Office of the Historian

157. Memorandum From the 40 Committee Executive Secretary (Ratliff) to Secretary of State Kissinger1

Washington, July 30, 1975.

SUBJECT

  • 40 Committee Proposal for Aid to Spinola

I circulated the proposal to give Spinola up to [dollar amount not declassified] covert financial support to the other 40 Committee principals, requesting a prompt vote.

Mr. Clements is out of town and will vote after his return Monday (Secretary Schlesinger declined to vote in his stead). Mr. Clements ap [Page 529] proved the CIA proposal on Portugal tabled at the last Committee meeting, so it would not be unreasonable to expect that he might approve the current proposal.

In Mr. Sisco’s absence, Mr. Hyland reports that State is opposed. State would prefer discussion at a formal meeting since the proposal opens a new line of policy, but pressed to vote, it says “No.” State believes that Spinola is discredited and lacks reasonable prospects of success. It cites a recent “very negative” assessment of Spinola made by Ambassador Carlucci with which the Department agrees, and believes that the Ambassador’s views should be sought. Finally, State believes that any assistance must be considered in the framework of an overall program and not evaluated in isolation. State concludes that it is not opposed in principle to operations in Portugal, and would consider proposals oriented to other groups closer to the current scene and with better political chances.

General Brown approves.

Mr. Colby votes “No.” He believes support should go to the centerist political parties in Portugal which have the mandate of the people through an election (as proposed in the CIA political program submitted at the last 40 Committee meeting). Noting the unresolved situation in Portugal, CIA believes there is a good chance the moderates will win the next step, unseating Goncalves and forcing the Communist Party to assume an appropriate parliamentarian role. Even if the moderates are not able to do this, they continue to represent a strong opposition which we and NATO countries could support. Spinola, on the other hand, is discredited and during tenure as president proved incompetent as a political leader and organizer. Mr. Colby notes that Spinola has participated in other schemes recently and that his security has been notoriously poor. He believes that any support we gave to Spinola would quickly become a public matter, if not because of poor security then because he would need publicity to gain supporters, and such publicity would be exploited by communists against the moderates as well as Spinola emigrees.

In summary, State and CIA vote against the proposal; General Brown approves; Mr. Clements will vote Monday.

Decision

The proposal is

Approved

Disapproved

Held for meeting when I return

Other

  1. Summary: Ratliff discussed the provision of assistance to Spinola.

    Source: National Security Council Files, Ford Intelligence Files, Portugal—GRF. Secret; Eyes Only; Outside the System. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed his approval of holding the proposal for a meeting. Scowcroft wrote “OBE” on the memorandum. A July 25 memorandum to the 40 Committee proposed giving [dollar amount not declassified] to help Spinola “‘liberate’ Portugal.” (Ibid.) On May 5, Rodman sent Kissinger an action plan that Spinola had given to U.S. officials “as a result of our indication of interest—in principle—in providing support.” On July 19, Rodman sent Kissinger a revised plan from Spinola, who said “[less than 1 line not declassified]” (Memoranda from Rodman to Kissinger, May 5 and July 19, and Memorandum from Scowcroft to Kissinger, undated; ibid.)

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