Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

144. Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, December 18, 1970, 4:14–5:02 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Poland

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Under Secretary John Irwin
  • Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand
  • Mr. John A. Baker, Jr.
• Defense
  • Mr. G. Warren Nutter
  • Mr. John Morse
• CIA
  • Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
  • Mr. Thomas Karamessines
• JCS
  • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
  • Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt
• NSC Staff
  • Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Mr. William Hyland
  • Mr. D. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. An inter-agency study will be prepared discussing political implications and possible US actions in the event of the following contingencies:

a. Abatement of the riots in Poland.

b. Suppression of the riots by the Polish armed forces.

c. Soviet military intervention in Poland.

d. Spread of disorders to East Germany and other East European countries.

The analysis of political implications should discuss how the above contingencies may affect Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the United States. With regard to possible US actions, the study should particularly consider the nature and timing of steps which the US might take to manifest its disapproval of Soviet intervention or repressive measures by East European governments.

The study will be prepared by a Working Group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Hillenbrand and including representatives of Defense, JCS, and CIA. The WSAG will meet on December 21 to discuss an initial report from the Working Group.²

2. CIA will continue to provide at least daily reports to the WSAG on the situation in Poland and related developments.

3. The WSAG noted the importance of continuing intensive efforts to obtain intelligence on Soviet troop movements.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we should get together in order to get ourselves up to speed on what the situation is in Poland. We need to see what implications might develop for us and what we should prepare for. (to Cushman) Can you give us a briefing?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: Two areas have been affected in Poland. One is around Gdansk, Sopot, and Gdynia, where they are partial to complete strikes. The Polish Government is maintaining air and naval patrols along the Baltic coast. The other hot spot is Szczecin, where authorities have closed schools, cancelled afternoon work shifts, and imposed a 6:00 p.m. curfew. There are reports that some disturbances may have occurred in Silesia; at least, we have indications that army units are on the alert there. At Wroclaw and Katowice commercial flights have been cancelled, and local officials are reported on the way to Warsaw. Disturbances were also reported in other cities west of Warsaw, including Poznan and Slupsk.

Dr. Kissinger: What triggered the disturbances?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: Price increases, combined with shortages. The government was attempting to shift purchasing from food to appliances while holding the line on wages. The disorders were apparently spontaneous. There have been strikes, including some in Warsaw, for wage increases; but the regime says it will hold fast. Soviet forces are on a common-sense alert, but we have no firm evidence that troops are on the move, although there was a single report of a troop movement. The Poles have fifteen divisions; as long as these remain loyal, they have plenty of muscle to handle the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the expectation about what the Polish Army will do?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: We think they will remain loyal. There has been no occasion to use troops yet although some tanks have been deployed. There has been some fighting, with about 100 wounded and 12 killed. That is the situation as of three oʼclock today.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you giving us daily reports?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: Yes. (to Karamessines) Are these being prepared on a regular basis?

Mr. Karamessines: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Continue to do that for the next few days.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: The reports will probably be prepared more often—I imagine at least twice daily.

Dr. Kissinger: What is our assessment of the effect these riots are likely to have on the Polish regime? In one of these reports you say that Gomulka might withdraw and Gierek might take over.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: This speculation is not based on any evidence. However, a few years ago Gomulka had quite a fight to retain power, and if this happened again, he might withdraw if it looked like the country were going to be torn apart.

Dr. Kissinger: What is Gierekʼs position?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: I donʼt know.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Hillenbrand) What do you say?

Mr. Hillenbrand: He is not an entirely orthodox communist. He would probably put the interests of the workers as he sees them ahead of reform. The current problem is related to action by the economic reform group in the Polish Government. It will probably mean a setback for reform. The Polish effort has been modeled somewhat after the Hungarian reform.

Mr. Baker: But the Poles have not gone nearly as far as the Hungarians.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it the Poles will stick to a more orthodox economic policy.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: How would the Soviets react to Gierek? Would they like him?

Mr. Hillenbrand: He would be acceptable. On the other hand, he may not be able to come to grips with the longer range problems of the Polish economy.

Dr. Kissinger: That is their problem.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Yes. It is certainly not ours.

Dr. Kissinger: What is our assessment of the possibility that the situation will get out of hand?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: It is difficult to say. If the riots spread—and if a report we have had that something may be occurring in East Germany proves valid, then things could really get going. The key to the situation is to be found in the Polish forces.

Dr. Kissinger: So far they have not been used.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: There has been some fighting.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Poles are basically relying on their security forces rather than on the army.

