Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

38. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 5, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Radio Free Europe

With reference to my memorandum of April 1 and your response of the 13th,² I feel sure you have by now seen Bonnʼs telegram No. 6296³ regarding Radio Free Europe.

The message, shorn of diplomatic niceties, reports German demands for the neutralization and ultimate elimination of the RFE as an instrument of our propaganda in Eastern Europe. The reference in the telegram to “irresistible pressures” to eliminate the RFE from Germany with “VOA left to do the job” means to me just that.

While I endorse the Ambassadorʼs suggestion that a high level representative should ultimately come to Bonn prepared to discuss the subject with the Germans, I believe we might in the interim take some steps which should give the Germans pause before they finally decide to sacrifice RFE for the sake of some, as yet unknown, concessions from the comrades.

1. We should emphatically associate ourselves with the view of the Foreign Office paper warning against the reaction of private and influential Americans who are also “strong friends of the FRG” and emphasize their and our own concern. We should try to get individual statements of concern and transmit them to the FRG.

2. We should also point out that, with a great many RFE employees aware of the Polish pressures, the German reaction to such pressures cannot long remain secret and the FRG must be prepared to face hostile reaction of U.S. public opinion as well as their own which is already alarmed by the tempo and intensity of Brandtʼs Ostpolitik.

3. Finally, we should point out that the closing down of the RFE which is of immense concern to millions of Americans of Eastern European origins might produce a political problem for President Nixon and might conceivably result in a demand of that influential and vocal segment of U.S. public opinion for our boycott of the Olympics.

I suggest these as preliminary steps with further action depending on German reaction to the above.⁴

Frank

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I. Secret.
2. Document 35 summarizes Shakespeareʼs April 1 memorandum, which is not printed. Regarding Kissingerʼs April 13 response, see footnote 6, Document 35.
3. Document 36.
4. On July 6 Kissinger responded in a memorandum to Shakespeare: “I think your concerns about RFE, in your memo of June 5, were well covered in the conversations you and Bill Buckley had with the President. I have also followed up with State. I appreciate your keeping me advised of this problem, and presume it will be worked out with Bonn in light of the Presidentʼs strong endorsement.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 379, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe & Radio Liberty, Vol. I) Regarding the conversation among Shakespeare, Buckley, and President Nixon, see Document 40.