Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

333. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, March 22, 1972, 1648Z.

1623. Department please pass DIA, CINCEUR, and USDOCOSOUTH. Subj: Further Analysis of Papadopoulosʼ Assumption of Regency.² Ref: Athens 1584; Athens 1585.³

1. Summary. Facts surrounding dismissal of Zoitakis and Papadopoulosʼ assumption of regency still not clear. Most Greeks will not accept official reason for change, but there is in fact long history of friction between PM and former regent. Papadopoulos now absolute ruler of Greece. There are few if any precedents for assumption of regency by PM. Papadopoulos now has number of options open to him, including: maintaining present situation; moving against King or even proclaiming a republic; or using his increased powers to implement Constitution, while presumably assuring continuation his own position as political leader of country. In foreign affairs field GOG may become more demanding of its allies. However, Papadopoulos has favored close ties with US, and he may now be in better position resist pressures diversify sources of arms supply. First reaction here to Papadopoulosʼmove has been surprise at brutal character of dismissal of Zoitakis. Opposition will see move as further proof Papadopoulos has no intention returning Greece to parliamentary rule. Papadopoulos has now made himself more of a target for those of his colleagues who resent his increasing monopolization of power. Key question is effect Papadopoulosʼ assumption of regency will have on unit commanders in army. End Summary.

2. Facts surrounding Papadopoulosʼ dismissal of Zoitakis as regent and his own assumption of regency in addition to position of Prime Minister (and Defense and Foreign Minister) are not yet clear. We doubt that most Greeks will accept Governmentʼs explanation that Zoitakis was obstructing legislation as real reason for his replacement. However, as we will examine later in this message, this may provide at least partial explanation. As we noted in our preliminary assessment, it is possible Cyprus may also have played a role in dismissal of regent. Whatever real reasons for Papadopoulos assuming regency, key question at this point is what effect this move will have on Greek political life both domestically and internationally.

3. First fact is that Papadopoulos has now become absolute ruler of Greece. At time of coup power was in hands of group which called itself the Revolutionary Council. By autumn of 1970 a crisis between Papadopoulos and this group led Prime Minister to proffer his resignation as Prime Minister. However, after period of time he consolidated power by shuffling Government and removing ministerial powers from key opponents while consolidating his links with army unit commanders. We have now reached new state in which all constitutional powers of Crown and Prime Minister are in Papadopoulosʼs hands—and powers of Crown are not insignificant. Important question is how Greeks will view this dual role of Papadopoulos. Greek history offers few parallels.

4. Greece has had five regents in the last 48 years: Admiral Koundouriotis (January–March 1924), General Kondylis (October–November 1935), Archbishop Damaskinos (December 1944–September 1946), General Zoitakis (December 1967–March 1972), and now PM Papadopoulos. With the exception of Damaskinos, all had military backgrounds, and all were publicly prominent figures at the time of their appointments. Although in two cases (Kondylis, Damaskinos) same man briefly held regency and prime ministry simultaneously, they did so in parliamentary circumstances totally different from present situation: as PM, Kondylis assumed regent after parliamentary vote in October 1935 proclaiming Greece again a constitutional monarchy. He continued as regent though late November 1935 while GOG held plebiscite, results of which were foregone conclusion and until King could return from exile abroad. Damaskinos reluctantly served for few days as “caretaker PM” in 1945 during prolonged Government crisis. As we recall King George II also assumed prime ministry for some days in similar circumstances. In any event, Zoitakis served as regent longer than his three predecessors combined, and there is no historical precedent in Greece for removal of one regent and his replacement by another.

5. Nevertheless, Papadopoulos may have felt dismissal of Zoitakis was unavoidable, following series of semi-public and private clashes between the former regent and PM. As early as February 1968 [less than 1 line not declassified] Papadopoulos expressed the view that Zoiktakis lacked “some of necessary qualities required of a regent.” In August 1970 [less than 1 line not declassified] a disagreement between Papadopoulos and Zoitakis reportedly stemmed from Zoitakisʼ fear that Papadopoulos was moving too rapidly toward release of political detainees and other liberalization measures. Zoitakis apparently took no decisive stand in September 1970 confrontation between Papadopoulos and dissident members of the “Revolutionary Council,” from which Papadopoulos emerged stronger than before; however, in late 1970 and early 1971 there were reliable reports ([less than 1 line not declassified], e.g.) indicating that Zoitakis had made common cause with frustrated “Revolutionary Council” dissidents and had begun to adopt an increasingly hostile stand toward Papadopoulosʼ personal rule. [less than 1 line not declassified] reported in early February 1971 that Zoitakis had gone so far as to consult with dissident revolutionaries concerning the feasibility of ousting Papadopoulos; and Papadopoulos reportedly had learned of the consultations and was seeking to provoke the regentʼs resignation.

