Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

383. Letter From the Counselor of Embassy in Cyprus (Crawford) to the Officer in Charge of Cyprus Affairs (Boyatt)¹

Nicosia, November 19, 1971.

Dear Tom:

“How can we come to any conclusion other than that Greece supports Grivas when every instrumentality responsive to Greek control is being used to support Grivas against Makarios?”

These words to me by Chris Veniamin some days ago prompt this letter. I am not sure that our disseminated telegraphic reporting has conveyed the full flavor of the picture we here see emerging ever more clearly. In part, our reporting hesitancy has been deliberate: we would not like to be charged with building a completed edifice from straws in the wind. We also know that [less than 1 line not declassified] Athens will not buy any suggestion that something could be afoot of which they were not aware. Therefore, our efforts gradually to convince must be based on fact as facts accumulate. Letʼs see what we have in hand as of this moment:

• Item—The Communistsʼ 40% showing in the 1970 elections shocked and angered the GOG. According to the Greek Embassy here, the conclusion was reached that something had to be done about Cyprus. At that time, the concern about building assets was related more to the spread of Communist influence on the island, under the umbrella of Makariosʼ bland detachment, than to solving the Cyprus problem in the interests of good relations with Turkey, although this, of course, remained an important Greek interest.
• Item—One of the first manifestations of the GOGʼs stepped up anti-Communist action program was the suddenly improved financial position of SEK. The GOG Labor Minister visited Cyprus and from that time on money was no obstacle in SEKʼs drive to expand.
• Item—Erimʼs entry in March 1971 led to a new sense of urgency on the part of both GOT and GOG in terms of the search for a solution. I speculate that this reinforced the GOGʼs earlier conclusion based on its anti-Communism that existing assets had to be strengthened and new ones created.
• Item—In the press field, Greece bought Mesimvrini, helped Aghon, and possibly acquired some influence in Eleftheria even before Grivasʼ return. Coincidentally with his return, Proini sprang into being and Patris suddenly discovered enough money to start publishing twice a week to increase its circulation. Last week Cosmos Simera, glossy and skillful as a bi-weekly magazine, reappeared in the stands after an 18-month suspension caused by financial difficulty. To no oneʼs surprise, it boosts Grivas and runs down Makarios in a sophisticated way. In December, we are to have a visit from GOG Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister, Byron Stamatelopoulos. His visit will wrap up already agreed arrangements under which the Athens News Agency will start to service all the Greek Cypriot newspapers, at a subsidized rate of £40 each monthly.
• Item—Sports. We hear that Col. Papapostoulou (the name sounds familiar)² recently “retired” from the Greek army and has gone to work for Aslanides. Aslanides set up in Cyprus the extension to Cyprus of Pro-Po, the Greek football pool. The extension was a thinly disguised device to channel funds to the anti-Communist clubs.
• Item—Commerce. Michael Savides and a strong team representing the Chamber of Commerce returned last week from a visit to Athens at the invitation of their opposite numbers. On his return, he announced that a new dynamic program of commercial and economic cooperation had been agreed. Extensive new private investment in Cyprus by Greeks is forecast, etc.
• Item—Education. GOC Education Minister Frixos Petrides was invited to Athens at the same time as the Savides team. Returning, he announced that there will be new programs to coordinate Cypriot education more closely with the mainland.
• Item—Fighters. In September, Elias Ipsarides and a large PEMA group was given red carpet treatment in Athens and an expenses-paid trip around Greece. As you know the ex-Fighters clubs subsequently came out strongly in favor of Grivas.
• Item—Youth. PEON in mid-summer was invited on a trip similar to PEMAʼs. According to Tassos Papadopoulos, who is close to PEONʼs leadership, the association was assured of unstinting financial support. PEONʼs present position on Grivas is that both he and Makarios are good fellows and must work together for advancement of the national cause.
• Item—National Guard. From many sources we hear about the kind of indoctrination mainland officers are giving Cypriot recruits. In this, Makarios is portrayed as the man who sacrificed the national cause—which could have been achieved by the Acheson Plan—for the sake of personal ambition, and who is prepared to undermine Hellenic interests by his encouragement of AKEL and invitation to the Soviets to in volve themselves in the Cyprus problem. Grivas is depicted as the authentic national hero who has returned to steer the island back to the enosis course. To achieve this goal, it is acknowledged, Greeks must be realistic. A territorial price will have to be paid to Turkey, but this involves little more than recognition of the present reality, which is that the Turks are independently administering their own portions of the island thanks to Makariosʼ past blunders. You will note the parallelism of this line and that taken by Ambassador Panayotacos with Ambassador Popper on November 19 (Nicosia 2053).³
• Item—the biggest one—Grivas.

