Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972

28. Telegram 14146 From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹ ²

Bonn, October 28, 1969, 1145Z.

Subject:

• NPT: Talking Points

Transmitted herewith is the text of the talking points the FRG NPT delegation intends to use in their Washington discussions this week.

Begin text:

1. The Federal Government is at present making a final appraisal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a view to signing it. In this review of the situation, German-American understanding is essential on the points which the former General [sic] Cabinet felt still required clarification. If these points can be settled satisfactorily, the Federal Government, whose positive attitude towards the aims of the Treaty are known to the United States, will make an early decision regarding signature.

2. In the event that the Federal Government decides to sign the Treaty, it has prepared a statement which will be delivered in the German Bundestag. It has also drafted a note which will be transmitted on the day of signature to the depositary governments accredited in Bonn.

[3.] As the United States Government knows, the German-Soviet talks of February and March 1969 on Articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, did not produce entirely satisfactory results. In particular, the Soviet Union—in contrast to the attitude of the three Western powers in connection with the German renunciation of nuclear weapons of 1954—is unwilling fully to base its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany on the principles contained in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.

The United States Government is therefore requested to have in readiness for publication in due course, a statement, which it has already offered to make, rejecting the Soviet claim to a right of intervention. The British Government has already proposed to make a similar statement: it is intended to ask the French Government to accede to such an American-British action.

The Federal Government intends now to bring to a conclusion the round of discussions on the Non-Proliferation Treaty held with the Soviet Union in 1969, and to give further consideration to the problem of the so-called rights of intervention—which the Soviet Government claims to be referred to in Articles 53 and 107—in the talks with the Soviet Union on the exchange of declarations on the renunciation of force.

4. The Federal Government would like to use the interpretation of the term “control,” which was internally given to NATO, in the deliberations of the Bundestag committees in closed session. It feels this is necessary in view of the consent of Parliament required for accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It therefore requests the United States Government to allow this interpretation to be used in such committee deliberations.

It would also be grateful to get the US views on whether it would not be expedient to make this interpretation known to the Soviet Union through appropriate channels in order to avoid any subsequent disagreement over interpretation.

5. The Federal Government would like to discuss with the United States Government how the risk of a Soviet objection to the “classical” American interpretations could be met after the deposit of the American instrument of ratification.

6. Considering the importance of NATO’s continued existence for German accession to the NPT, the Federal Government would be grateful if the United States Government would prepare a confirmatory statement—similar to the one made by Secretary Rusk in October 1969—and give us an assurance that, if necessary, that statement will be delivered in public.

7. It is the intention of the Federal Government, on the occasion of signing the NPT to make a statement in the German Bundestag to the effect that the existence of NATO or of a system providing similar security is one of the assumptions on which German accession to the NPT is based. Moreover, that statement will contain our viewpoint that the Federal Republic of Germany, in a situation in which it considers its supreme interests in jeopardy—this situation could arise if NATO were to dissolve or substantially shrink—will remain free together with other European states to take the necessary security measures.

The Federal Government requests the United States Government to give an assurance that it will express its understanding for this viewpoint by a statement in support of it.

8. The Federal Government requests the United States Government to give a formal confirmation that it agrees in principle with the German interpretations, and also to give a formal assurance that it is prepared to support them in case of dispute.

They are the following interpretations regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the verification agreement:

A) Limitation to the purpose of the Treaty

B) Freedom of research and development

C) Onus of proof

D) Supply of fissionable material

E) Exchange of information

F) Other nuclear explosive devices

G) Safeguards and verification agreement

(For full text see draft note, paragraph III).

Interpretations A, B, C, E, and G are known to the United States, since they have already been made public and have been transmitted to the United States.

The German side assumes that there is agreement with the United States side on interpretation D. it furthermore understands that the points in the American paper of 7 March 1969 on the interpretations regarding ‘onus of proof’ (c) and ‘exchange of information’ (e) have been satisfactorily clarified by the German reply of 23 April 1969. The German side requests support for these two interpretations along the lines of the understanding set forth in the German reply of 23 April 1969.

The first paragraph of the interpretation regarding the problem of other nuclear explosive devices has been taken word for word from the statement made by the Japanese delegate during the United Nations debate on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the last half-sentence has been taken from the Netherlands statement. It is said that the United States has in principle agreed to those formulations. The second paragraph is in accordance with the second American interpretative rule. The third paragraph is taken literally from the statement made by the Australian delegate in the United Nations on 17 May 1968. In accordance with the views of various non-nuclear weapon states such as Japan and Italy, our interpretation is based on the idea that non-nuclears too are permitted to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, provided that a distinction can be made between other nuclear explosive devices and nuclear weapons. We assume that it will be unproblematic for the United States to support interpretation F.

The Federal Government upholds the wording of the German interpretations. The German interpretations, which throughout include outside formulations already in international use, have been decided upon in their present form by the Federal Defence Council. The text of the interpretations as communicated has already been brought to international attention by the German side. For that reason the German side does not think it advisable to make any changes in the formulations used. The Federal Government assumes that the present wording of interpretations A, B, D, and G is acceptable to the United States. The Federal Government would, however, understand it if the United States were, if necessary,to use different language to express the purpose of the interpretations regarding ‘onus of proof’ (c), ‘exchange of information’ (e), and ‘other nuclear explosive devices’ (f), American formulations acceptable to both sides should be prepared without delay.