6. [less than 1 line not declassified] reported the failure of Zoitakis to clear his New Yearʼs message with Papadopoulos before its release, Papadopoulosʼ subsequent sanctioning of press criticism against the substance of Zoitakisʼ message, and Zoitakisʼ efforts to inspire counter-criticism of the Prime Minister. In March 1971 Papadopoulos did not appear publicly with Zoitakis on Independence Day to take the salute. This non-event provoked much comment at the time and [less than 1 line not declassified] was occasioned by Zoitakis having told Papadopoulos shortly before Independence Day that he would no longer swear in cabinet officials if he were not given the opportunity to review names proposed and to veto those to whom he was opposed.

7. In June 1971, [less than 1 line not declassified] quoted then Minister of Coordination Makarezos as stating that he, Zoitakis, and the dissident secretaries general had agreed that should Papadopoulos again offer to resign (as he had done in September 1970), they would accept Papadopoulosʼ resignation and replace him with Makarezos. Differences continued to manifest themselves, but in August the Prime Minister temporarily patched up his differences with Zoitakis, clearing the way for the governmental reorganization of August 26. It is also well known that there has been considerable friction between wife of the regent and the influential wife of PM.

8. While there may have been in PMʼs view more than sufficient reasons for removing Zoitakis, why did he himself assume regency? Until we know the answer to this question it would be premature to venture any prediction as to future course Prime Minister will take. He has number of options. These include: (A) maintaining present governmental structure with Constitution suspended and full powers concentrated in his hands; (B) at some stage arranging for Crown Prince eventually to accede to Greek throne, in meantime maintaining himself as regent governing in his name; and (C) proclaming a republic with himself as President with or without accompanying referendum; and (D) using his increased powers to move towards constitutional implementation while, presumably, assuring continuation his own position as political leader of country.

9. A key question for USG is what effect Papadopoulosʼ becoming regent will have on Greeceʼs foreign policy. We suspect overall result will be that GOG will be more demanding of its allies while at same time more conciliatory towards some of its potential enemies. On other hand, Papadopoulos has strongly favored close bilateral ties with U.S. and has been willing to see U.S. continue as principal arms supplier. Of possible interest in this regard is fact that Makarezos and Zoitakis have been fairly close, and that Makarezos has been one of chief advocates of Greece diversifying its arms supplies, particularly in direction of France. On Cyprus isssue, Government may now be more able to speak with one voice, assuming, of course, that dismissal of Zoitakis does not reflect serious split within GOG over handling of Cyprus problem.

10. Reactions here to change in regents so far focus heavily on offensive and brutal character of dismissal of Zoitakis. Point has been made to Embassy officers that Prime Minister made genuine tactical error in his manner of handling removal, i.e. nothing was done to save Zoitakisʼ face and in effect he left regency in disgrace. Given Zoitakisʼ original role on April 21, 1967, as well as fact he has been leading military personality, Papadopoulosʼ tactics seem particularly incomprehensible. Moreover, way in which Prime Minister moved on this occasion has not been characteristic of other changes in Government so that he is more vulnerable to criticism this time.

11. At this juncture, although we will be collecting reactions from former politicians as dust begins to settle, we would judge there will be almost universal reaction that this simply represents further move to reinforce personal dictatorship under Papadopoulos and proves that he has no intention of moving Greece toward parliamentary democracy. Wait-and-see attitude so far as impact on eventual status of Greece as monarchy probably will continue. At same time fact that removal of regent disclosed existence of first major falling out within original revolutionary group will be taken by some to mean that prospect of future falling out among members of present regime might precipitate crisis of proportions that would lead to other changes. Some may be encouraged to mount campaign of active resistance against Papadopoulos rule.

12. Within the revolutionary group we cannot ignore the possibility of the growth of opposition to the Prime Minister brought about by the increasing gap between him and the men who cooperated with him in achieving the 1967 coup. His military colleagues may be more critical of any missteps by Prime Minister in executing his absolute power, but their attitude may be tempered by example of decisive way in which he dealt with Zoitakis. It remains to be seen how unit commanders will react and whether PM can continue to maintain their loyalty on which he must continue to rely.

Tasca

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, Paris, Rome, USNATO, and USUN.
2. On March 21 the Council of Ministers, chaired by Pattakos, stripped Zoitakis of his position and appointed Papadopoulos regent.
3. Both dated March 21. The telegrams reported on the replacement of the regent. (Both in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE)