will agree to discuss these issues on a multi-national basis, and will do the same with the refugee question. Compared to their earlier demands, they have come close to what the Arabs wanted. Assad is now concerned about the relative importance of the plenary, and of keeping discussions in a multinational framework in contrast to strictly bilateral discussions. This is covered by the 1973 procedure whereby the working groups should report back to the conference.² Assad seems to be concerned about the possibility of divisions among the Arabs, but it is up to the Arabs themselves to decide how much they want to consult with one another. We have nothing except support for that approach.

There is another question of the PLO as such being a negotiating partner. This is not possible, and it would violate our own promises to Israel. Each of the participants in the Geneva Conference has the right to approve any new groups at the conference. All of them agree to Lebanon. The Israelis have agreed that Palestinians can be at the conference, and that they will not look at their credentials.

I think that it has become completely fruitless to try to reword the working paper. We drafted it as best we could. We made some modifications, and then we gave it to Israel, and then we modified it again. Now the parties seem to be frozen on words. And I am not prepared to go through another round of revisions. I think we need Saudi Arabia’s help to get the parties to Geneva. If the Arabs feel that their interests are not adequately protected, they can always withdraw from the discussions.

My public and private statements have been the same, and we put some of our proposals in writing. I hope that all of the leaders will be able to accept the present working paper. They should then let the United States and the Soviet Union request that the UN Secretary General convene the conference with the unified Arab delegation, and with working groups that would report back to the plenary, which would have to ratify any final agreement. And we should let the Palestinians be represented in national delegations as they choose, and as a separate entity to discuss the West Bank and Gaza and the refugee question. This proposal accommodates both Arab and Israeli concerns. It is important that Saudi Arabia use its influence to promote further accommodation. It has not yet been possible to get the PLO to disavow its goal of the destruction of Israel, and the PLO will not accept Resolution 242. We do hear, however, that Arafat is willing to go along with the procedures I have described.

Saud: Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to be very frank in what I say. Saudi Arabia is not directly involved in the negotiations, and we are only aware of developments insofar as you and the other Arab parties keep us informed. But Saudi Arabia is deeply concerned, and time is now of the essence. The example today of the attempt to assassinate Foreign Minister Khaddam is a reminder of how volatile the situation is.³ Saudi Arabia’s destiny is involved in seeing this problem solved. We do not feel there are any basic differences between Egypt and Syria. There may be some differences in how they evaluate the intentions of the parties, but both of them want to negotiate for peace. The Syrians are worried . . .

President: They are not reluctant to tell us so.

Saud: They are afraid that Geneva will only be a formal meeting, and that it will not settle substantive problems. They see that Israel wants to divide the issues, and to avoid the Palestinian question entirely. They think that Israel wants partial solutions. They are anxious not to allow this to happen, but they are not opposed to peace. Syria is being attacked in the Middle East for giving up its national goals. Their fear is understandable, but they do want Geneva. I don’t know if Syria has received any clarification on the role of the unified Arab delegation. But they want all of the issues to be integrated and they want to avoid separate deals so that a true settlement can be reached.

They are on their guard against separate agreements. The important element for a true settlement is that there be Arab unity in this period. We all realize that this is important if we are to achieve peace. The Syrians are doing all that they can. Khaddam is touring the Middle East, and has been in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. We are doing what we can to identify areas of common objective. This is a never-ending process for us, and we are not tired and we will continue.

The Arabs need most of all to get some indication of intent that the Palestinian issue is to be discussed. This is the core of the question behind Palestinian representation, and is a crucial factor. If the intent is to solve the Palestinian question, then any serious negotiation would want those who are the fighters to be involved. This is why we see the refusal to allow the PLO to be at Geneva as an indication that the problem is not going to be solved. I am being very frank. This is how the Arabs see the issue. It is very clear what the questions are for Egypt and Syria and what they will get from a peace settlement, but this is not true for the Palestinians. Egypt wants territory, and Israel wants normal relations. But the Palestinians do not see clearly what they can get from a settlement. This is a substantive issue, but it takes on importance even when talking about who will take the responsibility for representing them. These are their worries, and they are not unreasonable. These worries do not indicate a lack of interest in peace. On the contrary, they want to negotiate and to resolve problems.

