Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976

76. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Jerusalem, May 28, 1974, 12:40–2:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel
• Yitzhak Rabin, Minister of Labor and Prime Minister-Designate
• Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister
• Abba Eban, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense
• Shimon Peres, Minister of Information
• Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States
• Mordechai Gazit, Director, Prime Minister’s Office
• Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Army Chief of Staff
• Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Ephraim Evron, Deputy Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Col. Aryeh Bar-On, Aide to Dayan
• Eli Mizrachi, Assistant Director, Prime Minister’s Office
• Col. Dov Sion
• Lt. General David Leor, Military Assistant to the Prime Minister
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Amb. Kenneth B. Keating, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
• Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
• Amb. Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador at Large and Chief U.S. Delegate to Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East
• Amb. Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
• Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Mr. Carlyle E. Maw, Legal Adviser
• Mr. Harold H. Saunders, NSC Senior Staff
• Amb. Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to Secretary for Press Relations
• Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Secretary Kissinger: The best thing to do is to give you a report chronologically, and what the issues are as they now present themselves.

First, last evening I spent about 5½ hours altogether with him, until about 3:00 in the morning.² It concerned mostly the Palestinians and the lines and the thinning out. On thinning out—you can’t really say “no problem” because that doesn’t exist—but it went roughly along the lines we had discussed.

Then we went into the blue line, and he found four discrepancies in your blue line, from the overlay. I told them there was no cheating, and we both had the same overlay. They just put the overlay over your map and it does show some slight discrepancies. Also it doesn’t show those 500 yards in the Rafid area. That’s one of the four. The other three are just discrepancies produced by the overlay.

Then, on the red line. That produced a horrendous argument. It just wouldn’t stop. He called in his military commanders and they went over the red line and wouldn’t stop either. They seemed to be arguing with Asad. The basic problem is how can they publish in their newspapers something that has a demilitarized zone in Syrian territory.

Then, the two villages: How could those two villages be forward of the red line.

Then there was an hour’s brawl about the Palestinians, and he argued that it was impossible to say anything about the Palestinians. He asked to see me alone, and the others went off with Khaddam to draft the basic documents. I spent two and one half hours with him alone, all designed to get me to sign a private statement that I supported the 1967 borders and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. I went into a stall and explained why the most we could do was a statement of support for Resolution 338—I didn’t mention 242. By that time it was three o’clock in the morning. I met my colleagues who had had a session with Khaddam, who were hung up on every point. There was no issue they weren’t hung up on.

So we decided among ourselves that it was finished. We left it at night that we would meet again with Asad at 9:30 a. m. I was so certain we were finished that I told you we could meet at noon.

He called and said he wanted to meet alone. He explained he had a domestic situation as you did. He had told his military commanders he’d get the salient back. It was impossible for them to say anything about the Palestinians. He said this with some eloquence and some emotion. He said he really wanted an agreement.³

So we started drafting—it’s my best weapon—my departure statement. It was more or less agreed. We were discussing the President’s visit.

Then he said if we really both make an extra effort, could anything be done about the red line? I said I didn’t think so. I didn’t give him that extra kilometer, because I didn’t think it would make any difference.

I did mention, at night, the idea—as my idea—of measuring the distances from the blue line. He said it would help, but not enough.

On the Palestinians, he said he had kept the front quiet in the past and this wasn’t his method of fighting. He couldn’t do it in a statement. I said that after Ma’alot no American could say anything to the Israelis about terrorism. I said the only thing we could do is leave out the references to “hostile” in the first paragraph, and make a U.S. statement—publicly, not secret—that Israel has a right to take measures against terrorists. And we would support it politically, and by other means. I told him, “We don’t have to say you agree to it, but just don’t agitate about it.”

I’m getting the actual protocol typed up so you can see it.

He said he wouldn’t agitate against it. If on the day the agreement is announced, if we could permit the Israeli Government to state the U.S. interpretation of it. I’m not recommending it to you. He only expects me to present it. He said he’d accept this.

He said, “Our basic decision is whether we want to go to war or not. If we do, none of this is going to make any difference.”