9. As regards the definition of “source or special fissionable material”, the Federal Government shares the Italian view that the words “source material” and “special fissionable material” used in the Non-Proliferation Treaty—subject to the amendments expressly adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany—have the meaning laid down in the present text of Article XX of the IAEA statute.

The Federal Government will make a statement to that effect upon signing the NPT.

10. In view of the fact that a large portion of the German economy is made up of foreign trade, the problem of export provisions as contained in paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT is of considerable significance for the Federal Republic of Germany.

As regards the definition of “equipment and material” to which the export provision in paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT also applies, reference is made to the preliminary talks already held with the United States. Generally binding provisions do not seem to exist. Certain indications may be drawn from: the list by the working group of the IAEA Board of Governors of 14 October 1964:

• —the informal agreement between members of the group of supplier countries on the trigger list items;
• —the replies by the AEC to questions asked during hearings in the United States Senate (printed on page 115 of the hearings, July 10, 11, 12 and 17, 1968).

In accordance with the American view communicated to us on 5 August 1968, the Federal Government understands that each exporting country decides for itself which materials and equipment should fall under the provision of paragraph 2 of Article III. If more detailed arrangements should be made they would be binding upon the Federal Republic of Germany only if expressly adopted by it.

The Federal Government will make a statement to that effect upon signing the NPT.

[11.] It is of vital importance for the Federal Republic of Germany that a satisfactory verification agreement between EURATOM and the IAEA be sufficiently ensured. The relevant aspects in this connexion are political, economic and scientific-technological.

For some months now work has been going on within the community to elaborate a joint position of the European Atomic Community with the aim of giving it a mandate for negotiations with the IAEA. The Federal Government expects that a German decision to sign the NPT will speed up the preparatory work within the community, and that in the foreseeable future the preconditions for starting talks with the IAEA will be created.

The Federal Government wishes to ask the United States once again to promote the verification agreement until its successful conclusion by all suitable means and in all suitable quarters. The German side realizes why the matter is still being clarified wthin the community, does not, on certain substantial questions of the verification arrangement, make any comments going beyond the well-known American statements on the verification question. However, it asks the United States Government for the time being to give a general political assurance of continued promotion of the verification agreement between EURATOM and IAEA. For that agreement, the Federal Government introduced the following criteria into the internal EURATOM discussion:

• —no prejudice to EURATOM’s safeguards system;
• —the possibility for IAEA to verify that EURATOM’s safeguards do not permit, in accordance with the obligations assumed under the NPT by member states of EURATOM, the diversion of source or special fissionable material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
• —acceptance of EURATOM’s safeguard’s system by IAEA in accordance with paragraph 28 (d) of the Agency’s safeguards system;
• —limitation of verification to reviewing whether

12. In order to ensure equal opportunities and to avoid competitive disadvantages,the Federal Government attaches vital importance to the assurance being honored which was give by the United States President in December 1967, and confirmed by President Nixon,that all American civilian nuclear activities will be subjected to safeguards when safeguards are applied under the NPT. The Federal Government trust thats that the United States assurance—like the similar British statement—will be fulfilled. Acceptance of the NPT safeguards by the United States and Great Britain would create in the West at least an equality of treatment in the civilian nuclear sphere, assuming that France will continue to take part in the non-discriiminatory EURATOM safeguard system.

The Federal Government will make a statement to that effect upon signing the NPT.

13. The Federal Government trusts that American assurances regarding the continued supply of nuclear material to EURATOM will be honoured even in the unlikely event that a verification agreement in conformity with the EURATOM treaty cannot be concluded in time between EURATOM and IAEA. Apart from American assurances which had been given mainly under political and economic aspects, it would be of help if the United States could say in a more definite manner how it views the legal position in case of dispute. In conformity with available general American comments, the Federal Government considers that even the legal aspects of possible disputes can be solved.

It is emphasized that a novel, long-term, commercialized and liberalized type of supply contract taking also into account the aspects of safeguarding and equipment, in accordance with the NPT, is desirable after the treaty has entered into force. The US Government is requested to give the assurance that the aforementioned principles will be applied in concluding the contract between the United States and EURATOM.

14. The Federal Government stresses once again that it attaches great importance to a permanent German representation on the Board of Governors of IAEA. In dealing with the NPT during subsequent accession stages,the realization of this wish will be of importance for the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States is asked to give an assurance that it will sppport the german efforts in every suitable way even in the face of expected soviet opposition.

End text

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–6. Confidential. It was repeated to Moscow, US Mission Geneva, and USNATO.
2. The telegram transmitted the text of the talking points that the German NPT delegation intended to use in its upcoming talks in Washington. The points indicated a positive FRG appraisal of the NPT, even in light of the less than satisfactory German-Soviet discussions the previous March. The FRG then listed several requirements before it would consent to sign the NPT. Among those were requests to the U.S. Government to issue a statement denying the Soviet alleged “right of intervention” as noted in Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, for its continued support of NATO and the subsequent safeguards agreements, and its willingness to publicize its position in support of these requests to “avoid any subsequent disagreement” concerning the interpretation.