230. Airgram A–86 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Political Violence During Laugerud’s Second Year
REF
- Guatemala A–135 of 21 July 1975
Summary: There is a sharp contrast between internal security statistics for the last six months of 1975 and the first five months of 1976. The last six months of 1975 were probably the most peaceful in the last [Page 630] eight years, while the first five months of 1976 have shown an overall increase in political violence. Statistics for 1976, however, do not bear out DCG leader René de Leon Schlotter’s June 1976 testimony before a U.S. congressional subcommittee that Guatemala is being subjected to new waves of violence comparable to the one during the 1966–67 counter-insurgency campaign or those of the Arana administration.
Increased provocation from terrorists has had much to do with the upsurge in violence. Since the Laugerud administration’s sine qua non for a “satisfactory” internal security situation is control of violent subversive activity, it has come as no surprise that the GOG has been quite willing to act energetically to meet the “new challenge” from the Left. Government response has included resort to extra-legal measures, particularly in an area of rural Quiche Department. In the urban areas, the GOG has, with some major exceptions, continued to refrain from engaging in or tolerating random violence. We believe that the GOG will be able to deal with the guerrillas to its satisfaction. We are less certain that the GOG’s policy of restraint will continue to be used as successfully as in 1975. End summary.
Statistics. This report covers the period July 1975 to May 1976. Statistics for this eleven-month period show a striking contrast between the last six months of 1975 and the first five months of 1976. The average number of incidents per month during July-December 1975 was 15.3; during the first five months of 1976, the average jumped to 28.8 per month. For the eleven-month period, the monthly average was 21.4. Incidents during Laugerud’s first year in office (July 1974 to June 1975) averaged 36.6 per month. During the last year of Arana’s presidency (July 1973 to June 1974) incidents averaged 57.2 per month (see attached graph).
[Omitted here is a graph depicting political violence in Guatemala, February 1974–May 1976]
However harshly one may judge the rise in violence since January 1976, the statistics simply do not bear out DCG leader René de Leon Schlotter’s June 1976 testimony before a U.S. congressional subcommittee to the effect that Guatemala is being subjected to another “wave of violence” comparable to the ones in the 1966–67 counter-insurgency campaign in Zacapa or during the Arana administration. A conservative Embassy estimate of the number of guerrillas killed during the 1966–1967 Zacapa campaign (300) is still more than twice as high as the total number of incidents nation-wide between January and May 1976. The January to May statistics also show a rate less than half of what it was during Arana’s last year.
1975—A Very Good Year. It is no exaggeration to say that 1975, and particularly the second half of the year, was the most peaceful period Guatemala has experienced for at least eight years. There was a drop in [Page 631] both the quantity and significance of reported violence, both in the urban and rural areas.
Except for a sweep (which did not become public knowledge until January 1976) through rural Huehuetenango Department following the June 1975 assassination of a retired MLN activist, the GOG engaged in no major operations against terrorists during the second half of the year. In one case, the GOG suffered, and endured, a defeat in court—three women arrested following the December 1974 shootout between GOG and community party (PGT) forces were acquitted and freed. The GOG must certainly not have been pleased by the outcome, but it did not overturn the ruling either by pressure or extra-legal means.
The relative tranquility was due to two things: (a) debilitation of terrorist groups, and (b) government restraint in the absence of violent provocation. Between late December 1974 and April 1975, the PGT suffered major reverses—the Party Secretary General and at least three other operational commanders were killed by the government. None of the other terrorist groups except the EGP pulled off any major incidents during the year. The EGP, apart from its assassination of Arenas in Huehuetenango Department, was inactive, apparently organizing itself, until December 1975, when it assassinated right-wing Congressman Bernal Hernandez Castellon.
In the absence of terrorist provocation, government forces did not initiate “search and destroy” operations against these groups, except for the sweep through Huehuetenango. Other forces of the Right, particularly those associated with MLN boss Mario Sandoval Alarcón, remained held in check and were not a provocative force.