I said I wanted to consult my colleagues for a half hour. I said, “You tell me what you must have. Then I want to finish the documents. Then I will take the documents to the Israelis, whatever state they’re in. Tomorrow I will send Sisco, with no authority, with an Israeli answer. If the Israelis agree, we have an agreement. If the Israelis don’t agree, we don’t have an agreement. So we should spend the afternoon finishing the documents so we know what Syria will do—not what it might do—and is prepared to sign provided these various adjustments are made.” He agreed to this procedure.

His first proposal was to split the difference between the October 6 line and the present red line in the part north of those two bulges. Knowing I had your agreement to that one kilometer, I said I didn’t think it was doable. I said some movement west and some “sausages” that would include these two villages. And he would agree I could give you a letter of assurance of his—if the villages were on the hilltops—that no weapons would be there that could fire on a direct line on the settlements, on populated areas. I would get as much movement as possible, plus two fingers to include these two villages.

We then went through the documents. On the basic agreement . . . You would have to read it. I don’t think there is a problem, except the first paragraph which doesn’t include “paramilitary.” But it would go with a public—not secret—assurance. It’s basically the agreement we’ve been working on.

There are a few points left open. They would like to shorten the time of withdrawal, but they left it to me to put in the figure I thought. If you could shave a day or two, it would be good psychology. But Sisco will take it.

He didn’t want to phrase the release of prisoners as if disengagement was conditional on release of prisoners. We found this formula: “The prisoners will be released the morning after the conclusion of the work of the Working Group.” It’s actually less than twenty-four hours. And twenty-four hours after the conclusion of work of the Working Group, disengagement begins. It was 48 hours. We said the major reason for 48 and 24 was so disengagement began afterwards. And he proposed this.

Mrs. Meir: All of them?

Secretary Kissinger: The wounded will be released 24 hours after the signing. If it works out, the signing will be by the 30th. Then by Friday afternoon,⁴ the wounded are released. All the remaining prisoners, including the three captured during subsequent events, would be released the morning after signature of the Working Group agreement.

Mrs. Meir: Including the Lebanese?

Secretary Kissinger: The Lebanese we have to do separately. I didn’t want him to raise again all the Palestinians imprisoned here. He had said he’d give us a list and hasn’t done it yet.

On the Working Group agreement, he wants five days, and will settle for seven. I told him it’s up to him to speed it up. From what I’ve seen, it will take seven months.

Otherwise, I think there are only drafting problems.

Incidentally, they’re very sensitive about the word “initialing”. Can you avoid saying that on the radio? Can we say “agreement has been reached?” They want, I think, to avoid saying they signed something in the capitals. But they’re perfectly happy to say an agreement was reached and will be signed. They’re perfectly happy to initial it.

On the United Nations, they agree to a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.

Mr. Sisco: You remember they had objected to the word “Force;” but they accepted it.

Mrs. Meir: Did they agree to the terms of reference?

Mr. Sisco: I think you’ll find . . .

Mrs. Meir: Now we have UNEF, UNTSO, and UNDOF.

Secretary Kissinger: They wanted to add something about that UNDOF couldn’t operate in the towns and villages, which took an hour and a half to get rid of. They did agree to mobile . . .

Mr. Allon: And the right to defend themselves?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. They agree to 1250.

Ambassador Dinitz: The 50 is for your father!

Secretary Kissinger: Wise guys. I wanted to get 1286, so you would go into a frenzy trying to figure out how I arrived at it.

The UN mandate—there are no policy problems. We’ll leave them with you. If there are any policy problems . . .

Now we come to the most difficult one, limitation of forces.

They agree to have it as a U.S. Proposal.

Incidentally, their treatment of Gromyko was unbelievable. Unbelievable. He was supposed to come at 1:00. Then Asad at midnight switched it to 10:00, on the theory that I would be out by then. I told him I didn’t want the Soviet plane photographed with my plane. And I didn’t want anything to do with him. So they had the Deputy Foreign Minister meet him, and towed his plane way out. And kept him there until my motorcade went. And said Asad won’t see him until Joe has left.

Mrs. Meir: TASS says he’s going at the request of Asad.

Secretary Kissinger: We don’t know what’s true. But he’s said Gromyko asked.

