1. The United States Intelligence Board has reviewed
and updated its intelligence assessment of Project AZORIAN
(attached). On the basis of this review, the
Board concludes that there have been no significant developments
since the last Board assessment which would detract from the unique
intelligence value of this target.
2. Successful recovery and exploitation of the
cryptographic materials expected to be on board would represent a
major milestone for the U.S. [less than 1
line not declassified] effort against Soviet naval forces. [1½ lines not declassified]Acquisition of the nuclear warhead and the SS–N–5 missile system,
together with related documents, would provide a much improved
baseline for estimates of the current and future Soviet strategic
threat. The Board also expects that recovered
documents would provide important insights [1½ lines not declassified]
3. In its evaluation the Board assumed a successful mission. On this
basis the Board continues to believe that recovery of
the AZORIAN submarine would
provide information [less than 1 line not
declassified] on subjects of great importance
to the national defense.
Attachment
Memorandum From the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the United
States Intelligence Board (John T.
Hughes) to the Chairman of the United States
Intelligence Board (Colby)2
SUBJECT
- Intelligence Value of Project AZORIAN
REFERENCE
- JEN–0009/72(U) dated 7 August 19723
1. The Ad Hoc Committee has reviewed and
updated the assessment of intelligence value of Project AZORIAN. In the conduct of its
review, the Committee found that there have been
no significant intelligence developments since the last Board
assessment which would detract from the unique potential of the
AZORIAN target,
particularly with respect to cryptographic materials, the
nuclear warhead, and SS–N–5 missile components. A
recommendation for Board consideration is set forth in paragraph
4.
2. In conducting this review, the Committee did not address the
technical or political feasibility of AZORIAN. Its conclusions assume successful recovery and
physical possession of certain weapons components, cryptographic
materials, and sensitive documentation in a condition adequate to
permit detailed technical examination.
3. The Committee examined the five major categories of equipment
which are believed to represent the more significant acquisitions
potentially derivable from the AZORIAN target. Committee conclusions
are summarized below:
a. Cryptographic Machines and Materials (Annex A).
A major justification for Project AZORIAN is the intelligence value of the
cryptographic materials. [5½ lines not
declassified]. Such equipment and related
material would be of very high value to the U.S. intelligence
effort against Soviet naval forces. It could also be an
important factor in our overall [less
than 1 line not declassified] of the
Soviet Union.
b. Nuclear Warheads and Related Documents (Annex
B). Acquisition of data in this category, particularly on
nuclear weapon design, would be extremely valuable. [2 lines not declassified] Recovery of nuclear
warheads
[Page 868]
and related
documents from the AZORIAN
target would provide important new insight into
Soviet nuclear technology, weapon design concepts, and related
operational procedures.
c. The SS–N–5 Missile (Annex C). The SS–N–5
missile, although not in itself the major SLBM threat, would
provide important information on technologies relevant to the
SS–N–6, and possibly to some aspects of the SS–N–8. [4 lines not declassified] acquisition of the
SS–N–5 would represent an important milestone and
be of high intelligence value.
d. Navigation and Fire Control Systems (Annex
D). Most navigation equipment probably would be relatively
unsophisticated in terms of more recent systems and would provide
little data pertinent to them. On the other hand, equipment and documentation in the missile fire control
category are considered to be of high value. Instruction books,
internal circuit diagrams, spare parts, and related
documentation probably would add significantly to our technical
understanding of the GOLF–II strategic weapon system.
e. Sonar and Other Naval Equipment (Annex E).
Sonar and ASW equipment is
generally expected to be of modest value, due to obsolescence, but
would provide evidence of Soviet progress in
areas [less than 1 line not
declassified] Sonar communications
systems, self-noise data, and ASW decoys would be of higher value.
4. Recommendation: It is recommended that
USIB approve the major
conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee as summarized in paragraph 3 and
supported in detail in Annexes A through E.
John T. Hughes
Chairman
Ad Hoc Committee