1976—EGP Takes On Kjell. The December 12, 1975, assassination of MLN congressman Bernal Hernandez marked the end of the year’s tranquil period. In a way, though, the success of the attempt illustrates how quiet the period had been; even one of Arana’s former bodyguards had been lulled into unpreparedness by the six months of calm.
The EGP followed up the Hernandez killing with several other spectaculars, such as the killing of an Army colonel in April, a gun store robbery in April, and the burning of trucks carrying coffee from El Quiche Department in May. The government has been unable to solve any of these.
Apparently of greater concern to the GOG were reports of the EGP’s presence in northern Quiche Department, particularly around the Ixil-speaking towns of Nebaj, Chajul, and Cotzal. GOG forces were sufficiently concerned to go to the area in force after the Corps of Detectives made an initial investigation. The Air Force’s A–37B jet fighters were used to bomb suspected guerrillas, and on the ground peasants were reportedly terrorized by groups of armed unknowns who hauled [Page 632] them out of their houses and took them away; some of this was undoubtedly done by GOG forces.
The government’s response in Quiche demonstrates the Guatemalan Army’s deep fear that rural guerrilla groups will manage to become entrenched, thereby making it difficult to dislodge them without a bloody campaign as in Zacapa in 1966–67. The Army is willing to act early and harshly to prevent terrorists from taking root again, even at the expense of human rights violations. The Army ignored domestic protests against its handling of the Quiche operations, and we have no doubt that formal protests from abroad would either have been ignored or rejected out of hand.
The GOG’s general reluctance to engage in or tolerate random political violence, a main feature which distinguishes the present administration from the Arana administration, has continued, although with some major exceptions. Most prominent among the exceptions are the February 20 killing of FURD leader Rolando Andrade Peña who had reportedly encouraged some persons left homeless by the February 4 earthquake to squat on land owned by the Arana family, and the Escuadron de la Muerte (Death Squad)-like killings of petty criminals following the earthquake. The latter were carried out by regular policemen and were confined to persons with criminal records who were caught in the act of looting after a major disaster. There have been no more since the immediate post-earthquake period.
The Andrade murder was more serious. A reliable source reported that Andrade was killed by President Laugerud’s personal security service. We must assume the President knew and approved the service’s actions in advance. It is the only instance we are aware of in which the GOG has executed a non-Communist for political reasons. Why there should have been so extraordinary a departure from Laugerud’s general policy of restraint and tolerance of non-Communist opposition is not clear. The intense strain of the earthquake crisis and rumored pressures from Arana may have been factors.
More recently, the GOG’s handling of cases involving university students and its handling at the same time of a case involving the wealthy rightist Zimeri family have raised questions about a double standard with regard to illegal activities.
As we look to the future, we believe that the internal security situation will depend primarily on the answers to two questions: Will the government be able to satisfy itself that it has successfully met the challenges posed by the EGP, PGT, or other terrorist groups? Will President Laugerud become increasingly tempted or increasingly pressured to abandon his general policy of not resorting to extra-legal methods in dealing with political dissidents? Our tentative answer to the first ques [Page 633] tion is yes; the answer to the second is that we are a lot less certain than we were last year.
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Summary: The Embassy reported on increases in political violence and attributed them to increased provocations by terrorists, countered by a government response that included extra-legal measures.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760105–1670. Confidential. Drafted by D.C. Johnson, cleared by G.F. Jones and W.E. Thomas in the Political Section, and approved by Andrews. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. Airgram 135 from Guatemala City is ibid., P750120–2241. In telegram 5437 from Guatemala City, August 2, the Embassy observed that “Violence remains the most fundamental political problem of Guatemala, and there is no question but that its origins lie in the tension produced by attempting to maintain a government that neither taxes nor spends, an electoral system which permits dissent but rarely rewards it, and an economic and social system designed to preserve the comfort and ease of a tiny majority.” (Ibid., D760297–1158)
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