On the military provisions, we have no problem. They’re very good. On the ten-kilometer zone it’s precisely described, and will be inspected by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. One thing I said—if there is any monkeying with the red line, then the twenty kilometers could not be counted from the October 6 line but everything had to be counted from the red line. And that is now in the agreement. Both the ten- and twenty-kilometer zones are counted from the red line in the agreement. The twenty-kilometer zone is accurately described and there will be no 162 mm. artillery, no SAMs, and so on. This is what we agreed to.

They agreed to put into writing that the United States can do aerial inspection of the provisions of the agreement.

Where we get into massive problems—and what cost me three hours—were the civilians on Mount Hermon and the police in the demilitarized zone. They say they cannot accept anything that implies they don’t have jurisdiction over their civilians.

Mrs. Meir: Civilians on Mount Hermon?

Secretary Kissinger: Anything that puts restrictions on what the civilians will do. The maximum they’re willing to say on Mount Hermon is, first, that the UNDOF takes over the Mount Hermon area, and no military observation of any kind can be conducted there, and the UN can inspect it. I said what about a shepherd? He said, if the UN thinks he’s engaged in observation, it’s prohibited.

On the number of police—on the assumption that this document, although secret, will become public—they don’t want restrictions on civilian authority. They’re willing to say “no police except comparable to those in comparable cities and towns in Syria.” They won’t put in the number, but they would give me a number for six months, after which if there are more civilians in Kuneitra, it may have to be adjusted. They said I should give them a number.

So there are four policy issues I can identify . . .

Minister Dayan: Did they accept the character of vehicles?

Secretary Kissinger: No armored cars. Not in writing.

You have no idea how long it took to do all of this.

Minister Dayan: What do you mean we have no idea? It’s 1:30. [Laughter] We all have watches.

Secretary Kissinger: There are four issues: On “paramilitary,” the American public assurance released on the day of the agreement can substitute. Second, what can be done about the red line.

Mrs. Meir: What can be done about the red line after the one kilometer?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I will show you what he asked for, and what might conceivably work. In my view if he got one kilometer and sausages, that would work.

Mrs. Meir: You offered him the one kilometer?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I think the one kilometer and sausages . . . He asked for half the distance, so I think a little more than one kilometer. We should calibrate what can carry it, and I’d give you my best judgment.

Terrorism, the red line, Mount Hermon, and police.

Mrs. Meir: What does he want with civilians on Mount Hermon?

Secretary Kissinger: He doesn’t want civilians on Mount Hermon; he doesn’t want to say the United Nations is the only and exclusive presence on Mount Hermon. That would take Mount Hermon away from Syria. He said, “what is it that worries the Israelis?” I said, “observation from there.” So he said there will be no military observation and the UN can inspect.

So where we are is this: What will gain acceptance is these documents and whatever we can work out.

Mrs. Meir: Is the language on “first step” the same as in the Egyptian agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Minister Eban: Except the “Geneva Conference.”

Secretary Kissinger: I didn’t think we needed that.

Minister Eban: It’s their business to ask for it.

Secretary Kissinger: My view is it’s Gromyko’s strategy to go back to Geneva, to raise the Palestinian issue, to raise the most comprehensive issues. My strategy—of course with your agreement, which we should discuss—is to turn Geneva into a talkfest.

The UN charter and the basic agreement—you make the judgment on “paramilitary”—are in my judgment signable.

We have to discuss the red line.

Minister Dayan: Why did they agree for Kuneitra to be in the demilitarized zone, but in two villages, to have forces there? What is the reasoning?

Secretary Kissinger: The first is, Kuneitra is a new acquisition and that he can explain. The other two villages, he says: It is one thing to lose control from 1967 on, everyone is used to it. Now when the people look at the map, they’ll say he’s given up more territory. He wants some military there. “Sausages” is his word.

Mrs. Meir: What is his concept of military forces in the villages?

Secretary Kissinger: They would be under the 6,000-man ceiling. He did agree not to station weapons in these villages that have a direct line to your settlements.

Mrs. Meir: Are they on the hills?

General Gur: Yes. The trouble is they’re both very close to our positions. Eight hundred yards. Between these villages and our positions. That’s why I don’t think . . .