President: Let me ask you if you think that the present working paper and our statements about our purposes are adequate?

Saud: Let me get back to the question of intent. The working paper is a compromise which tries to incorporate various elements. The problem is that it does not tackle the question of the Palestinians at Geneva. The first paper had referred to “not well known members of the PLO,” and then that was removed. What does this mean? Is this an attempt to avoid discussing the Palestinian entity? Does this mean that only West Bank residents can participate? Does this mean that those outside of the West Bank and Gaza are not involved in the problem? The first working paper also had reference to a procedure for the working groups to report to the plenary, but then that was dropped. What does that mean?

President: Has Secretary Vance explained to you the agreement that I reached with Dayan on Palestinian representation? Let me review it for you. In the Lebanese delegation, for example, there would be no prohibition on PLO members participating. They could belong to any of the national delegations. In addition, over Israel’s very great opposition, agreement was reached that Palestinians could be represented on their own in a unified Arab delegation. I thought the Arabs would be pleased by that. The Palestinians can be at Geneva to discuss the Palestinian question. I would now like people to agree to go to Geneva and to let the United States and the Soviet Union prepare an agenda. The agenda would include the Palestinian question, the definition of peace, and the territorial question. But to try to spell out in writing that the PLO will be represented will insure Israel’s refusal. We have a private agreement with Dayan, however, that the PLO can go to Geneva.

Concerning the plenary, we propose that the 1973 procedures be followed. This provides for the working groups to report back to the plenary. I told Foreign Minister Khaddam that if Syria does not accept the results of the West Bank-Gaza negotiations, Syria can withhold its own agreement with Israel. It would be a mistake now to go back to Israel and try to revise the working paper. The paper passed the Israeli Cabinet by a very narrow vote. But they did agree to discuss the West Bank and Gaza with Palestinians, and to discuss the refugees on a multi-national basis that could even include Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Israel has made a major sacrifice. I don’t see any comparable flexibility on the Syrian side. We now need to get the Arabs to get together and to say that they either will or will not go to Geneva.

Saud: Has Israel agreed that the United States and the Soviet Union should prepare the agenda?

President: We will rely on the procedures of 1973. We have not yet discussed this precisely. The plenary can be part of the Geneva process. But we need agreement that the Arabs will now go to Geneva on the basis of the 1973 procedures. At this point, I don’t see that the Syrians are showing adequate flexibility. They seem to be more adamant than the PLO. And Egypt is not yet willing to say publicly that it is willing to go to Geneva. There is also the question of our role. We want to help all that we can. We think the conference should be convened under the UN Secretary General, the parties should make their opening speeches, and then the working groups should be formed. Some details can be worked out at Geneva. We need flexibility, and I think we have gone about as far as we can before Geneva. In the last session I had with Dayan, Israel made a serious effort to come up with compromise formulations for the first time.

Secretary Vance: We should try to use the procedures from the past as much as possible. This is how we would suggest handling the question of the relationship between the working groups and the plenary. Israel has said that they will use those procedures.

President: Israel is very eager to see these procedures used because that gives them the chance to approve of any new groups at Geneva. Syria also wants to keep cohesion on the Arab side, and the 1973 procedures can accommodate that. If there is no agreement on the 1973 procedures, we could waste a lot of time trying to get agreement on new procedures, and so we will lean very hard on all of the parties to get 1973 procedures adopted.

Saud: I appreciated what you said about not giving up on the peace-making effort. The United States must remain involved. This is not just our belief, but is also the belief of others. It is crucial for the peace settlement. At the same time, there are fears and uncertainties among the Arabs, and they are not all irrational. There is a long history to this problem. We see Israel in a different light from you. The history of our interrelationship with Israel does not lead us to trust them.

President: Israel has the same history of distrust toward the Arabs.