Let us look at another dimension. From a variety of reports, you know that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are ready on short notice to have the former support the latter in a move out of their existing enclaves in NE Cyprus, to consolidate themselves in a solid zone of physical control based on a line running from Kyrenia through northern Nicosia and down to north Famagusta. The Turkish Embassy here, for example Counselor Tunabas, acknowledges that some blood would be spilt on both sides but points out that creation of a demarcation line will in the end be the only solution and that “a solution must entail some sacrifices.”

And a final dimension. We have had some glimpses into private channels of communication between Athens and Ankara. During a visit here, Acetʼs deputy referred to a link using Papadopoulosʼ private secretary (name not given) and Ambassador Turkmen. Specifically, he spoke of a message received on this channel in which Papadopoulos had signified his support of double-enosis as the only solution. A military channel also seems to exist, using the Greek military Attaché in Ankara. At a higher level, we would be curious to know the content of exchanges now taking place in Athens between TGS Chief of Staff General Tagmac and his Greek counterparts. Locally we are aware of a “hot line” between “Bozkurt” and General Kharalamvopoulos. For example, General Leslie⁴ tells us of tense situations in which he has found his own (inimitable) phrases used with the Turkish Fighter leadership coming back at him an hour or two later from Kharalamvopoulos.

At the present time the facts carry us only to the conclusions that: Greece is embarked on a coordinated effort to build its assets in Cyprus; these are essentially being used in support of Grivas and against Makarios; Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are militarily ready to carve out control of northeastern Cyprus; there exist coordinating mechanisms between the GOG and GOT; and, while Greece and Turkey are willing to give negotiations and diplomacy a further try, they are telling us itʼs the last, that June 1972 is the limit, and that double enosis may in the end be the only way of solving the Cyprus problem once and for all.

Most of the foregoing is not new to you. It is the summation that, I feel, provides useful food for thought.

I ask myself if, when the time comes, if it does, or before it does, our Government wants to stay silent, say “no” with conviction, say “no” with tongue in cheek, or say covertly “yes” to buy into the planning of our allies. As you know, there are the very faintest of indications that the British may already be privy. A whole separate letter could be written concerning the script that could be devised were we ever to decide to say “yes.” I do not believe we need decide now or hastily. Greece and Turkey are still on the diplomatic track and our efforts should be to help that succeed. But if and when it shows signs of not paying off, we judge that they are likely to consider putting into motion the alternative machinery that is being readied. By that time we will need a USG position carefully thought out and approved at the White House level.

The Ambassador has seen the foregoing and agrees that it summarizes the situation, as we see it, fairly.⁵ He suggests that you show this letter to Rodger Davies.

Warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Bill

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Official–Informal. Copies were sent to Brown and Draper.
2. In a December 2 reply to Crawford, Boyatt noted that Papapostoulou was “widely rumored to have been involved in the March 1970 attempt to assassinate Makarios and the subsequent successful murder of Georkadjis.” (Ibid.)
3. Dated November 19, it reported that the Greek Ambassador had informed Popper that Grivas was ready to settle for a partial enosis solution. (Ibid.)
4. Edward M. Leslie, Chief of Staff, UNFICYP.
5. In a December 7 letter to Boyatt, Draper found himself in “general agreement” with Crawfordʼs presentation, but noted some evidence that the Turkish Government was not sold either on the idea of a double enosis solution or on cooperation with the Greek junta. (Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 26–1)