Secretary Kissinger: He says if you’re worried about observation . . .

General Gur: The observations he can do with civilians.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

[Gur shows on the map.]⁵

General Gur: The last houses to the west are 800 yards from our positions. To make the sausage like that is very complicated.

Secretary Kissinger: My own estimation is this: If we can straighten this a little bit and say this is it, he’ll take it.

General Gur: That’s a political matter.

Secretary Kissinger: I can’t go up there again, and Joe can’t negotiate.

Mr. Sisco: I’m glad.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think it’s in our interest to get into another haggle. We should go up and say this is it.

I’m assuming on the overlay there is no problem.

He also asked for a 1:25,000 map.

General Gur: We have one.

Secretary Kissinger: We also need one of the old kind, but the official map will be 1:25,000.

I think we should check the overlay now. I told them there was no attempt to cheat them.

Mrs. Meir: Especially since they caught on.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think it’s a substantive point. We’re talking about 200 yards here and there.

General Gur: In favor of whom?

Secretary Kissinger: They say it’s all in your favor. Then there were the 500 yards. They’re haggling also for a few hundred meters also on the Mount Hermon red line, saying you’d drawn it where they already are.

Mrs. Meir: Mr. Sisco tomorrow can go to Mount Hermon.

Mr. Sisco: She’s suggesting I go to Hermon.

Mrs. Meir: It’s beautiful.

Secretary Kissinger: This is where we stand. If we change the red line, we can send Sisco up and show it to them. One kilometer here—that’s the minimum we can show them.

Minister Dayan: It may be too late. If there is a question of interpretation of the agreement, can there be an agreement on who is authorized to interpret the agreement?

Mrs. Meir: Interpretation of what?

Minister Dayan: Any paragraph of the agreement. If there are differences of opinion, there used to be in the Armistice Agreements that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission would do it.

Secretary Kissinger: There is no provision in the Egyptian agreement. Seeing these people work, we have this choice. If there is a clause that’s manageable, we can risk it.

My judgment is, if we can give them one of these sausages, the other might go.

On the text of the agreement, I’d under no circumstances, unless it was overwhelmingly important, raise a new paragraph. And they would raise a new paragraph. And Joe can’t negotiate it, or shouldn’t negotiate it. And we’d go on forever.

It seems to me the basic decision is to go ahead.

Let me say, first of all: You’ve gone a long way. If you decide against it, no one on the American side will feel you were unreasonable, so that shouldn’t enter into it. What should enter into it is the basic merits of the consequences of an agreement against the consequences of no agreement, with a country whose basic reliability is uncertain but whose reliability is no more certain without the agreement.

Minister Eban: What is the nature of the American undertaking on terrorism?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States will declare that the first paragraph of the agreement gives Israel the right to take measures in self-defense against irregular attacks across the demarcation line, that if Israel takes such measures, the United States will support Israel. He asked me “militarily?” I said politically, but the U.S. will support Israel. And publicly, because you’ll say it in the Knesset. If this is breached by the fedayeen and Israel retaliates, the United States would feel obliged to veto a resolution in the UN that condemns Israel.

Minister Dayan: You mentioned before that your interpretation of the first clause would include also paramilitary. It’s your interpretation but not his.

Secretary Kissinger: I would say we interpret the first paragraph to mean that it in no way precludes Israel’s right of self-defense against irregular attacks.

Minister Dayan: But you don’t interpret it as binding the Syrians against letting terrorists across but you do interpret it as allowing Israel to fight it. It’s a cease-fire but . . .

Secretary Kissinger: I think it’s in our interest to do something that the Syrians will not do a rejoinder to. We have a promise that the Syrians will not rejoinder.

Mr. Allon: Otherwise it allows the guerrillas to fight and us to fight. That we don’t want.

Minister Eban: If self-defense is legitimate, the thing against which you defend yourself is illegitimate.

Mrs. Meir: There will be some reference to Article 1.

Secretary Kissinger: What we have is what I read to you.

Mr. Allon: This could be read as permission to the guerrillas.

Ambassador Dinitz: You say you don’t consider the Israeli action a violation, but you don’t say you consider the Syrian action a violation of the ceasefire.