Saud: But we are not trying to tell the Israelis who should speak for them, although they are insisting that they choose the Palestinians with whom they will discuss the West Bank and Gaza. To reach a compromise on this problem, there will have to be discussions. The PLO representative in New York, Qaddumi, told me that the level of representation for the Palestinians is not as important as Palestinian rights. But he is worried that the question of representation will be used to avoid real discussion of the Palestinian issue. That is not in anyone’s interest. If peace and normalization are to be achieved, we need to solve the Palestinian question.

President: Do you think that a public statement by the United States and the Soviet Union would help?

Saud: Especially now it would help to get an Arab consensus. It would be more than useful.

President: When we have an agreement with Syria or Israel, and it is supposedly private, sometimes it is unilaterally announced. When we took the working paper to the Jordanians, Egyptians and Syrians, we were close to agreement. Then we gave it to Israel, and they announced it as a US-Israeli paper. We don’t want that to happen again. We want the Arabs to agree to go to Geneva with the 1973 procedures, and we will speak out on the need for a comprehensive peace based on the territorial settlement, resolution of the Palestinian question, and a definition of peace. If they agree, then we would propose to issue a final invitation. We can’t go on renegotiating the wording of the working paper. The words in the working paper have no real meaning in and of themselves. The final result and the attitude of the parties at Geneva is what counts. We should close the discussion on the working paper and think of what else we can now do.

Saud: The environment for negotiation that existed after the US-Soviet communiqué came close to creating a consensus among the Arabs of the sort that you said was needed. Even the Palestinians reacted well. What shocked people, especially the Palestinians, who had gone so far as to praise the US-Soviet communiqué, was the subsequent joint US-Israeli statement. This seemed to be putting the United States in the position of aligning itself with one of the parties. This caused concern which was reflected in Syrian comments at the time. The US-Soviet statement had created great expectations.

President: We still stand behind every word in the US-Soviet statement. The Syrians themselves were the first to express concern over that statement. The Syrians were concerned that it did not refer to the PLO or Palestinian national interests. Israel was also upset by the statement.

Saud: The Syrians mentioned one point to us—the fact that the 1967 borders were not referred to.

President: Both Syria and Israel said that they could not accept all of the US-Soviet statement, but the statement did represent what we and the Soviets saw as the basis for negotiations. We do not require that the parties accept every word of that statement as a prerequisite for going to Geneva. What we want as a prerequisite for going to Geneva is acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 only. There can be too much concern for exact words. We had a long discussion with the Soviets on the paper, and we got some compromises. But it doesn’t suit all the other parties. There has been no backing off from that statement, and it, along with Resolutions 242 and 338, are elements of our policy.

Saud: You’re right that we need to promote greater consensus within the Arab world.

President: It doesn’t seem to exist at all.

Secretary Vance: We’ve already said most of what is necessary to promote a consensus among the Arabs in the US-Soviet statement.

President: We could say it again, along with the statement on the 1973 procedures, if that would get the Arabs to go to Geneva.

Saud: His Majesty will have more thoughts on this when you come to Saudi Arabia. In the meantime, he will see President Sadat next week. There are efforts underway to get this consensus. We see it as vital.

President: Let me add that if we reach private agreements, they should not go public. There shouldn’t be any talk of a US-Saudi document, for example. But if the Arabs say that they want us to reaffirm that the Palestinian question, the question of borders, and the question of peace will be on the agenda, and if we can confirm that the 1973 procedures will be used, and if that would convince Syria and the others to attend, then we can take that step. We need to get the Arabs together, and then we will go to the Israelis. But we should do it privately. The Israelis publicized our proposal as a US-Israeli proposal, and this of course made it harder for the Arabs to accept.

Saud: I think that Dayan did that on purpose.

President: I’m sure that he did.

Saud: The Arabs have handled their discussions with you quite discreetly, and we do not make a habit of discussing in public what we say to you in private. We, of course, are not directly involved in the negotiations, but we are interested. We have no inhibitions in working for a successful negotiation, and for the unity of the Arab parties. That has long been part of Saudi policy. We are not asking for any kind of joint statement with you.

