315. Telegram 0823 From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, January 22, 1973, 1000Z.1 2

TELEGRAM
Department of State
MANILA 0823

P 221000Z JAN 73

FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2647
DOD
CINCPAC

CINCPAC EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL GAYLER AND POLAD

IT IS TIME NOW TO SETTLE BACK AND EXAMINE WHERE WE ARE IN THE PHILIPPINES AND WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WE CAN AND SHOULD DO ABOUT THE CHANGED SITUATION. THIS MESSAGE WILL DEVOTE ITSELF ENTIRELY TO SOME OF THE MANY ELEMENTS WE MUST KEEP IN MIND AS WE TRY TO THINK THINGS THROUGH. THEY ARE LISTED BELOW AS OFTEN UNRELATED “ITEMS,” NOT NECESSARILY IN ANY ORDER OF PRIORITY.

ITEM NO. 1: DEVELOPMENTS SOMEWHAT ALONG THE LINES OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED HERE PROBABLY HAD TO HAPPEN AT SOME TIME. THE STATEMENT OF MARCOS THAT THIS IS A “SICK SOCIETY” IS NO EXAGGERATION, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE THOSE THAT WOULD ADD THAT HE IS MERELY THE LATEST OF A LONG LINE OF PREDECESSORS THAT HELPED MAKE IT SO. BE THAT AS IT MAY, THE MERE FACT THAT AN HONEST NATIONWIDE PLEBISCITE ON THE QUESTION OF “STATEHOOD-USA” WOULD PROBABLY HAVE WON IS AMPLE INDICATION OF FRUSTRATIONS OF THE MASSES AT THEIR OWN SYSTEM. I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD CRY TOO MUCH OVER A TEMPORARY LOSS OF DEMOCRACY AS IT WORKED IN THE PHILIPPINES, AS DEMOCRACY IS DEEPLY ROOTED AND PREDICTABLY WILL RETURN IN TIME AND ONE WOULD HOPE IN A MORE EFFECTIVE MANNER. THE QUESTION BEFORE US, THEREFORE, IS REALLY WHETHER THIS IS THE RIGHT TIME, WHETHER THIS IS THE RIGHT MAN, AND WHETHER HE IS DOING IT THE RIGHT WAY.

ITEM NO 2: IS IT THE RIGHT TIME? I WOULD SAY THERE IS [Page 2] NOTHING WRONG AS REGARDS TIMING. IF CHANGE HAD TO COME TO THE PHILIPPINES, PROBABLY BETTER NOW THAN LATER, BECAUSE THE TREND WAS SO BAD THAT DELAY MIGHT HAVE INCREASED THE CHANCES A CHANGE WOULD BE MORE VIOLENT AND BLOODY, WHICH SO FAR HAS NOT BEEN THAT CASE.

ITEM NO. 3: IS THIS THE RIGHT MAN? MARCOS IS WITHOUT DOUBT THE MOST CAPABLE MAN OF ANYONE ON THE SCENE WHO HAD ANY CHANCE TO BE IN POWER AT THIS POINT IN TIME IN THE PHILIPPINES. AND YET HE STARTS HIS TASK WITH VERY LOW CREDIBILITY INDEED, AND THERE ARE ELEMENTS OF BOTH CONCERN AND FEAR AMONG THE POPULACE AS TO HIS INTENTIONS. THIS CREDIBILITY QUESTION RELATES BOTH TO THE SINCERITY OF THESE INTENTIONS AND HIS CAPABILITY TO CARRY THEM OUT. TO SAY THAT THIS IS UNFORTUNATE IS REALLY AN UNDERSTATEMENT — BECAUSE THIS IS REALLY THE NUB OF THE PROBLEM.

