Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

155. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 22, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Pros and Cons of Stops in Poland and Turkey²

Poland

While there would be certain temporary advantages, due to what would undoubtedly be a warm public reception, there would be little if any lasting gain. The West Europeans would be quite upset if you stopped in Eastern Europe but not in the West.

A stop in Poland, however brief, would be a public success all around; the people will be turned out and the reception will be warm. On the Polish side, the Gierek regime would welcome this because, just as with Ceausescu in 1969,³ it would, as it were, be riding the coattails of the American President. Gierek almost certainly cleared the trial balloon with the Soviets who presumably do not object to a public demonstration for you. However, Poles are not as disciplined and subtle as Romanians, and there is always a possibility that demonstrations could become emotional (as in 1959)⁴ to the point of becoming an embarrassment for both the regime and the Soviets. We should not forget that the present leadership has been in office only about 15 months (after removing Gomulka) and there could always be an unexpected blowup when emotions run high. But, barring this unpredictable element, the net effect of a visit, from the public standpoint, would be positive and it would come across well here at home and, with some exceptions, please the Polish-American community.

Also to some extent positive from our standpoint would be

• —The reassurance to the Poles and others in Eastern Europe that your Moscow trip does not mean you accept Soviet hegemony in that part of the world.
• —At least some boost for Brandtʼs chances of getting his Eastern treaties ratified since he could use your interest in Poland against his CDU opponents; this almost certainly entered into Soviet and Polish calculation. On the other hand, however, many of our friends in the CDU would feel let down in view of your assurances that you regarded the German ratification debate an internal German matter. We have to remember that quite apart from the Eastern policy Brandtʼs government is currently on weak ground and could be replaced this summer by the CDU.
• —The Polish regime would probably draw some measure of increased strength, as noted above, and this in turn would increase its freedom of maneuver. But this is inherently limited by geography and other factors and the plus from our standpoint would only be minor.

The strong argument against going, apart from the possibility of public demonstrations, getting out of hand, is

—That you have declined to go to Western Europe and the NATO meeting in Bonn. In this context, a stop in Poland after you have gone all the way to Tehran would tend to accentuate our problems with the West Europeans. This would also be the case, though to a lesser extent, were you to stop in Warsaw before going to Moscow. Such a scenario would, however, be likely to irritate the Soviets. (The Polish Foreign Minister, no doubt for this reason, was quite specific in talking about a stop after Moscow.)

There is also a more basic point to consider. While it is true that there is something natural in special attention to Poland because of our large Polish-American community and your 1959 trip, our relations with Poland are in fact no better than they are with Hungary. In terms of the prospects of these relations over the next several years, there is no reason to single out the Poles for special treatment. Indeed, the constraints operating on them are basic and long-term and the payoffs in foreign policy terms of special attention are never likely to be very great. Thus, while a stop in Warsaw would put the Poles on the level of Romania and Yugoslavia, they would not be able to play the role of those two countries. Their position in the Indochina ICC would probably not be any more helpful to us than before.

Turkey

Here, again, while the public reception would be good (though not without some danger of disruption), and the Government would be strengthened, a stop in Turkey at the very time of the NATO meeting in Bonn would be badly received in Western Europe.

Moreover, the Soviets, whom Henry told that you would make no stop beyond Iran, would see a pattern in stops in both Iran and Turkey. They probably would assume that your purpose is to prevent these two adjacent states from going too far in improving their own relations with the USSR.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 481, Presidentʼs Trip Files, Presidentʼs Poland Trip 1 Jun 72. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Attached was a routing slip from Bruce Kehrli of the NSC staff to Kissinger, March 28, that reads: “Bob Haldeman covered this verbally with the President and General Haig.”
2. On March 20 at 6 p.m., Chapin wrote in a memorandum to Haldeman: “Secretary Rogers called and would like to speak to the President regarding a ‘telegram from Poland.ʼ Haig says that the Secretary may wish to raise the issue of a Presidential visit to Poland on the return from Moscow. If the Secretary raises this (a proposal was made today by the Polish Foreign Minister to Ambassador Stoessel) the President should definitely be non-committal. Such a visit could seriously hurt the Moscow Summit.” (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 80, EX TR 38–3 WARSAW, POLAND)
3. Regarding Nixonʼs 1969 visit to Romania, see Documents 183 and 184.
4. Reference is to Nixonʼs 1959 visit to Poland as Vice President. For documentation on the visit, August 2–5, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe Region; Poland; Greece; Turkey; Yugoslavia, pp. 190–221.