415. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1
1214. Subject: Cyprus: Estimate re Future Developments. Ref: State 1025822.
- 1.
- Following views are keyed to questions in reftel and are based on
most recent info available to Embassy and [less
than 1 line not declassified].
- (A)
- By his letter of June 10 to Bishops (septel)3 Makarios has as expected defied Synod in a manner which conveys his disdain. Various courses now open to Bishops are described at some length in a separate message. Politically significant factors here are that Makarios has decided not to be bothered by anything Bishops can throw at him, and that there is, therefore, no chance of their succeeding in forcing his resignation from presidency. In fact, our understanding is that if they continue to press and annoy him, Archbishop considering going on offensive to remove Bishop of Paphos and charge the two others with various infractions of canon law. Archbishop has reportedly received word from Palamas that GOG, while not admitting contact with Bishops, will nevertheless work in appropriate ways to try to have them ease their stand.
- (B)
- Announcement re formation of new cabinet expected June 15. Apparently Greece has signified its approval of principal appointments.
- (C)
- Public support for Grivas since his return to Cyprus last fall has never been large and what support he had at first has been steadily eroding as Cypriots, by nature opportunistic, conclude Grivas not likely be a winner in this, his third Cyprus reincarnation. Nevertheless it is assumed Grivas has a hard core of gunmen and some strike by him at any time remains a possibility. We understand Makarios has no specific game plan as regards Grivas. His intention is to wait Grivas out, playing for time in an awareness that Grivasʼ support is steadily slipping away.
- (D)
-
Atmosphere in which expanded intercommunal talks getting under way is not good or conducive to fresh thinking. We do not think Makarios is much interested in compromise. To him, resumed talks are a convenient device to paper over his conflict with Greece, distract at [Page 1025] tention from Bishops and keep him at center stage in a continuing world problem. His posture of ostensibly earnest cooperation in new negotiation process has already won him one handsome dividend, a visit by UNSYG.4 We doubt Makariosʼ postural forthcomingness will prove translatable into accommodations of substance.
Clerides and UN are understandably annoyed at GOT and Denktash for having violated agreed terms of reference for June 8 inaugural meeting by heavy-handed injection of substance. Turks seem to be approaching coming negotiation with hard-nosed stand, emphasizing their insistence on separateness of Turkish-Cypriot administration. In short, present situation is not auspicious.
Left to their own devices, parties would probably do little this summer (Clerides is planning one-month vacation in August) and progress would be negligible. However, UNSYG Special Rep Osorio-Tafall will be anxious to produce movement. Understandings resulting from Bonn meetings of Greek and Turkish FonMins5 may be helpful. Particularly if Osorio has behind-the-scenes backing of USG he can keep partiesʼ noses to the grindstone and perhaps achieve progress.
- (E)
- As noted, Grivas is the main short-term threat to stability. GOG intentions remain obscure [garble] GOG is seen by many here as ultimately determined to remove Makarios by one means or another. Next rotation of Turkish contingent is expected in August and such rotations invariably add to tensions. However, weight of evidence is that Greece and Turkey presently disposed use their considerable influence for calm. This is very much a plus factor both as regards rotation and possibility of incidents (created by Grivas or otherwise) escalating. Beyond the 3–6 months period specified, a new phenomenon will bear watching. That results from a possible interaction between a resident ChiCom diplomatic mission and hitherto largely dormant left-wingers in Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities who are dissatisfied with conservatism of their elders, e.g. Maoists in AKEL and unemployed Turkish Cypriot university graduates. However, ChiComs will need some time to familiarize themselves and can be expected move cautiously.
- 2.
- As indicated para “D,” we believe USG role can be quite important in determining whether enlarged intercommunal talks, for which everyone has worked so hard, succeed or fail. We would hope to see USG influence used discreetly but strongly in direction of a positive outcome.