President: What do you suggest?

Saud: I haven’t heard the Syrian views recently. I will see the Syrians after my return, and I will report to His Majesty and he will get in touch with the Syrians.

Secretary Vance: Jordan and Egypt are likely to accept what the President has suggested. We are not so sure about the Syrians.

Saud: Will the Palestinians accept?

President: That depends. When we hear about the PLO positions from the Egyptians, they seem flexible. When we hear from the Syrians, they seem adamant. It depends on who carries the message.

Saud: The representative of the PLO has apparently rejected the US-Israeli paper. But the refusal seems to be hedged.

Secretary Vance: It left some room, and it was not as closed as some said. I saw some flexibility. We hear through the Egyptians that the PLO is flexible, but the Syrians carry a different message.

President: The essence of the problem is that unless we go to Geneva, the problem cannot be solved short of another round of conflict. Therefore, we need maximum flexibility from all the parties and good faith negotiations. I know there is a good deal of distrust and many radical statements have been made in the past. I am pleased with the accomplishments that we have made so far, but we can’t go much further without Geneva. The most difficult problem is lack of consensus among the Arabs. That is now the hardest part, and you can help there. You can provide leadership.

Saud: I don’t know if it is any harder for you to work with the Arabs than it is for you to work with the Israelis.

President: Up until my talks in New York, I thought the most difficult party was Israel. But they yielded on two issues, the unified Arab delegation and Palestinian representation.

Saud: The Syrians are concerned with two problems. They want the working groups to report to the plenary.

President: They can be handled as part of the 1973 procedures. Egypt and Syria see this differently. Syria wants the Arab delegation to act as a unit.

Saud: They are afraid of another separate agreement.

President: I understand. The differences are not only between Israel and Syria, but also between Egypt and Syria. We think Geneva should be convened with the Arabs as a unified delegation, including Palestinians, and that working groups should be set up so that the Syrians will negotiate about the Golan Heights, the Egyptians will negotiate with Israel on Sinai, and Jordan will negotiate on strictly bilateral issues. But the Palestinians should participate in the talks on Gaza and the West Bank, along with Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. This is a major Israeli concession. They had to change their policy. Israel also agreed to discuss the refugees on a multi-national basis which could include Lebanon and Syria. I can’t say that Israel will agree that there should be a strong role for the plenary. There is nothing improper in Israel’s position on this. But if the Arabs insist that a unified agreement must be reached among the Arabs before the bilateral issues are finally resolved, they can do that. They can withhold their final agreement. This will guarantee that the Palestinian question is treated as part of the whole, and we can help.

Saud: Would this be done outside of Geneva?

President: It can be done in the plenary at Geneva. This could be decided among the Arabs in private, and then they could simply announce it as their policy. But there is no reason not to go ahead with the bilateral meetings on Sinai and the Golan heights. We don’t want to see the Palestinian question ignored. If it is not solved, then Geneva would be a waste of time.

Saud: There is a problem of leaving some issues undecided. You’re asking the Arabs to settle their differences outside of Geneva, but then in Geneva they would split up into separate groups. I think that the Arabs have already compromised a great deal. A unified Arab position is central to the success of the negotiation. Israel’s maneuvers are sometimes harmful, and leaks make it difficult for the Arabs to respond to your proposals.

President: I don’t deny that. I am not trying to defend Israel. We were trying to mediate the conflict by being evenhanded. Maybe the United States should reissue a unilateral statement on the three key elements of a peace settlement.

Saud: That would be excellent. That would help. It should not be a US-Saudi statement though.

President: I would be glad to do that. We’ll try to regain the kind of momentum that we hoped to achieve by the US-Soviet statement. We can do that, and afterwards we will see if Israel is willing to go to Geneva, and we will also reaffirm the 1973 procedures. I have no doubt that Israel, Jordan, and Egypt are ready to go. The problem is Syria, and their distrust of Israel and their fear of a separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement. We’ll try to assuage that concern. I’m not trying to be critical.

Saud: The role of peacemaker is not easy.