Mr. Karamessines: They have put troops in certain industrial areas.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume that the riots will either have to subside or spread—that the present situation wonʼt continue. Is that a fair judgment?

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think so.

Dr. Kissinger: What conclusions can we draw about the reaction in East Germany and the Soviet Union? Can we get an assessment? We donʼt have to have it right now.

Mr. Hillenbrand: We have a tentative assessment. Even if the disturbances do not rise to a higher level than at present, we believe the cause of economic reform in Poland will be set back. The Polish disorders will also give the Hungarians pause in carrying out their far-reaching economic reform program, to which there is considerable domestic opposition. In the USSR the group that takes a passive attitude toward Ostpolitik may be led to reassess their position. One theory about the Polish price hikes is that they were implemented at this time because the Polish Government was feeling more confident as a result of having settled its border with Germany.³ If the objective of Ostpolitik was greater Soviet permissiveness toward German intercourse with Eastern Europe, then the troubles in Poland may constitute a setback for Ostpolitik.

Dr. Kissinger: If I may be the devilʼs advocate, couldnʼt the riots be viewed as being not the fault of Ostpolitik but of the conclusions the East Europeans drew from Ostpolitik? That is, it is all right to go full speed ahead on Ostpolitik, but it is not correct to conclude that it is possible to raise prices just because a major international settlement has been arranged.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Possibly, although my judgment is that in the short run we will find the Soviets and the Poles taking a more conservative approach.

Dr. Kissinger: Then you estimate that if the riots subside, the domestic consequence in Poland will be a more conservative economic policy and that internationally the Poles will adopt a more cautious approach toward increased dealings with the West.

Mr. Irwin: These are possibilities, not predictions.

Mr. Baker: There will probably be a greater impact on the Soviet attitude toward Ostpolitik than on the Polish. Poland will still be looking for the benefits that Ostpolitik could bring. As Marty [Hillenbrand]⁴ has said, if the Soviets see that the situation is volatile in Poland, they may take another look at Ostpolitik.

Dr. Kissinger: The old approach to Ostpolitik, which the Germans tried in 1965, was to deal directly with the East European countries. When that didnʼt work, they decided that the way was to go through Moscow. Now the Soviets may conclude that even that route is too dangerous. The Germans represent a magnet for the East Europeans. The conclusion the Soviets might draw is that rapport with Bonn is just not the right policy. If one carried this line of speculation one step further, it might be said that the Soviets will decide that it is better to seek détente with the US.

I believe that one of the foreign policy problems the Soviets have had in recent years is choosing between geopolitical and ideological considerations. They want to be sure that they are free to meet the Chinese threat; yet, if they get too close to us, they open the way for the Chinese to contest their leadership in the communist world. Ostpolitik seemed to offer the Soviets a way out by pacifying Europe. Now they may draw the conclusion that these benefits from Ostpolitik are only superficial. Am I speculating too wildly?

Mr. Karamessines: The Polish disorders could be the greatest thing that ever came down the pike for Ulbricht.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Sonnenfeldt) What do you think?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Russians may be more cautious about German access to Eastern Europe, but they will still have a major problem. They want Western economic and technical assistance, and they know they can only get what they need from Germany. It is not going to be available from us, and the French and British canʼt offer enough. The only way for the Soviets to avoid economic reforms is to get the margin of support that Germany can provide.

Dr. Kissinger: When Ambassador Pauls was in yesterday crying about Acheson,⁵ he said the Germans were not going to give credits to the Soviets. (to Hillenbrand) Do you believe that?

Mr. Hillenbrand: On the basis of recent talks I have had with various German bankers and industrialists, I would say that the Russians have illusions about the quantity of money that might be available from either private or governmental sources in Germany. Paulsʼ statement is probably correct. People like Egon Bahr are economic illiterates. The money wonʼt be produced by the Chancellorʼs office but by the industrialists and bankers, who are much more bearish about the possibilities.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: They also belong to a different party.

Dr. Kissinger: If neither the government nor the private bankers give the money, then the last incentive for Ostpolitik is removed.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets may well draw the conclusion that they cannot derive the dividends from Ostpolitik that they had expected. The Soviets face the problem of deciding what to do to promote economic growth. If credits are unavailable, the pressures for economic reform will possibly be increased. There are three ways they can make the economy move. They can squeeze the people; that constitutes a return to Stalinism. They can try to get subsidies from the West. Or they can make reforms, but this is repugnant to the present leadership.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) What are your views?

Mr. Irwin: I tend to think that anything like what is happening in Poland tends to make the Soviets more cautious. However, if they recognize that the recent events are not the result of Ostpolitik but are due to the internal situation in Poland, they might conclude that Ostpolitik is still helpful to them.

