Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

215. Telegram 262111 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Guatemala and the United Kingdom¹

Washington, November 5, 1975, 1949Z.

262111. Subject: Belize.

1. Please deliver the following letter to Foreign Secretary Callaghan at the earliest opportunity.

2. This message also contains instructions for Ambassador Meloy.

3. Begin text: Dear Jim:

We have the aide mémoire delivered by Ambassador Ramsbotham yesterday (Nov. 4). Ambassador Meloy, as you know, has already made several high-level démarches to the Guatemalans as to the use of force in Belize. We have also tried to be helpful to you with respects to delivery of our C–47s and the supply of guns and ammunition. As the aide mémoire requested, we have now instructed Ambassador Meloy once again to meet with the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, and to pass on to him the representation of your government to us as set out in the aide mémoire.

We should, however, be under no illusions, nor should you. The Guatemalans, we think, already understand our position. We have little additional credit to draw on. Your recent reinforcement will increase the pressures within Guatemala to attack. Our representations will do precious little to deter them.

The likelihood of an attack is also increasing, we think, because of the increasing likelihood of passage by the UN of your draft resolution. As we now see it, the resolution, by appearing to the Guatemalans to leave nothing of substance to negotiate, may have so weakened the position of moderates within the Guatemalan Government as to make it impossible for them to prevail against military adventurism.

We believe that the recent visit of Ivor Richard to Guatemala was a positive move. However, our assessment is that more is needed if we are to insure against an armed confrontation which would serve no one’s interest. There may be at least two further possibilities for positive and immediate measures which you might wish to consider in an effort to head off resort to force:

(A) The International Court of Justice: We gather that Richard raised this privately with Foreign Minister Molina and received an equivocal response. However, our own discussions with the Guatemalans, including Molina, lead us to believe they would finally accept, as a way out, submission of the Belize question to the ICJ. We are aware of the past history of attempts by your government to reach this result and of the problems that further such attempts might entail. Nonetheless, we believe this is a live option. It also seems to promise a good way out for everyone concerned if some sort of agreement can be reached with the Government of Guatemala prior to passage of the UN resolution.

(B) Security and economic guarantees: The second option that might be available would be a joint announcement, now, with the GOG, to be closely timed to passage of the UN resolution, setting out matters of vital security and economic concern to the GOG to be encompassed in the negotiations called for by the resolution and which will begin immediately on the heels of UN action. I should emphasize that we have had no contact with the Guatemalans on this idea. Furthermore, I do not purport to be presenting any sort of quote package unquote. The following are simply some examples of the kinds of things in which the Guatemalans have previously expressed an interest and which might be enough to persuade them to parlay rather than fight: (1) limits on both Belize and Guatemala with respect to rights to enter into military accords with third countries; (2) promises to cooperate in exchanges of information on threats to the security of the other state; (3) pledges not to allow the territory of one party to be used as a base for overt or covert attack against the other; and (4) a commitment that an independent Belize would adhere to the Rio Treaty. Economic interest might include: (a) a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Amatique or other arrangements for guaranteed access; (b) fishing and seabed rights in the Gulf; and (c) Guatemalan access to Belizean ports.

I am not at all certain that an initiative along either of these lines would stave off a Guatemalan military move. However, I put them before you for your consideration. Warm regards. Henry. End text.

4. Please advise when message delivered.

Kissinger

1. Summary: Secretary Kissinger noted that despite U.S. efforts to encourage a peaceful resolution to the Belize issue, the likelihood of an attack by the Guatemalans was increasing. While applauding British meetings with the Guatemalan Government, the Secretary suggested two possible approaches to defusing the situation: arbitration through the International Court of Justice or security and economic guarantees to build confidence between the negotiating parties.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–77, Country Files, Box 4, Guatemala, State Department Telegrams, From SECSTATE—EXDIS. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Belize City and USUN. Drafted by Lazar; cleared by Vine in EUR, Buffum in IO, Cutter in C, Ortiz in S/S, and Rogers and approved by Kissinger. On November 4, a copy of Ramsbotham’s aide mémoire was sent to Kissinger as an attachment to the draft telegram. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830114–0644)