Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

173. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Guatemala City, October 17, 1973.

PARTICIPANTS

• General Efrain Rios Montt, Christian Democratic (Opposition Unity) Presidential Candidate
• Danilo Barillas Rodriguez, Secretary-General, Christian Democratic Party
• John T. Dreyfuss, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim
• William T. Pryce, Chief, Political Section

SUBJECT

• Rios’s Presidential Candidacy

Summary: In his first meeting with Embassy officers since returning to Guatemala to assume his Presidential candidacy, General Rios Montt left the impression that he will run a strong populist-type campaign, rejecting close control by either Rene de Leon Schlotter and the Christian Democrats to whom he owes his opportunity to run, or by the other leftist political leaders who have rallied to his leadership. He evidenced a fierce pride in his record and reputation as a military officer, a deep resentment against the senior military officers who forced his removal as Army Chief of Staff and banishment to Washington, a strong conviction that he could and would win the election, and confidence that the Army would ensure relatively free elections and insist that he take power if he won. End Summary.

Background: This was the first meeting of Embassy officers with Rios since he returned to Guatemala to assume his Presidential candidacy on September 29th. Since we had already talked with the Christian Democratic leaders who were responsible for Rios’s selection (see Dreyfuss-Pryce-de Leon Schlotter memcon of September 20 and Pryce-Burghardt-Barillas memcon of September 25) and were anxious to talk to Rios alone at this first meeting, we therefore went to some effort to enable the Chargé to contact Rios directly and invite him personally to lunch. To no avail. On reconfirming his acceptance, Rios asked “must I come alone or may I bring an assistant?” He naturally was given his choice and he showed up with Christian Democratic Secretary General and de Leon confidant Danilo Barillas. But it didn’t really matter, because although the atmosphere at the lunch was a little reserved at the beginning, Rios, who has known both the Chargé and the reporting officer for quite some time and soon recognized that Barillas did also, warmed up considerably during the course of the conversation and seemed relatively uninhibited by Barillas’s presence, as will be evidenced by the memorandum of conversation which follows:

Rios’s Goals: Rios said that he had not yet decided on a plan of government, but fully intended to insure that his was a government for all Guatemalans. The Christian Democratic plan would serve as the basis for developing his plan of government, but it was by no means immutable, and he would no doubt make changes. Rios caused Barillas no small amount of uneasiness when he announced that he considered there was very little difference between his philosophy and that of the Government candidate General Kjell Laugerud, who he said was an outstanding military officer who had a deep sense of social consciousness very much like his own. The principal difference between them, said Rios, was that they were backed by different sets of personal interests. He said that he would not be bound by political considerations in selecting his cabinet and asserted he would have no compunctions about appointing an extreme rightist to a high position if he thought the man was the best available for the job.

Rios emphasized time and again that he would insist on absolute integrity in his government. He harked back with fierce pride to his record as a military officer which he asserted (correctly to the best of our knowledge) had never been blemished with the slightest hint of personal dishonesty. “I never ate the food of my soldiers,” he cried at one point (referring to the fairly common practice among senior military commanders of pocketing some of the official funds allocated for feeding their troops), “and I won’t change as President.” He added that he would insist on equal honesty on the part of his ministers. “What I would really like to do,” he said, “is appoint my best friends to three or four key ministries.” “But,” he added, “if I found one of them stealing so much as a nickel, which would mean they were taking four pieces of bread out of the mouths of the people, I would have him shot.” “Then,” he said, “there would be no dishonesty on the part of his replacement or his fellow ministers.”

Campaign Plans and Strategy: Rios said that he intended to wage a strong, vigorous campaign which would be directed at the poor and underprivileged who represented the vast majority of Guatemala’s population. He intended to campaign especially hard in the countryside. He recognized that a strong Revolutionary Party (PR) candidate might eat into his strength, but hoped to be able to overcome the appeal of the PR symbol by convincing the PR rank and file that he, and not the PR candidate, would best serve their interests. He expressed confidence that he could and would win the elections and said he thought that the Army would not only ensure that the elections were relatively free and honest, but would also insist that he take power if he wins. In a discussion about whom the backers of Col. Peralta would support if, as seemed probable, Peralta is not able to secure a presidential nomination, Rios claimed that most of them would flock to his banner. Barillas disagreed mildly, noting (correctly we believe) that many Peralta supporters were “Kjellistas.”

Both Rios and Barillas set great store in the rallies which were being organized on Rios’s behalf to take place on October 19th in Guatemala City and October 20th in Escuintla. They believe that if the rallies are large and successful, as they hope, this will begin a bandwagon effect for Rios among the large group of uncommitted voters. They asserted that the rich finca owners were going to make it difficult for their workers to attend the Escuintla meeting.

Campaign Organization: Rios said that the difficult decisions regarding the selection of candidates for Congress and mayoralities had not yet been finalized. He at one point asserted that the selection would be made strictly on the basis of picking the best man for the job, but at another point talked about the difficult job of “dividing up the cake.” Barillas professed to agree that partisan considerations should not dominate the selection process, saying that the DCG would not even propose candidates in areas where they did not have good men (DCG Leader de Leon had told us previously that he and his party were prepared to be “generous” in the division of candidacies among the opposition coalition).