Dr. Kissinger: Letʼs look at the next contingency. What if the riots spread and are bloodily suppressed by the Polish forces? Would we expect the consequences to be merely a magnification of what we have already discussed, or would there be additional elements that might come into play?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The quantitative difference would be such as to constitute almost a qualitative difference. The Ulbricht line will carry the day—that is, that it is dangerous to expose yourself to Western contamination.

Dr. Kissinger: I tend to agree with what John [Irwin] said, but if the Soviets did connect the troubles in Poland with German policy, what would happen?

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think the linkage is more complex. The Soviets might conclude that if the political systems in the Eastern European countries are so volatile that a price rise threatens their stability, how much more dangerous might it be if these countries are exposed to German influence.

Mr. Irwin: That makes considerable sense.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good thesis. Then we can say that if there is a bloody revolt, the Soviets will clamp down. Will it be a general clampdown, or will they try to achieve friendlier relations with us, since we are not a threat in this situation?

Mr. Hillenbrand: SALT would probably be the least affected. There might be more fallout with regard to Berlin and Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there anything that we can do in the event of these first two contingencies? I assume that anything we might say would only make matters more complicated.

Mr. Baker: If the Polish Government sheds a lot of blood, there will be an outcry in this country. Many groups will be demanding to know what our attitude is toward a repressive Polish regime.

Mr. Nutter: I donʼt think the Polish military will respond if ordered to put down an internal revolt.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Polish Government can always repeal the price hike.

Dr. Kissinger: But such concessions often only make matters worse if they come late in a revolutionary process. (to Irwin) Could you prepare a list of measures we might take if we wanted to show our disapproval in the event of a bloody revolt?

Mr. Irwin: We are already working on it. Here is the list that is in preparation covering actions under certain contingencies.⁶

Dr. Kissinger: What contingency?

Mr. Hillenbrand: Russian intervention.

Dr. Kissinger: Could you polish it up over the weekend, and then we can meet again. Are there any other inputs needed?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: The only input we might have would be Radio Free Europe broadcasts, for which we would want policy guidance.

Dr. Kissinger: (looking at the list provided by Irwin) What is this item about economic retaliation? Do we have the authority to take this action on the basis of administrative discretion? What other economic measures could we take? What about refusing to sell that oil plant?

Mr. Hyland: That has already been disapproved.

Mr. Hillenbrand: There are steps we could take to restrict credits and export licenses.

Mr. Irwin: With regard to the Soviet reaction to events in Poland, what the Soviets do could be affected by our own reaction, for example, whether we do anything in SALT.

Dr. Kissinger: In the contingency we are discussing, the Soviets have not yet done anything. We are talking about bloody repression by Polish forces. You are going to provide us a list of possible measures that we might take if this happens.

Now letʼs take a third hypothesis. Suppose the disorders spread to East Germany. This is probably the only neighboring country where this might happen.

Mr. Hyland: Possibly the riots might also spread to Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you think that the Czechs are going to have more than one revolution every 400 years?

Mr. Baker: There could be slowdowns in Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Kissinger: Are they slowing down?

Mr. Baker: They have never really speeded up since 1968.

Dr. Kissinger: Letʼs leave open for now the question of specifying countries to which the disorders might spread. I assume we donʼt expect any troubles in Hungary and Romania.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If the Soviets clamp down, the Hungarian reform program will be affected.

Mr. Hillenbrand: The Hungarians are far out ahead on economic reforms. They will be afraid that the riots in Poland will strengthen the position of the Hungarian conservatives.

Mr. Baker: A sympathetic reaction in Hungary to what is happening in Poland could have an effect on whether the Soviets become involved.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume that the East German forces have the capability to put down an East German uprising.

Mr. Hillenbrand: That is the assumption. However, in 1956 in Hungary the troops went over to the people.

Mr. Nutter: I canʼt see the Polish forces putting down a widespread revolt.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: To do so they will need more troops than they have in the north.

Dr. Kissinger: Letʼs leave aside temporarily the case of suppression of an East German revolt by East German troops. It is really just an extension of the case we have been discussing for Poland. I assume there will be no interruption of Berlin traffic if there is an uprising in East Germany.

Mr. Hillenbrand: Ground traffic might be stopped temporarily for internal security reasons. The East Germans might have to move troops across the Autobahn. But any blockage would not be for the purpose of harassing us.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we have contingency plans for supplying Berlin?

Mr. Hillenbrand: We have short-term stockpiles in Berlin.

