Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

235. Telegram 8298 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State¹

Guatemala City, December 13, 1976, 1300Z.

8298. Subj: President Laugerud on U.S.-Guatemalan Relations. Ref: Guatemala 8229 (Notal).

1. Summary: President Laugerud used his meeting Dec 10 with Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers and me to put in context for us the widespread resentment he says is felt among his people, particularly among the military, over our behavior toward Guatemala in recent years. He pictured this mistrust as growing essentially out of our posture on Belize, and recited a long litany of our alleged failures to be helpful in the military supply field. Expressing his concern over a move among political parties here to break off the Belize negotiations as a result of British failure to abide by their alleged commitment not to raise Belize in the current UNGA, he said he would try to forestall such action. As usual, he cited Cuba as an underlying concern for Guatemala, both in the Belize issue and with regard to guerrilla activities in Guatemala. End summary.

2. President Laugerud received Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers and me for an hour and fifteen-minute conversation Dec 10 which was largely taken up by the President’s exposé of difficulties he said he was having in countering the apprehensions of many of his people, primarily in the military, who felt that the U.S. had failed Guatemala in recent years and particularly in connection with Belize. I had begun the conversation by telling President I had no specific issues to raise with him but would appreciate opportunity to hear any preoccupations he might have in considering his relations with us. He said he would speak frankly and would tell us about the widespread feeling among his military officers, many of whom ironically had received their training in the U.S., as well as among others who had come to regard us with mistrust and who felt we could no longer be relied upon. There were always people who tried to build up antagonism between the U.S. and Guatemala and, although he knew they were wrong, he had to deal with the results of their efforts. Unfortunately, he said, there had been a series of actions and inactions by the U.S. in the matter of providing military equipment which fed the propaganda being used against us. This was particularly true in connection with the Belize issue. He recited several instances, going back as far as the early seventies, of alleged U.S. refusal to sell C–47 aircraft to Guatemala, the protracted delay in reaching a decision to sell M–16 rifles, inability to obtain an A–37 fighter, incomprehensible slow-downs in the delivery of minor types of equipment, inability to obtain spare parts, and the early 1975 refusal to approve the resale to a private American of two T–33 trainers which Guatemala had obtained earlier from the U.S. He said that Ambassador Meloy had once been very frank with him and told him that we did not wish to be in the position of supplying military equipment which might be used to kill British soldiers. He said he understood this but, nevertheless, the whole history of our attitude on military equipment had resulted in a build-up of suspicion and mistrust among many of his colleagues. Many of them felt, he said, that since Guatemala was so close to the U.S. and was within its sphere of influence, we should be more helpful than we had been.

3. I said I appreciated the candor with which he had spoken. I said I had been aware of this strain in our relationship and that Vice President Sandoval had been quite frank with me about some of these ideas and misconceptions about our attitude toward Guatemala. I said I hoped he would understand that we saw the Belize question as a dispute between two of our very good friends. It was a dispute in which in the past we had tried to be helpful but that our efforts had not proved successful. Now we felt that the parties directly involved should reach agreement among themselves, although we did what we could to urge each of the parties to find a reasonable and peaceful accommodation. But I wanted to emphasize that the attitude did not reflect any lack of friendship for Guatemala. On the contrary, we wished to have the friendliest relationship with his people, his government, and with him personally. I said I would not comment on all the instances he had recited of difficulties in the military supply field as many of them had apparently occurred several years ago. As Ambassador Meloy had mentioned to him, there might be situations where we would be concerned about military deliveries. I would, nevertheless, look into the current situation to see if there were any misunderstandings that could be cleared up. But what, I asked, could he tell us about the outlook for the current round of talks with the British on Belize?

4. The President said that he was deeply concerned about these talks, and what he felt was the British failure to keep their word to forgo action in the UN while the talks were going on. He said that the British had assured Foreign Minister Molina during the recent talks that, with the talks in progress, they would not raise the issue in the UN this year as had been the case the year before. Despite this understanding, the matter had been raised again and a new resolution passed. This had created a furor among the members of the Guatemalan delegation, four members of which were from the four principal parties of Guatemala. These representatives had now sent word that they would introduce a motion in the Congress demanding that the government break off the talks with the British in view of the action in the UN. For them to do this would place him, as President, in an almost impossible situation before the country.

5. I said I thought this would be a most serious mistake. I said we had understood that the talks had been proceeding well and that for Guatemala to break off the negotiations because of actions outside of the talks themselves would be most unfortunate and would not be understood. The President said he completely agreed but that the situation nevertheless was very difficult. I said that surely the members of the delegations wishing to take this action could be educated about the harm such action could have. The President said that fortunately the Congress would recess at the end of next week and not resume until January. This would give him a three-week breather and he would try his best during that period to head off this idea.

6. At this point Luers asked the President whether his government had expressed its disappointment to the UK over this supposed breach of faith about the UN resolution. Luers said he had been at the UNGA prior to the passage of the resolution on Belize and sensed that the UK was not pressing for a strong resolution. It had been the Caribbean nations working with representatives of Belize. The President said the GOG had indeed expressed its unhappiness to the UK.