Secretary Vance: If the original procedures are followed, the two co-chairmen would say that the parties have agreed to go to Geneva, and they will ask the UN Secretary General to call the conference. The unified Arab delegation can include Palestinians, but there will be no individual invitations. We will simply use the same procedure as in 1973. We will report to the members of the Security Council that the conference is going to be reconvened. There will not be individual notifications. If we stick to these original procedures, we should be able to get to Geneva.

President: All of the parties need to save face. Some of their old statements are a problem. We want to get the conference going, and we will give some private assurances of our good faith.

Saud: I see no objection. Would you do this in public or in private?

President: Whatever. We might make a public statement, and we will also reaffirm the 1973 procedures. Otherwise there could be an endless debate over the role of the co-chairmen, the Secretary General, and if we had to renegotiate all of that, I would just throw up my hands. We don’t need to redo that. There may be some parts of the procedures that the Syrians may not like, and some the Israelis won’t like, and some that we won’t like, and some that the UN Secretary General won’t like, but we should just stick with the 1973 procedures.

Secretary Vance: There was even a problem of where the parties should sit in 1973.

Saud: They didn’t sit for long that time.

President: This time I think they will. All of the parties want peace, including Syria. I don’t deny that. Of all those whom I have met in these talks, I have enjoyed my talks with Assad and with Khaddam as much as any. They don’t equivocate, and I understand Assad’s problems.

Saud: Maybe we should let the Syrians and the Israelis do all the negotiations!

President: We’ll proceed on the basis that I’ve described. Secretary Vance can be in contact with all of the parties, and then later we will make a unilateral statement, followed by a statement reaffirming the 1973 procedures. We aren’t going to withdraw from our involvement as long as the parties trust us to act as fair mediators. If it takes three, two years, or one year, we will try to provide the core around which the issues can be discussed. The UN Secretary General has too much of a formal role, but we will be there in the bilateral groups and in the plenary, and I am in it to stay.

Saud: You are not an uninvolved intermediary.

President: I know. And neither are you. The Arabs respect your government and know that it will act in good faith. They have important religious bonds with you, and they know how important peace is to your country.

Saud: It is essential to us.

President: If there were another war in the Middle East it could spread to involve more countries.

Saud: The destruction of the next war would be terrible.

President: I will personally assure you that I will stay in the process until it is over. If we ever do something to cause you concern, I want you to contact me directly. I can’t afford to lose your confidence. I know that the parties don’t trust the Soviet Union, and the UN doesn’t have enough strength. I recognize our unique role. But there are times when I have to go to the leaders of the Middle East countries and ask them to move forward, and we are now at such a point.

Saud: We appreciate that, and greatly value the honesty and directness with which you talk to us.

President: I have been reassured with the thought that the United States and Saudi Arabia are acting in concert. We want you to remain involved, even though you will not be at Geneva. You have a profound influence. It is crucial that we work closely together.

Saud: The commitment of Saudi Arabia to the Arab cause and to peace is sacred.

President: Let me change the subject. We don’t want you to let the price of oil go up next year.

Saud: You know where our heart is on that question. Ours has been a position of reasonableness and this will continue. We are hopeful that the next meeting of OPEC will be reasonable. We need to analyze the situation carefully. In December OPEC will meet. Your visit to a number of OPEC countries can be very helpful.

President: It is not accidental that I am visiting several oil producing countries. We recognize your leadership on this issue.

Saud: I have been encouraged by recent statements from several OPEC members which have been quite reasonable, even those from Algeria and Nigeria. I think the environment will be good.

President: I hope you’ll keep Secretary Vance informed on how we can help on this issue.

Saud: That has become normal between us.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Middle East.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement 1977: Volume I [II]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
2. A reference to the procedures established for the 1973 Geneva Conference.
3. On October 25, a Palestinian attempted to assassinate Khaddam at the Abu Dhabi airport as he prepared to depart the United Arab Emirates. The assassin missed Khaddam, instead killing the UAE Minister of State Saif ibn Said al-Ghubash.