Rios was unresponsive to a number of probes regarding the identity of his running mate. He did confirm that he had in fact offered the Vice Presidency to Clemente Marroquin Rojas, as the latter has claimed in his newspaper La Hora, and that Marroquin had refused. In a statement somewhat at odds with his other remarks about picking the best man for each job, he said that in offering the Vice Presidency slot to Marroquin he had been influenced by the fact that his campaign was short of funds, and he thought that Marroquin’s newspapers and financial resources would be a decided asset. He was greatly pleased by the fact that Marroquin’s original public hostility toward him had softened considerably, and that Marroquin now had kind words for him. He obviously hopes to get Marroquin on board his campaign. Rios commented that press speculation that Guillermo Toriello and Raul Osegueda, both of whom have far leftist reputations, were being considered as his running mates was nothing more than that—speculation.

In response to a delicately put question from the Chargé as to what the relationship between himself and Rene de Leon Schlotter would be, given the fact that de Leon had billed himself as “leader of the national opposition” in a television program after the DCG support for Rios had been announced, Rios replied without a moment’s hesitation that de Leon would operate at the secondary level. (“Rene se va a segundo plano.”) Barillas coughed over his food at this point and quickly interjected that de Leon, Mayor Meme Colom, and PR dissident Fuentes Mohr would all be right behind Rios giving him full support during this campaign.

What Made Rios Run: At one point in the conversation, beginning when Barillas had left the room temporarily, Rios said that he would never have run for the Presidency if he had not been kicked out as Army Chief of Staff. He realized his military career was through when his long-time friend Laugerud had declined a dinner invitation Rios had extended to him and his wife Helen shortly before the Rioses left for Washington last July. Rios said that if Laugerud had come to the dinner, he would have offered Kjell the use of his car in his campaign since he did not intend to take it to Washington. If Kjell had taken the car, Rios said, he would never have run against him since that would have required going back on an unwritten pledge of loyalty to Laugerud, something he would not do. But Kjell had not come to dinner, and Rios had surmised that his military career was finished and that the best he could hope for after a Laugerud victory would be an assignment as Military Attaché to Washington or some similar post.

Then, with Barillas back in the room, Rios launched into an impassioned denunciation of those responsible for his abrupt departure as Army Chief of Staff last July after serving in the job for less than six months. “You know,” he began, “that I was thrown out of the job as Chief of Staff, don’t you; that’s what it was, I was dishonored and demoted to the Inter-American Defense College. It’s a fine job alright but let’s face it, it was a demotion; I was kicked out of the finest job in Guatemala (Army Chief of Staff), a job which is better than being President.” Then warming to his subject, he went on with his eyes blazing, his voice trembling, and his finger waving, “But do you know why they threw me out? I’ll tell you why! Because I wouldn’t let them eat their soldiers’ food (i.e., he attempted to stop commanders from pocketing money intended for soldiers’ substance); because they wanted to be on their fincas when they were supposed to be on the job, and I wouldn’t put up with it. I insisted that they be soldiers, and they threw me out because I wasn’t a member of the club.”

Relations With Laugerud: A number of times during the conversation Rios expressed admiration for his former Chief, General Laugerud. He said that he had not seen Laugerud since returning and although he would be happy to do so, he doubted that Kjell would be interested. He asked the Chargé, whom he knew to be a long-standing personal friend of Laugerud, to pass on his continuing respect and admiration to the government’s candidate and to tell Laugerud that if he, Rios, threw a few barbs at him during the campaign, it would only be in the process of playing the political game. He said he knew that if Kjell won, he would come out all right, and was sure Kjell knew that if he, Rios, won, Kjell would come out all right.

Comment: Leaving aside for the moment the other interesting aspects of the conversation, what impressed us most was the very decided impression we got that Rios will be his own master during the campaign, and that the DCG and anyone else will play hell trying to control him, despite the fact that Rios owes his nomination to the Christian Democrats. We also had the firm impression that de Leon, who last month told us in effect that a principal reason the Christian Democrats had picked Rios instead of Col. Peralta was that they weren’t sure how much influence they would have had in a Peralta regime, may be in for an unwelcome surprise if Rios wins. In short, the Christian Democrats may well have a tiger by the tail.

Also of considerable interest was the revelation of the very deep-felt resentment Rios holds against the senior military commanders who were responsible for his removal as Army Chief of Staff. Although he didn’t come out and say it, we had no doubt that one of the motivations he had in giving up his military career just short of retirement to take the risks of an electoral campaign was to “show the SOBs” who did him in. End Comment.

1. Summary: In a meeting with Embassy officers, Presidential candidate General Efraín Ríos Montt indicated he would not be controlled by the Christian Democrats, and that following a strong populist campaign, he would win the 1974 Presidential election.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 GUAT. Confidential. Drafted by Political Counselor William T. Pryce on October 19, and approved by Chargé John T. Dreyfuss. Sent as an enclosure to airgram A–213 from Guatemala City, October 23. The meeting was held during a luncheon at the Dreyfuss residence.