7. The President went on to say that another preoccupation strongly felt in Guatemala was concern about Cuban entree into Belize. He said he understood that Guatemala could not recover all Belizean territory; it was too late for that although there was much criticism of President Ubico for having failed to occupy Belize during World War II when the British were too heavily engaged elsewhere to have countered such a move. The President hastened to disown this idea, noting that it would not have been in the Guatemalan character. However, he said Guatemala would have to have the southern portion of Belize, referring to the District of Toledo. If Britain and Guatemala could work this out, the Cuban problem could be avoided. But if this failed, they had to worry about Cuban intentions since Cuba’s principal export was guerrillas, as in Angola. He also noted in this connection reports that Belize Attorney General Shoman had visited Cuba.

8. This led the President to refer to Cuban efforts to create internal difficulties in Guatemala. He referred to the recent EGP takeover of the Shenandoah Oil Camp and said they had established the presence of at least one Cuban in the EGP group. Queried about the basis for his certainty about this, he said that there had been one member of the group who had worn a green beret with a red star and who, as a member of a three-man team of interrogators of their captured helicopter pilots, had remained silent during the interrogation, but who at one point had shouted an obscene expression which was unique to the Cuban vernacular. (In fact, the quoted expression is also heard in other Caribbean countries.)

9. Returning to the subject of the atmosphere of mistrust between the U.S. and Guatemala, he said that small gestures were important. In this connection he wanted to mention that his Military Attaché in Washington was to have signed an order today opening bids for the repair of three Huey helicopters. If action on this request were taken expeditiously, this would be considered helpful; and he recalled the lightning speed with which we had responded to certain requests just after the earthquake. If, however, weeks went by before the aircraft arrived to pick up these helicopters, this would not be good. I said that Mr. Luers and I were glad to know about this and we would do what we could to ensure quick action.

10. But I said this led me, in the same spirit of candor in which he had spoken, to ask him to explain one thing which puzzled me. I said he had recalled a number of cases going back some time in the past in which we had appeared not to be as forthcoming and helpful as they had wished, but that he had now mentioned illustrations of our immediate actions in helping them after the earthquake. Since this evidence of our friendship was very recent, why was this not the dominant impression in the circles he referred to rather than the older history he had cited? The President said the trouble was that people’s memories were short and that, while everyone had been overwhelmingly grateful for our generous assistance after the earthquake, this disaster was now beginning to recede in everybody’s mind while the Belize issue continued to be a current issue.

11. Commenting on the President’s review of the Belize issue, Luers reminded him that the first American invocation of the Monroe Doctrine had been by President Cleveland in the case of British Guyana, an action which, despite our intention to be helpful, had failed to win us anything but resentment from Britain, Venezuela and Guyana. The lesson which we had to take from this was that, despite our desire to be helpful to our friends, we were better off not trying to intervene in disputes in the hemisphere. The President said he understood this reasoning.

12. During the course of conversation, the President told us of his decision to spend the first year after the end of his term in the United States, going initially to Glastonbury, Connecticut where his father-in-law lived. He said after a couple of months there, they planned to buy a mobile home and spend the rest of their time seeing all of the fifty American states. He said not only did he look forward to this opportunity to get to know the U.S. but he also felt it essential to get out of Guatemala in order to avoid being constantly importuned by friends who would wish to have him intercede on their behalf with the new administration.

13. Comment: We have been keenly aware of the strains in our relationship which have resulted from the biased view entertained by some Guatemalans, particularly among the military, of our posture in the Belize dispute, both our unwillingness to take Guatemala’s side in the issue and also the actions we have taken in the military supply field as a result of our concern about possible hostilities. This is, nevertheless, the clearest expression of the depth of feeling on this question and the President’s preoccupation with it as a political problem which he sees in his relationship with his own supporters. My earlier conversation with Vice President Sandoval in which he bluntly castigated us for our posture is precisely to the point. Because of this background, it will be important to use whatever opportunities we have to demonstrate our friendly attitude toward Guatemala, as we did after the earthquake. The President was obviously signalling just such a token opportunity to us in the case of the helicopter repair bids and we urge that a special effort be made to meet this request as expeditiously as possible, a gesture which President will take as personally reassuring.

14. As for the threat of a break-off in the Belize negotiations, we believe it is well within the President’s power to prevent such action by the Congress and we are confident that he will in fact prevail over the hard-liners on this issue.

Boster

1. Summary: During a December 10 meeting, President Laugerud told Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers and Ambassador Davis E. Boster that resentment against the U.S. had grown in recent years, primarily due to its posture on Belize and its alleged failure to assist Guatemala with military supplies.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760459–0003. Confidential; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to London, Mexico City, Belize City, USUN New York, USCNICSO, and SECDEF. Telegram 8229 from Guatemala City is dated December 8. (Ibid., D760453–1097)