Mrs. Meir: The reason we held your lunch up one hour on Sunday⁶ was for Cabinet discussion of this. None of us can change this final position of the Cabinet. So, tomorrow we will have a Cabinet meeting at 9:00.

Secretary Kissinger: Could it be earlier?

Mrs. Meir: Eight-thirty.

Minister Dayan: The question is not when it begins but when it ends!

Secretary Kissinger: We have a concrete problem, which is that Asad promised not to see Gromyko until Sisco has been there—but that won’t hold the whole day.

[They discuss notifying the Cabinet members now of a change in the time of the meeting.]

Secretary Kissinger: Should we reformulate the assurance now? So you’ll have it.

Mrs. Meir: Yes.

Mr. Allon: I wonder if a few sentences excluded from the agreement could be in the American assurance?

Secretary Kissinger: I agree it should be expressed positively.

Minister Eban: There is no need to use euphemisms in the American statement.

Secretary Kissinger: We shouldn’t use “paramilitary” because that caused . . . Can you say “raids by armed groups or individuals across the cease-fire line are violations, and Israeli action in self-defense . . .”?

Minister Eban: The words “self-defense” are terribly important in our context.

Secretary Kissinger: I told him that a private assurance was not enough.

Mrs. Meir: We’ve committed ourselves to the Knesset. They wanted us to bring it before any signing. We refused, because under our law we have the right to negotiate. But between the initialing and signing, we committed ourself. Does he know this?

Secretary Kissinger: He knows this. Your radio has said . . . Can you do anything about the radio?

Mrs. Meir: We can change the red line, the blue line, but not the radio.

Minister Rabin: Not the radio line.

Secretary Kissinger: Can you stop discussing what the issues are? Radio Israel broadcast four times that I went there to discuss the fedayeen issue. This cost us one hour.

Minister Peres: For twenty-four hours we can do something.

Secretary Kissinger: They don’t insist on initialing. They’re willing to make an announcement tomorrow or Wednesday that agreement has been reached and will be signed. I told them you needed a day for the Knesset.

Assuming we can get the red line accepted and get Sisco off, then tomorrow we can have an announcement. How long would the Cabinet take? With Gromyko there.

Mrs. Meir: I’ve cut people off.

Secretary Kissinger: I suggest letting Sisco leave at noon at Ben-Gurion. That means not seeing Asad until 2:30, but that’s all we can do.

Minister Dayan: The BBC says there will be 70,000 going back to Kuneitra.

Secretary Kissinger: He says he wants 20–30,000 there but first he has to send people there to clear the rubble. Seventy-thousand looks very high to me.

Minister Rabin: What is the number of policemen there?

Secretary Kissinger: I have to give him a figure. When I said 75, they had a heart attack.

Mr. Allon: A positive result anyway.

Secretary Kissinger: They said they’d accept the same number you had in Tiberias.

Minister Dayan: And the same class too.

Mrs. Meir: Unless they sleep in the street, he can’t bring 25,000 people into Kuneitra.

Secretary Kissinger: He’s expected some figure other than 75. I don’t think 25 more or less, or 50 more or less, will determine the fate of this agreement. If he goes to war, he won’t do it with policemen. Please be a little generous, since he invited me to give the figure.

I’ll give Dinitz the American resolution.

Ambassador Dinitz: We need the documents, the points.

Secretary Kissinger: If you think these documents aren’t satisfactory, you can reject them. But these are the best that could be achieved. No one who hasn’t experienced it knows what it’s like. To the extent that the defects can be solved by American assurances, assume they can be done.

Minister Dayan: The definition of what they want on Mount Hermon.

Secretary Kissinger: “No military observation of any kind will be permitted.” “Of any kind.”

Mr. Allon: And the UN will determine.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Minister Dayan: What is demilitarization?

Mr. Sisco: There is a sentence, that also refers to Mount Hermon.

Secretary Kissinger: “The area of separation between line A and line B will be demilitarized.” Then there is a separate paragraph which reads, “The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force will take over the positions in the Mount Hermon area. No military observation . . .”

Minister Dayan: Observation and personnel.