ITEM NO 4: IS HE DOING THE RIGHT THINGS? AS FAR AS THE DIRECTION OF HIS PROGRAM OF REFORM IS CONCERNED, THE ANSWER IS GENERALLY YES. HOWEVER, HIS PROGRAM, WHILE PRAISEWORTHY, IS PROBABLY OVERAMBITIOUS AND THERE IS SOME DANGER THAT THE LIMITED RESOURCES AND TALENTS AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPLISH IT MIGHT BE DISSIPATED IN AN EFFORT TO DO TOO MUCH WITH TOO LITTLE. I WILL NOT TAKE UP SPACE BY LISTING THE STEPS HE HAS ALREADY TAKEN THAT ARE BENEFICIAL AND THAT ARE WIDELY ACCEPTABLE. SOME, LIKE THE PICKING UP OF GUNS AND DISBANDMENT OF PRIVATE ARMIES ARE NEARLY FINISHED. OTHERS, LIKE GETTING RID OF THE INEFFICIENT AND CORRUPT ARE ONLY PARTIALLY UNDERWAY. HE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE PROGRAMS SUCH AS THESE AND AT A HIGHER AND HIGHER LEVEL IN GOVERNMENT UNTIL IT REACHES THE TOP TO REGAIN HIS MUCH NEEDED CREDIBILITY.

ITEM NO. 5. NO ONE WANTS THE SYSTEM TO RETURN AS IT WAS BEFORE. IN ANY HONEST REFERENDUM IN THE PHILIPPINES THE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE VOTED FOR THE CONTINUATION OF MARTIAL LAW, EXPRESSED THEIR DISGUST IN GENERAL AT POLITICIANS, AND VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY FOR SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE STATE OF SOCIETY. THERE ARE VERY FEW VOICES OF DISAPPROVAL THAT EVEN SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN ARE NOW OUT OF A JOB.

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ITEM NO. 6: CONTRARY TO USUAL PATTERN, CHANGE HERE SO FAR HAS NOT BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY XENOPHOBIA AND NATIONALISM WITH ANTI-FOREIGN TONES. QUITE THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE, AND THIS IS SIMPLY BECAUSE MARCOS KNOWS THAT HE NEEDS FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO HELP THE COUNTRY DEVELOP. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE TOOK A HAND IN DRAFTING THE NEW CONSTITUTION TO MAKE IT MORE FAVORABLE TO FOREIGN INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY U.S., THAN THE OLD CONSTITUTION.

ITEM NO 7: IF MARCOS FAILS, OR SOMETHING HAPPENS TO HIM THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL PROBABLY (AND PARTICULARLY DUE TO HIS MANNER OF RATIFICATION) BE TORN UP BY SUCCESSORS. ANY SUCCEEDING CONSTITUTION UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE MORE NATIONALISTIC AND LESS FAVORABLE TO FOREIGN INTERESTS.

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ITEM NO. 8: IF MARCOS FAILS, OR IF SOMETHING ELSE HAPPENS TO TAKE HIM OFF THE SCENE, WE COULD BE FACED WITH A CHAOTIC SITUATION. THERE IS ALREADY ALMOST NOTHING LEFT OF THE TRADITIONAL PARTY STRUCTURE THAT COULD TAKE OVER IN ANY ORGANIZED SORT OF WAY. THE ULTIMATE RESULT MIGHT BE THAT THE MILITARY, ALMOST BY NECESSITY, WOULD HAVE TO TAKE OVER COMPLETELY. THERE WOULD BE PREDICTABLE SPLITS WITHIN THEIR RANKS AND THEIR STRENGTH AND CAPABILITY IS NOT ALL THAT GOOD IN ANY EVENT. AND THE COUNTRY WOULD BE FACED IN TIME WITH THE INEVITABLE PROPOSITION THAT ONCE THE MILITARY HAVE TASTED POWER TO THE EXTENT THEY MIGHT NOW WILLINGLY AGREE WITHIN SOME REASONABLE AND SHORT PERIOD TO GO BACK TO THE BARRACKS AND THE PARADE GROUND. SINCE THEY WOULD HAVE TO RELY ON THE SUPPORT OF CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL ELEMENTS, THIS COULD ACCENTUATE A TREND TOWARD THE POLARIZATION OF POLITICAL FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES WHICH MIGHT WELL HAVE ALREADY BEGUN UNDER MARCOS’ PERSONAL RULE.