Dr. Kissinger: How long would it be before a shortage began to be felt?

Mr. Hillenbrand: With the stockpiles and an airlift, we can go for six months. We could live through any short period of interrupted access without real dislocations in the city. The only problem might be that export orders could not be filled.

Dr. Kissinger: What about the case of Soviet intervention? You mentioned forces in East Germany. Do you mean Soviet forces?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We assume Soviet forces would come from East Germany or the Byelo-Russian Military District.

Dr. Kissinger: How long would it take them to get there?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Szczecin and Silesia are right across the border from East Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: But where are they deployed? (to Moorer) Tom?

Adm. Moorer: If they havenʼt started making preparations now, I think it would take them about ten days to move.

Mr. Irwin: They will have to move more quickly than that.

Adm. Moorer: It all depends on whether they are making preparations now.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we tell whether they are?

Lt. Gen. Cushman: As yet we have no indication they are.

Adm. Moorer: It took all of ten days for them to get ready to move into Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we intensify our watch on Soviet troop movements?

Mr. Karamessines: We have already done so.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume we have better intelligence for Central Europe than for the Soviet Union.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: We will have to analyze the position of each division and its state of readiness.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it that none of this is going to happen this weekend.

Mr. Baker: I donʼt think things will move that fast.

Dr. Kissinger: We need to put together a Working Group with Marty [Hillenbrand] as chairman and with representatives from all of your agencies. The Working Group should work out the details of each of the hypotheses we have discussed and should consider the political implications. You should consider what the effect will be on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and the US. The Group should also take a look at measures the US should take. In the Hungarian and Czech cases there was criticism that had the US made its position clearer, we might have had a greater deterrent effect on what the Soviets did. I am not particularly a partisan of this line of thinking. However, the Working Group should address the question of what the President should do if he wants to take a firm stand right away. The Group should consider not only what he should do, but when he should do it.

(to Hillenbrand) Can you get that put together by Monday [December 21]?

Mr. Hillenbrand: I think we can get a report pretty well assembled by Monday.

Dr. Kissinger: It should be ready at least for an oral presentation.

Mr. Hillenbrand: With regard to the East German situation, there are quadripartitely agreed contingency plans dating from 1961 to cover an East German uprising. The plan is entitled “Western Attitude in the Event of an Uprising in East Germany or East Berlin.”

Dr. Kissinger: What does the plan involve?

Mr. Hillenbrand: The plan basically calls for doing nothing except to exert every effort to welcome refugees. There is to be no action on East German territory.

Dr. Kissinger: Could the West Germans go along with such a policy?

The contingencies that the Working Group should address are: if the riots at the present level die down, if the riots become more extensive and are suppressed by Polish forces, and if the riots become more extensive and lead to Soviet intervention. Then we should also consider the possibility of troubles in East Germany. This might be broken down into three contingencies parallel to those I have listed for Poland.

There is also a question whether the FRG could stand by if a massive revolt took place in East Germany. What impact would that have on West German domestic politics?

Mr. Hillenbrand: That is a separate question.

Dr. Kissinger: Thatʼs right. We donʼt need a contingency plan for that.

Adm. Moorer: If the Poles donʼt put down the riots, the Soviets will have to make preparations before they can move. Soviet action wonʼt be necessary unless the Polish army refuses to suppress the riots. If the Polish troops refuse, they might turn and oppose the Soviets.

Dr. Kissinger: Itʼs possible they might do neither.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: The Polish army could just dissolve.

Dr. Kissinger: The Czech army did neither.

Lt. Gen. Cushman: There were no riots in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If Gomulka canʼt put down the revolt, he will call in the Soviets.

Dr. Kissinger: Can a Polish Government survive if it does that?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Itʼs really a question of whether it can survive one way or the other, unless, of course, it decided on a new leader who could quell the uprising.

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps we ought to restudy our NATO exercise. These events in Poland could make the Soviets more reluctant to move troops outside of East European territory.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If there is Soviet involvement, it will be at Polish request.

Dr. Kissinger: There was no request in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets already have two divisions in Poland. They might act in self-defense.

Dr. Kissinger: I take it for granted that the Soviets will intervene if they see no alternative for preventing the establishment of an unacceptable regime in Poland. I agree with John [Irwin] that they would be reluctant to do so. We can meet again on Monday, [December 21]. We can call your offices to set up a time.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969 and 1970. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. See Document 147.
3. See Document 140.
4. All brackets in the original.
5. For information concerning Kissingerʼs meeting with Pauls, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Document 146.
6. Not found.