124. Memorandum From Arthur Downey of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Cardinal Mindszenty: Press Handling and Transportation
It appears that the Vaticanʼs tug of war with our Guest has reached the concluding stages. This past weekend, the Pope finally sent the Cardinal a personal telegram warmly but firmly informing the Cardinal that he expected to see him in Rome before the September 30 opening of the Synod of Bishops. The Cardinal indicated that he would be prepared to leave on September 28. He was assured that our Ambassador would move his memoirs out of Budapest and hold them for him in our Embassy in Vienna (the memoirs arrived in Vienna on September 23).2
There are two points which now require your attention: the press handling and transportation.
1. Press guidance. State has prepared a telegram containing press guidance, for your approval (Tab A).3 The Vatican and the Hungarian Government have agreed to issue a joint communiqué stating that the Cardinal has “departed definitely” on the basis of an agreement between the Vatican and the Hungarian Government. For our part, State intends no statement until after the joint communiqué, and then will make a statement (no press release) in reply to questions. The statement (paragraph 6 of the telegram at Tab A) points out that the decision to leave was the Cardinalʼs, and that we are pleased that the US was able to assist him during the years.
The guidance contained in the telegram seems unobjectionable. The question remains whether it is desired to have the initial US statement made by the White House, rather than the State Department. I am inclined to think that it should come from here, not State—but of course this question involves domestic considerations.
[Page 292]Recommendation
That you approve the dispatch of the cable at Tab A containing press guidance, but altered to provide that the initial USG statement is made from the White House.
Approve
Disapprove, let State handle it (Cable cleared without change)4
2. Transportation. A series of exchanges have taken place over the question of the mode of transportation for the Cardinal from Budapest to Vienna and on to Rome. The Hungarian Government offered to provide an official aircraft to carry him to Rome, or alternatively to provide him with an entire first class section of a regular Malev flight to Rome. The Cardinal refused. The present planning is that he will travel by car to Vienna.
The Vatican, however, asked us (prior to the Cardinalʼs refusal of the Hungarian plane) if the USG could provide an aircraft, either Budapest/Vienna/Rome, or from Vienna to Rome. Subsequent comments by the Cardinal (with approval by the Vatican representative) indicate that he plans on being driven to Vienna, and then proceeding to Rome by air after a short rest.
The foreign relations impact of a decision to provide an aircraft would not appear to be significant. The Hungarians would probably grant landing permission for a US VIP aircraft under these circumstances. Providing an aircraft, of course, does link us rather closely to the episode and undercuts some of the emphasis on direct Vatican-Hungarian dealings. The question may have a significant domestic impact. And that seems to cut both ways: a warm gesture such as providing an aircraft would be very welcome by large segments domestically; but, others might very well use that as evidence that the US pressured the Cardinal to leave in order that we might improve relations with the Communist Government of Hungary. (Note: I assume you will wish to alert appropriate members of the White House staff to the Cardinalʼs departure so that interested groups (e.g., Heritage Division) might be informed.)
State has proposed a course which appears to strike a mid-ground: (a) advise the Vatican that we would prefer not to provide the aircraft, and to leave the departure details a matter for the Vatican and Hungarian Government; (b) have DOD alert one of its VIP aircraft at Wiesbaden to stand by for possible Budapest/Vienna/Roma or Vienna/Rome flight; and (c) in the event that the Cardinal himself requests USG aircraft and if that appears to be the decisive factor in his on the spot decision to depart, then we should provide it.
[Page 293]Stateʼs proposal is set out in the memorandum at Tab B and a proposed cable containing this instruction at Tab C.5
I am inclined to suggest that we offer the Cardinal an aircraft from Budapest or Vienna to Rome, for the following reasons: (a) it would be a generous and fitting gesture to a man with whom we have been so closely linked for 15 years, (b) if he accepts a flight from Budapest, this would eliminate the risk of public demonstrations (by either the people or the Cardinal) along the road if he were to be driven to Vienna, and (c) our offer just might soften his views of the US, and this Administration, which otherwise might appear rather sharp in his memoirs and public statements. Of course, there is a distinct possibility that he will refuse an aircraft even if we offer it.
Recommendation
That the Cardinal be informed, in consultation with the Vatican representative, that the US would be prepared to provide him with an aircraft if he wishes for the flight from Budapest or Vienna to Rome.6
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 693, Country Files—Europe, Hungary, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action.↩
- Published in English as Memoirs (New York: Macmillan, 1974).↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- Kissinger initialed this option.↩
- Both attached but not printed.↩
- Kissinger initialed the approval option. In telegram 1857 from Budapest, September 28, Puhan reported: “Joszef Cardinal Mindszenty left Embassy Budapest for Rome this morning at 0828.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 693, Country Files—Europe, Hungary, Vol. I)↩