THE FOLLOWING ITEMS PERTAIN MORE DIRECTLY TO U.S. INTERESTS HERE:

ITEM NO. 9: THE UNITED STATES HAS AN ENORMOUS STAKE IN THE PHILIPPINES. CLARK AND SUBIC ALONE ARE VERY MUCH NEEDED LOGISTIC BASES FOR SUPPORT OF FUTURE MOBILE FORCES IN THE PACIFIC. [Page 5] AS THE YEARS GO BY THEIR RELATIVE REPEAT RELATIVE IMPORTANCE IN OUR PACIFIC POSTURE WILL IN MY OPINION GO UP, AND NOT DOWN. OUR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS HERE ALONE UNDOUBTEDLY REPRESENT INVESTMENTS OF OVER TWO BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. THEY HAVE BEEN BUILT UP OVER THE YEARS WHEN LABOR AND MATERIALS WERE FAR CHEAPER THAN TODAY. REPLACEMENT ELSEWHERE AT TODAY’S COSTS WOULD RUN INTO SEVERAL TIMES THAT MUCH. OUR POSTURE IN THE PACIFIC WOULD BE GREATLY IMPAIRED WHILE SUCH A PROCESS WAS GOING ON, AND EVEN BEYOND THAT WOULD BE PERMANENTLY IMPAIRED BY LOSS OF THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

ITEM NO 10: JUST AS THE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS HERE SERVE AS A LOGISTIC BASE FOR OUR PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, SO DOES THIS MISSION ITSELF, FOR THE LARGEST ELEMENT OF ITS STRENGTH IS ENGAGED IN REGIONAL ACTIVITY. WE HAVE 20 U.S. FEDERAL AGENCIES OPERATING IN MANILA, WITH EIGHT OFFICES HAVING REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. AS ONLY ONE EXAMPLE, ALL OF OUR COMMUNICATIONS FROM KOREA TO INDIA ARE PROCESSED THROUGH FACILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES. THE VOA INSTALLATIONS HERE ARE DESIGNED FOR ALL OF EAST ASIA, AND WE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN TOLD OF THEIR INCREASING IMPORTANCE FROM A WASHINGTON POINT OF VIEW AFTER WE LEAVE INDOCHINA. WE CAN ONLY MAKE THE ROUGHEST KIND OF ESTIMATE OF THE EXTENT OF THE DOLLAR VALUE OF U.S. NON-MILITARY HOLDING HERE, BUT THEY CERTAINLY WOULD RUN INTO HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS. THEIR REAL IMPORTANCE, HOWEVER, CAN IN NOW WAY BE TIED TO THE COST VALUE ALONE.

ITEM NO. 11: THE EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF ALL OUR FACILITIES HERE, OF COURSE, REQUIRES A TOLERABLE STATE OF SECURITY AND LAW AND ORDER, A STATE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, BUT BEYOND THAT GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT ITSELF.

ITEM NO. 12: OUR AID PROGRAM HERE IS AN UNUSUAL ONE AND IS UNUSUALLY EFFECTIVE. IT IS AIMED STRICTLY TOWARDS THE LITTLE MAN IN THE PROVINCES, AND THE GRATITUDE AND FRIENDSHIP WE RECEIVE IN RETURN IS VERY NOTICEABLE AND TOUCHING. MARCOS HAS LET US BYPASS MANILA AND DEVISE WAYS THAT EFFECTIVELY PROHIBIT GRAFT IN OUR PROGRAMS. HE WINCES A BIT AT TIME OVER THE FACT THAT WE OFTEN GET MORE CREDIT THAN WE PERHAPS DESERVE, [Page 6] AND THE GOVERNMENT SOMETIMES GETS LESS. IT IS A FACT OF LIFE THAT WE DO GET THE CREDIT, EVEN WHERE A MAJORITY OF THE FUNDING IS LOCAL, SIMPLY BECAUSE PEOPLE THINK THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS WOULD NOT BE MADE IF WE WERE NOT THERE.