Secretary Kissinger: No observation of any kind, not just military personnel. They wanted “no military observation posts.” We rejected that. It doesn’t say by whom. It’s the best we could get. On Mount Hermon their normal frenzy is heightened.

May I suggest my feel for what they want on the red line.

[They get up and look at the maps.]

Since he made a number of these points in front of his military commanders, whether he wins or loses has some significance.

If you can shave anything here, two hundred yards.

He claims his forces are 300 yards from the peak; that you’re cheating him, and he says to write into the agreement that the UN will determine the red line by military positions. I didn’t accept that because it would start the damnedest brawl on top of Mount Hermon.

Mrs. Meir: It’s a dangerous place!

Secretary Kissinger: Shave a few hundred yards here.

Mrs. Meir: Did you ever see the 1947 map with the kissing points?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mrs. Meir: Three people were killed there yesterday.

Secretary Kissinger: It will certainly stop with the signing.

I can send a message. But I’m not going there again.

Mrs. Meir: But it is possible that the Cabinet will not accept the sausage.

Mr. Allon: It’s not Kosher.

Secretary Kissinger: Then it may fail.

Mrs. Meir: But can I say to the Cabinet—what drives people mad is, we are on the way to Geneva, and with the shooting going on.

Mr. Allon: While debating in the Cabinet, with the shooting going on.

Secretary Kissinger: Please give Sisco a minimum of messages. I believe it will probably be agreeable. I didn’t mention it today. I’ll have Sisco mention it tomorrow. It is a reasonable proposal.

Mr. Gazit: It’s what the Egyptians did.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s the worst possible argument.

Minister Peres: In the American declaration, will it say “military and paramilitary?”

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t think we should use the word “paramilitary.”

Minister Eban: I think “paramilitary” is bad.

Minister Peres: What do you have?

:s100/98 Secretary Kissinger: “Crossing by armed groups or individuals . . .”

Minister Peres: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that is the way it should be phrased. It shouldn’t mention fedayeen or paramilitary. Use Aubrey’s phrase.

Minister Eban: “Crossing by armed groups or individuals.” “Crossings and armed attacks.”

Secretary Kissinger: “Armed attacks across the demarcation line by groups or individuals.” For whatever it’s worth, this one kilometer will not do it on the red line. A little more than that one kilometer, and if at all possible, a very thin sausage.

[Sisco and Kissinger show the overlay and blue line to Gur.]

Secretary Kissinger: On their map it didn’t touch the old blue line.

General Gur: They’re right.

Secretary Kissinger: What should we say to the press? At Damascus I said President Asad and I discussed all aspects of disengagement and I would send Sisco back to Damascus.

Minister Rabin: You didn’t say the specific issues.

Secretary Kissinger: On the plane, on background, I did say that the thinning out and the UN are essentially settled—which is true—but I gave no figures.

Minister Peres: That is a problem, because they’ll speculate.

Minister Rabin: Let them speculate.

Mrs. Meir: The Secretary brought us considerations from Damascus, the Cabinet will meet tomorrow for a final decision, and we will give you an answer.

Secretary Kissinger: I did say that some drafts exist with disagreed points.

Minister Peres: That is a problem. Because our press will speculate on the Palestinian issue. Here we must deviate.

Secretary Kissinger: Can’t you have your press shut up about the Palestinian issue for 24 hours?

Minister Peres: I can try and ask them to not speculate about the Palestinian issue.

[The meeting then ended.]

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 8, Nodis Memcons, May 1974, Folder 10. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at the Prime Minister’s office and took place on May 28, not May 27–28 as indicated on the original. Brackets are in the original. Meir and members of the Israeli negotiating team also met with Kissinger on May 28 from 2 until 4 p.m. at the Prime Minister’s office after the Israeli Cabinet met and agreed to the text of the agreement with the same minor modifications. However, the Israeli cabinet wanted Kissinger to get an assurance from Asad that Syria would not allow paramilitary groups to operate in Syrian territory and attack Israel. Kissinger agreed to raise the issue with Asad that evening. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.)
2. See Document 74.
3. See Document 75.
4. May 31.
5. The map is not attached, but a final status map is printed in Appendix B, map 2.
6. May 26.