ITEM NO 13: OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE HERE IS MODEST AND INSUFFICIENT TO MEET THEIR REAL NEEDS. THE PROPOSITIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND OF THE MILITARY BUDGET TO NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ARE VERY SMALL IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND MUST BE INCREASED IF THE MILITARY ARE TO CARRY OUT ALL OF THEIR INTERNALLY ASSIGNED ROLES.

ITEM NO 14: WE ARE LONGER AS IN THE PAST, SITTING HERE ALONE IN THE PHILIPPINES AND PAYING THE WHOLE BILL. THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM IDEA IS WORKING AND OUR OWN DIRECT CONTRIBUTION HAS FALLEN BELOW 50 PERCENT (IT WAS BELOW A THIRD BEFORE FLOOD RELIEF) WHICH IS ONE OF THE MOST ENCOURAGING THINGS THAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE I HAVE BEEN HERE.

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ITEM NO. 15: THE STATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP HERE HAS IMPROVED BY 100 PERCENT SINCE EARLY 1970. MARCOS, I AM SURE FOR REASONS OF HIS OWN, PUT OUT THE WORD THROUGHOUT THE GOVERNMENT TO BE HELPFUL AND COOPERATIVE WITH AMERICANS. OUR DAILY WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH ALL OF THE MINISTRIES HAVE NEVER BEEN AS GOOD AS THEY ARE NOW, OR EVEN BEFORE MARTIAL LAW. HE HAS INTERVENED PERSONALLY, ON DELICATE MATTERS THAT WERE DIFFICULT FOR HIM UNDER THE OLD SYSTEM AND ITS PRESS, TO HELP US ON MANY ACTIONS ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE BASES AND THEIR STRATEGIC ROLE, AS WELL AS WITH OUR BUSINESS INTERESTS. HE HAS DONE ALL OF THESE THINGS EVEN WHILE SMARTING UNDER IT, IN THE BELIEF THAT WE TAKE THE PHILIPPINES TOO MUCH FOR GRANTED, SLIGHTING THEM ON SUCH VITAL MATTERS AS MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

ITEM NO 16: IF THINGS GO WELL I WOULD PREDICT WE COULD GET A SATISFACTORY NEW MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT WITH MARCOS, AND PROBABLY AS SOON AS THINGS SETTLE DOWN TO THE POINT WHERE THERE IS TIME FOR HIM TO UNDERTAKE IT. UNLESS WE CAN CHANGE OUR OWN POSTURE AS REGARDS FUTURE ECONOMIC RELATIONS, WE ARE HEADED FOR TROUBLE, BUT HOPEFULLY SOMEHOW OR OTHER WE CAN WORK THIS ONE OUT.

ITEM NO 17: IF MARCOS SEES THAT HE IS GOING TO FAIL HE MAY VERY LIKELY BECOME HIMSELF XENOPHOBIC AND PERHAPS ANTI-AMERICAN. [Page 8] IN THE EXTREME, IF THIS SHOULD HAPPEN, HARASSMENT AROUND THE BASES AND AGAINST AMERICAN INVESTMENT WOULD REACH THE POINT WHERE THIS WOULD NOT BE A VERY NICE PLACE TO WORK AND LIVE.

THE ABOVE LIST COULD, OF COURSE, GO ON AND ON TO THE POINT WHERE CABLE TRANSMISSION WOULD BE PROHIBITIVE. THE STAKES HERE ARE VERY HIGH, AND MANY MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE HAVE NOT BEEN ADDRESSED ABOVE. BUT IT IS ITEMS SUCH AS THE ABOVE THAT WE MUST PUNCH INTO THE COMPUTERS, BEFORE WE TRY TO GET OUT ANY ANSWERS.

EXEMPT GDS 58 (3)
BYROADE

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–192, NSSM 155 [2 of 2]. Secret; Exdis. Repeated Priority to DOD and CINCPAC.
  2. The embassy analyzed events in the Philippines.